Elís Miller

This paper develops an account of omissions as epistemically significant features of cognition. Drawing on a functionalist framework inspired by Fodor and recent theories of attention, I argue that inattention and omissions are not mere absences but structured elements with mental architecture that determine which representations become epistemically operative. Through the case of an inattentive driver who overlooks a cyclist, I show how omissions can shape what counts as evidence in both individual and social contexts. Empirical research on inattentional blindness and social salience supports the view that unconscious attentional processes contour the scope of epistemic justification. Inattention can produce epistemically diminished outcomes by constraining access to relevant information. I conclude that an epistemology of attention must also be an epistemology of inattention.

In this paper, we examine how increasing understanding and explicit awareness of social consciousness can develop through transformations in worldview. Based on a model that emerged from a series of qualitative and quantitative studies on worldview transformation, we identify five developmental levels of social consciousness: embedded, self-reflexive, engaged, collaborative, and resonant. As a person's worldview transforms, awareness can expand to include each of these levels, leading to enhanced prosocial experiences and behaviours. Increased social consciousness can in turn stimulate further transformations in worldview. We then consider an educational curriculum to facilitate the understanding of worldview and the cultivation of social consciousness as core capacities for twenty-first century students and global citizens.