Elisabeth Pacherie

Much recent work elucidates different types of representational format, and ways that aspects of perception and cognition may be formatted. Our paper targets an underexplored topic: the format of motor representations, the psychological states that serve as the primary causal link between an agent’s immediate intention to act and their subsequent behaviour. In Sect. 2, we situate motor representations within the context of processes of motor planning and motor control. In Sect. 3, we discuss key differences between symbolic and analog representational format types. In Sect. 4, we argue that there is evidence indicating that motor representations show a core marker of analog formatting. In Sect. 5, we argue that motor representations show core markers of symbolic formatting. In Sect. 6, we characterize motor representations as an interesting form of hybrid representation. In a slogan, motor representation is a symbolic scheme that utilizes analog representations as cognitive tools. We then highlight several open questions this characterization raises and note how it may impact a range of philosophical debates, such as those pertaining to the relationship between propositional knowledge and skilled action guidance, the interface problem, and the issue of how to draw boundaries between central cognition and the motoric.

Agnes Moors’ claim that the processes underlying emotional behavior and those driving non-emotional instrumental behavior are predominantly goal-directed leads her to the eliminativist conclusion that there is no solid mechanistic distinction between emotional and non-emotional episodes—and, thus, that emotions do not qualify as scientifically fruitful concepts. Here, I introduce a distinction between two types of goal-directed processes and discuss the sense of value that I consider relevant to emotional goals. On that basis, I reexamine whether the path to eliminativism is actually unescapable.

Much recent work elucidates different types of representational format, and ways that aspects of perception and cognition may be formatted. Our paper targets an underexplored topic: the format of motor representations, the psychological states that serve as the primary causal link between an agent’s immediate intention to act and their subsequent behaviour. In section 2, we situate motor representations within the context of processes of motor planning and motor control. In section 3, we discuss key differences between symbolic and analog representational format types. In section 4, we argue that there is evidence indicating that motor representations show a core marker of analog formatting. In section 5, we argue that motor representations show core markers of symbolic formatting. In section 6, we characterize motor representations as an interesting form of hybrid representation. In a slogan, motor representation is a symbolic scheme that utilizes analog representations as cognitive tools. We then highlight several open questions this characterization raises and note how it may impact a range of philosophical debates, such as those pertaining to the relationship between propositional knowledge and skilled action guidance, the interface problem, and the issue of how to draw boundaries between central cognition and the motoric.

I concur with Dan Zahavi that research focused on small-scale joint agency is not a promising starting point for a general theory of collective intentionality. Zahavi argues that insights drawn from classical phenomenological analysis can help us define a more comprehensive framework. In this commentary, I consider a complementary source of insights coming from work on social cognition in the cognitive sciences. Their focus on small-scale joint actions and on the elucidation of the notion of collective intention leads classical accounts of joint action to underestimate both the role played by a host of lower-level cognitive abilities and the role played by external social coordination devices in the success of joint action. I argue that this double neglect of the cognitive infrastructures of joint agency and of its social superstructures is a major impediment to the development of a general account of collective intentionality and of the diversity of its forms. In particular, I propose that small-scale, face-to-face interactions and larger scale, more impersonal forms of collective intentionality tend to rely on different sets of psychological processes and capacities, but that, ultimately, both may have the same motivational basis, the need to belong as a basic human need.

To what extent are the cognitive processes underlying human subjective experiences, thoughts, and behaviors shaped by socio-cultural norms and values, or conversely, impervious to socio-normative influences? To explore this question, I use delusions of control as a case study. Delusions of control present two apparent paradoxes, the resolution of which may illuminate the interplay between processes permeable to socio-cultural norms and those that are not. The first is the agency attribution paradox: individuals with delusions of control exhibit both under- and over-attribution of self-agency. The second is the paradox of double social standards: delusions of control simultaneously demonstrate permeability to socio-cultural influences and imperviousness to intersubjective evidence. I argue that a version of the predictive processing theory of the sense of agency, as proposed by Leptourgos and Corlett (2020, _Frontiers in Big Data_, _3_, 27), may help resolve the agency attribution paradox and clarify some limits of socio-normative penetrability in cognitive processes. Furthermore, I suggest that the paradox of double social standards may be partly explained by metacognitive impairments and abnormally strong metacognitive feelings of confidence attached to delusional beliefs. These factors may account for both the significant role of socio-cultural priors in shaping delusional content and the resistance of delusions to change, even in the face of corrective social influences.

It is generally agreed that there is a distinction between two kinds of representations of space and time. Perspectival or egocentric representations are viewpoint-dependent in the sense that the way spatial and temporal positions and relations are represented is relative to one's own position in space or time. In contrast, objective representations are independent of one's position in space or time and thus viewpoint-invariant. For instance, I may represent event A as past or as more past than event B (perspectival representations of temporal position and temporal relation, respectively) or I may represent event A as occurring on September 11, 2001 and as earlier then event B (objective representations of temporal location and temporal relation, respectively). And similarly for spatial positions and relations. One contentious issue, however, is whether perspectival and objective representations are independent or whether representations of one kind are constructed, at least in part, from representations of the other kind. One further issue is whether the analogy between space and time is strong enough that the answer given to the previous question in the case of space, say, should also hold for time, or vice-versa. The notion of dependence can be understood in several ways and the dependence or independence claims can be given stronger and weaker readings. I try to disentangle these various readings and to sketch their relations. I also offer detailed characterizations of the distinction between egocentric and objective representations, first in the case of space and then in the case of time. I examine how the different versions of the dependence/independence claims fare with respect to time and to space. I argue that for two of these claims the analogy between space and time breaks down. I propose that the reasons why the analogy is disrupted have to do with certain fundamental differences in the way we egocentrically apprehend temporal and spatial properties.

We often effortlessly take the perceptual perspective of others: we represent some aspect of the environment that others currently perceive. However, taking someone's perspective can interfere with one's perceptual processing: another person's gaze can spontaneously affect our ability to detect stimuli in a scene. But it is still unclear whether our cognitive evaluation of those judgements is also affected. In this study, we investigated whether social perspective-taking can influence participants' metacognitive judgements about their perceptual responses. Participants performed a contrast detection task with a task-irrelevant avatar oriented either congruently or incongruently to the stimulus location. By “blindfolding” the avatar, we tested the influence of social perspective-taking versus domain-general directional orienting. Participants had higher accuracy and perceptual sensitivity with a congruent avatar regardless of the blindfold, suggesting a directional cueing effect. However, their metacognitive efficiency was modulated only by the congruency of a seeing avatar. These results suggest that perceptual metacognitive ability can be socially enhanced by sharing perception of the same objects with others.

I will concentrate on the 'executive' conception of intentions and intentional actions. I will argue that intentional bodily movements have distinctive observable characteristics that set them apart from non-intentional bodily motions. I will also argue that that when we observe an action performed by someone else, the perceptual representations we form contain information about the dynamics of movements and their relations to objects in the scene that can be exploited in order to identify at least the more basic intentions of the agent. In the final part of the paper, I will offer some suggestions as to how this capacity to perceive the actions of other agents as intentional relates to our capacity to recognize our own actions as intentional.

Actions unfold in time, and so do experiences of agency. Yet, despite the recent surge of interest in the sense of agency among both philosophers and cognitive scientists, the import of the fact that agentive experiences unfold in time remains to this day largely underappreciated. This chapter argues that agentive experiences should be conceptualized as continuants, whose contents evolve as actions unfold. It attempts to characterize these content shifts, distinguishing two main dimensions of change—changes in scale, or fine-grainedness, and changes in tense—as well as the main action control and action specification processes that underlie them. The chapter further argues that taking into account this temporal dynamics of agentive experiences can help researchers better appreciate in what sense some of the apparently conflicting empirical models of the sense of agency proposed in recent years can be seen as complementary, rather than as rival, thus refining integrative models.

In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different forms of intentions. I also hope to show that one further benefit of this approach is to open the way for a more perspicuous account of the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action

Research on collective emotion spans social sciences, psychology and philosophy. There are detailed case studies and diverse theories of collective emotion. However, experimental evidence regarding the universal characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. Moreover, current research mainly relies on emotion self-reports, accounting for the subjective experience of collective emotion and ignoring their cognitive and physiological bases. In response to these challenges, we argue for experimental research on collective emotion. We start with an overview of theoretical frameworks to identify a set of three characteristics of collective emotion. Based on research in cognitive and affective sciences, we then examine the corresponding candidate mechanisms. Finally, we highlight outstanding questions, review experimental evidence, and suggest ideas for future experimental research.

To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attribution and maintenance of commitments. Second, we argue that commitments require affective states such as social motivations or shared emotions. Finally, we conclude by assessing three possible proposals for how social robotics could implement an architecture of commitments by taking such an affective components into consideration.

In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor attempts to reconcile the idea that psychological laws are characteristically intentional with the idea that their implementation is typically computational. In order to do so, Fodor must show that narrow contents are superfluous for the purposes of psychological explanation and that Frege cases are rare and constitute unsystematic exceptions. The paper contends that the argument Fodor offers in order to establish his claim is flawed. It argues that the principle of informational equilibrium the argument is based on rests on an utterly implausible conception of the rationality of action

I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1.

The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how commitments may contribute to make acting jointly emotionally rewarding, both by improving coordination and by inducing or reinforcing the circumstances under which shared emotions emerge among co-agents.

The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article proposes some perspectives borrowed from psychology and philosophy showing the key role of communication in human interactions. From mutual recognition between individuals to the expression of commitment and social expectations, we argue that communicative cues can facilitate coordination, prediction, and motivation in the context of joint action. The description of several notions thus suggests that some communicative capacities can be implemented in the context of joint action for HRI, leading to an integrated perspective of robotic communication.

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model.

One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us to act in opposing ways. In contrast, on an executive construal of self-control, the emphasis is not on overcoming temptation, but on overriding or inhibiting “cold” automatically triggered routines and habits that are at odds with what we intend to do. Our general aim in this chapter is to contribute to the development of an overarching theory of self-control by exploring ways in which these two apparently competing frameworks can be reconciled. We propose that self-control is best understood as a hybrid set of skills. We draw on recent work on expert motor skill to highlight important ways in which experts differ from novices in the capacities they deploy and the ways in which they deploy them. We consider analogies (and disanalogies) between the domain of sports expertise and the domain of self-control. We end by considering how such a hybrid approach can help us reconcile a motivational and an executive approach to self-control.

The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant development of metacontrol processes that can be used to shape and balance it.