•  10
    Editorial: “Skilled Action Control”
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3): 469-480. 2021.
  •  38
    The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant developme…Read more
  •  1
    Commitments in Human-Robot Interaction
    with Víctor Fernandez Castro, Aurélie Clodic, and Rachid Alami
    AI-HRI 2019 Proceedings. 2019.
    An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to successfully perform a joint action, the participants must be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should endow robots with similar competences for commitment management in order to achieve the objective of performing joint tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we examine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These approaches, we argue, emphasize diffe…Read more
  • Key Elements for Human-Robot Joint Action
    with Raja Chatila, Rachid Alami, and Aurélie Clodic
    In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Springer. 2017.
  •  4
    Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong
    with Víctor Fernández Castro
    Synthese 198 (8): 7597-7626. 2020.
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this …Read more
  •  43
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this …Read more
  •  12
    Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action
    with Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, and Valérian Chambon
    Cognition 195 104117. 2020.
  •  19
    The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action
    with Ouriel Grynszpan, Aïsha Sahaï, Nasmeh Hamidi, Bruno Berberian, Lucas Roche, and Ludovic Saint-Bauzel
    Consciousness and Cognition 75 102820. 2019.
  •  30
    Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model
    with Jean-Rémy Martin
    Psychological Review 126 (1): 133-152. 2019.
  •  25
    Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents
    with Aïsha Sahaï, Andrea Desantis, Ouriel Grynszpan, and Bruno Berberian
    Consciousness and Cognition 67 44-55. 2019.
  •  25
    Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning: How Different Are They?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6): 585-593. 2018.
    In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks.
  •  350
    Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1-11. 2004.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framew…Read more
  •  33
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which …Read more
  •  323
    The content of intentions
    Mind and Language 15 (4): 400-432. 2000.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its …Read more
  •  106
    Too much ado about belief
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
  •  326
    Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?
    with Melissa Green and Tim Bayne
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3): 566-577. 2006.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Co…Read more
  •  305
    In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions
    with Timothy J. Bayne
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 163-88. 2005.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that th…Read more
  •  171
    Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite
    Synthese 190 (10): 1817-1839. 2013.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s …Read more
  •  33
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves pr…Read more
  •  9
    James Russell claims that executive difficulties in both autism and schizophrenia are likely to be due to impairments of action monitoring at "a fairly high level". I argue that there is room for some 'intermediate' level of action-monitoring in between the higher and lower levels he distinguishes and that impairments at this intermediate level may play an important role in explaining some of the difficulties encountered by both schizophrenic patients and subjects with autism.
  •  283
    The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13. 2007.
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of a…Read more
  •  13
    Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Mind and Language 19 (2): 113-146. 2004.
  •  6
    Reply to John Campbell
    In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--255. 2002.
  •  28
    The phenomenology of controlling a moving object with another person
    with John A. Dewey and Guenther Knoblich
    Cognition 132 (3): 383-397. 2014.
  •  70
    Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 299-317. 2002.
    The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the d…Read more
  •  4
    Isteering COMMITTEE I
    Dialectica 50 (4). 1996.
  •  212
    Do we see with microscopes?
    The Monist 78 (2): 171-188. 1995.
    Trying to understand better the role played by epistemic artifacts in our quest for reliable knowledge, it is interesting to compare their contribution with the one made by the epistemic organs or systems with which we are naturally endowed. This comparative approach may yield the further benefit of an improved understanding of the nature and epistemic functions of our natural epistemic equipment. In this paper, I shall concern myself with comparing the role of a family of instruments, microscop…Read more