Addresses what fictional realism is, including abstract versions (via the example of van Inwagen 1983) and concrete versions (via the example of Lewis 1978). Argues against fictional anti-realism, primarily referring to fictionalism but also Meinongian theory. Addresses the significant critique of fictional realism that is independent of other theories, namely the indeterminacy of identicality among fictional characters, but by a different method than has been commonly referred to. With brief re…
Read moreAddresses what fictional realism is, including abstract versions (via the example of van Inwagen 1983) and concrete versions (via the example of Lewis 1978). Argues against fictional anti-realism, primarily referring to fictionalism but also Meinongian theory. Addresses the significant critique of fictional realism that is independent of other theories, namely the indeterminacy of identicality among fictional characters, but by a different method than has been commonly referred to. With brief reference to Barthes 1968, the common method is rejected. The alternative is consistently alluded to throughout the text, with only a scant attempt at a complete articulation being made by the end of the text, for reasons that also have meta-philosophical consequences that are remarked on. The article includes several typographical errors and leaves many topics under-addressed.
