Elizabeth Finneron-Burns

_Philosophy for AS and A2 _is the definitive textbook for students of Advanced Subsidiary or Advanced Level philosophy courses, structured directly around the specification of the AQA. Following a lively foreword by Nigel Warburton, author of _Philosophy: The Basics_, a team of experienced teachers devote a chapter each to the six themes covered by the syllabus: Each of the chapters include helpful student-friendly features. a list of key concepts, to introduce students to the topic bite-size sections corresponding to the syllabus topics actual exam questions from previous years suggested discussion questions to promote debate text-boxes with helpful summaries, case-studies and examples an annotated further-reading list directing students towards the best articles, books and websites a comprehensive glossary, providing a handy reference point There is a final chapter on essay writing and exam preparation, designed to help students get to grips with the examination board requirements. _Philosophy for AS and A2_ is written by a team of expert teachers based at Heythrop College - part of the University of London - which specializes in teaching philosophy and theology.

Relational egalitarians sometimes argue that a degree of distributive equality is necessary for social equality to obtain among members of society. In this paper, we consider how such arguments fare when extended to the intergenerational case. In particular, we examine whether relational reasons for distributive equality apply between non-overlapping generations. We claim that they do not. We begin by arguing that the most common reasons relational egalitarians offer in favour of distributive equality between contemporaries do not give us reasons to object to distributive inequality between non-overlapping generations. This argument by itself however will not fully suffice to show that there are no relational reasons to care about intergenerational distributive equality, given the nature of relational equality and its requirements in the intergenerational case are likely to be qualitatively different than in the contemporary case. Therefore, we also make the positive argument that for the intergenerational case to satisfy the requirements demanded by the ideal of relational equality it suffices that future persons’ interests are meaningfully incorporated and protected in the decision-making of preceding generations, and there is no basis for a concern with distributive equality. While some have argued that the one-way and asymmetrical causal influence between non-overlapping generations means concerns of social equality are inapplicable in the intergenerational case, we argue that the ongoing nature of this influence makes concerns of social equality appropriate. If successful, the upshot of the argument is that it can be coherent to maintain a commitment to relational equality between non-overlapping generations, all while remaining agnostic about distributive equality between them.

The aim of the book is twofold: (1) To develop a comprehensive, contractualist theory of intergenerational ethics; (2) To argue that contractualism's ability to be that comprehensive theory of intergenerational ethics contributes to its plausibility as a moral theory in general. The book's core claim is that contractualism provides us with a comprehensive theory of intergenerational ethics that justifies including future people in the scope of what we owe to each other and tells us how much we owe them. It begins by arguing that contractualism is not susceptible to the non-identity problem and so we must consider what future people could reasonably reject. It then argues that contractualism endorses 'reason-balanced sufficientarianism' and develops a series of moral principles guiding our behaviour towards future generations in terms of resource distribution, procreative decisions, optimal population size, and risk imposition. It concludes by applying these general principles to concrete, real-world individual and policy decisions and considering how the principles can and do interact with each other.

In her recent paper ‘The Epistemology of Propaganda’ Rachel McKinnon discusses what she refers to as ‘TERF propaganda’. We take issue with three points in her paper. The first is her rejection of the claim that ‘TERF’ is a misogynistic slur. The second is the examples she presents as commitments of so-called ‘TERFs’, in order to establish that radical (and gender critical) feminists rely on a flawed ideology. The third is her claim that standpoint epistemology can be used to establish that such feminists are wrong to worry about a threat of male violence in relation to trans women. In Section 1 we argue that ‘TERF’ is not a merely descriptive term; that to the extent that McKinnon offers considerations in support of the claim that ‘TERF’ is not a slur, these considerations fail; and that ‘TERF’ is a slur according to several prominent accounts in the contemporary literature. In Section 2, we argue that McKinnon misrepresents the position of gender critical feminists, and in doing so fails to establish the claim that the ideology behind these positions is flawed. In Section 3 we argue that McKinnon’s criticism of Stanley fails, and one implication of this is that those she characterizes as ‘positively privileged’ cannot rely on the standpoint-relative knowledge of those she characterizes as ‘negatively privileged’. We also emphasize in this section McKinnon’s failure to understand and account for multiple axes of oppression, of which the cis/trans axis is only one.