Elizabeth Regnerus Minyard

I argue that moral learners, most typically children, flourish in their particular life stage when they acquire the natural virtues. The natural virtues are habits which are up to the learner and capture when they act well in respect to the reasons available to them and the capacities they have developed. Furthermore, these habits are the means by which the learner becomes practically wise and morally mature. However, some of these habits which are flourishing conducive for the learner are not so for the mature individual. Thus, I argue that there exists a class of natural virtues which effect key moral developmental processes but ultimately disappear.

Although in contemporary parlance the concept of shame is itself stigmatized, the idea that shame is instrumental in bringing about moral progress is ancient. But in the moral psychology literature, shame is generally not viewed so positively. The implication of some of this empirical evidence could be that if shame is involved in moral development at all, its effects are likely to only cause harm and the learner should attempt to diminish its influence. The gap between this version of shame in the empirical psychology literature and that discussed in Aristotelian scholarship is quite wide, but I argue that the theoretical framework of the developmental natural virtues closes it. Rather than being a non-starter for moral growth, the emotion of shame can be directed and when the individual does this well on a habitual basis, we can credit her with natural virtue. To argue for this, I first define shame and guilt and discuss psychological evidence about these emotions. I argue that the empirical evidence shows that while shame can lead to withdrawal, it can also motivate restorative behavior and a resolve to self-improve. Furthermore, shame fundamentally is concerned with restoration of a positive self-concept. So, instead of regarding shame as guilt’s “ugly step-sister,” shame’s positive role in motivating approach behaviors ought to be acknowledged. If the individual is capable of channeling these aversive feelings into motivation to improve her character, shame becomes an essential ally in becoming morally good. This is because naturally virtuous shame facilitates the move from acting well due to external enforcement to a deeper and more independent source of motivation—self-enforcement. Such development of the self-evaluative capacity contributes to the formation of practical wisdom and is necessary for virtue development. To achieve such an end, the individual must of course respond to shame in a particular way and then resolve and move beyond the negative feelings, which I argue can be achieved through the process of self-forgiveness.

I examine whether patients can inculcate the virtue of courage through the practice of assisted suicide. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’ account of courage, adapted to include all kinds of death, understood as the spiritual battle of the soul—a concept developed in the late medieval ars moriendi tradition. Applying this account to assisted suicide, I find that the practice does not stimulate courage in the agent. To die with dignity and autonomy, patients must embrace the battle rather than cede to suicide. In this way, they demonstrate the marks of the courageous man and pursue a noble end.