Ella Zhang

Feminist metaphysics is widely held to differ methodologically from mainstream metaphysics in a way that renders it epistemically suspect: its theory choice involves moral and political values, whereas mainstream metaphysics aims at political neutrality. I argue that this characterization misrepresents the epistemic standing of theory choice in feminist metaphysics. I show that feminist-informed adequacy (FIA)—the theoretical virtue paradigmatically deployed in feminist metaphysics—has a justificatory status analogous to that of simplicity in mainstream metaphysics: both are deployed in good faith by theorists, and both are serious candidates for epistemic virtue. The assumed methodological asymmetry between the two strands of metaphysics reflects an unprincipled double standard, not a genuine difference in their epistemic practice. The demand that feminist metaphysicians provide a higher level of justification for FIA than mainstream metaphysicians do for simplicity relies on the presupposition that moral and political concerns are uniquely epistemically disqualifying. Feminist epistemology and standpoint theory put pressure on this presupposition, and it is the critic who bears the burden of providing independent justification for it.