Ellie Ripley

At first glance, orthodox paracompletists and dialetheists seem to have trouble expressing disagreement with an assertion of A: their distinctive theories of negation mean that asserting ~ A won't work. The standard solution to this trouble is to appeal to a separate speech act of denial. This chapter argues that such an approach faces deeper problems than are usually acknowledged. On pain of unsolvable paradox, there had better not be any connective D in the language that embeds denial-that is, such that asserting DA is equivalent to denying A. But the friend of the standard solution needs just such a connective for several reasons. The chapter considers several replies and concludes with a proposal that all parties, including paracompletists and dialetheists, keep negation, denial, and disagreement linked closely together.

The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare the two approaches and examine three specific consequence relations in relation to those, which we call:strict-to-tolerantentailment,pragmatic-to-tolerantentailment, andpragmatic-to-pragmaticentailment. The first two are nontransitive, whereas the latter two are nonmonotonic.

This paper explores the relations between two logical approaches to vagueness: on the one hand the fuzzy approach defended by Smith (Vagueness and degrees of truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), and on the other the strict-tolerant approach defended by Cobreros et al. (“Tolerant, Classical, Strict”, J Philos Logic 41(2):347–385, 2012). Although the former approach uses continuum many values and the latter implicitly four, we show that both approaches can be subsumed under a common three-valued framework. In particular, we defend the claim that Smith’s continuum many values are not needed to solve what Smith calls ‘the jolt problem’, and we show that they are not needed for his account of logical consequence either. Not only are three values enough to satisfy Smith’s central desiderata, but they also allow us to internalize Smith’s closeness principle in the form of a tolerance principle at the object-language. The reduction, we argue, matters for the justification of many-valuedness in an adequate theory of vague language.

In a previous paper (see ‘Tolerant, Classical, Strict’, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can use these notions of satisfaction to define mixed consequence relations that capture non-transitive tolerant reasoning. Although we gave some empirical motivation for the use of strict and tolerant extensions, making use of them commits us to the view that sentences of the form ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${p {\vee} {\neg} p}$$\end{document}’ and ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${p {\wedge} {\neg} p}$$\end{document}’ are not automatically valid or unsatisfiable, respectively. Some philosophers might take this commitment as a negative outcome of our previous proposal. We think, however, that the general ideas underlying our previous approach to vagueness can be implemented in a variety of ways. This paper explores the possibility of defining mixed notions of consequence in the more classical super/sub-valuationist setting and examines to what extent any of these notions captures non-transitive tolerant reasoning.

Recent experiments have shown that naive speakers find borderline contradictions involving vague predicates acceptable. In Cobreros et al. we proposed a pragmatic explanation of the acceptability of borderline contradictions, building on a three-valued semantics. In a reply, Alxatib et al. show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong interpretations for some examples involving disjunction, and propose as a remedy a semantic analysis instead, based on fuzzy logic. In this paper we provide an explicit global pragmatic interpretation rule, based on a somewhat richer semantics, and show that with its help the problem can be overcome in pragmatics after all. Furthermore, we use this pragmatic interpretation rule to define a new consequence-relation and discuss some of its properties.

We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set X of premises whenever, if all the premises of X hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisite of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.

In a recent paper, Barrio, Tajer and Rosenblatt establish a correspondence between metainferences holding in the strict-tolerant logic of transparent truth ST+ and inferences holding in the logic of paradox LP+. They argue that LP+ is ST+’s external logic and they question whether ST+’s solution to the semantic paradoxes is fundamentally different from LP+’s. Here we establish that by parity of reasoning, ST+ can be related to LP+’s dual logic K3+. We clarify the distinction between internal and external logic and argue that while ST+’s nonclassicality can be granted, its self-dual character does not tie it to LP+ more closely than to K3+.

The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare the two approaches and examine three specific consequence relations in relation to those, which we call: strict-to-tolerant entailment, pragmatic-to-tolerant entailment, and pragmatic-to-pragmatic entailment. The first two are nontransitive, whereas the latter two are nonmonotonic.

In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases.

The target of Vincent’s paper is what she calls the ‘Incongruence Thesis’: the idea that trans people’s experienced gender is incongruent with the sex they were assigned at birth, which she takes to be the basis for contemporary health organisations’ support for ‘transgender medical interventions’. We share the reservations voiced by many of the invited respondents about Vincent’s critique of the Incongruence Thesis. Our focus, however, is elsewhere. In section 7.2, Vincent endorses requiring psychotherapy before accessing transgender medical interventions. We argue against such a requirement.

One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley–Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.

This chapter attempts to give a brief overview of nonclassical (-logic) theories of truth. Due to space limitations, we follow a victory-through-sacrifice policy: sacrifice details in exchange for clarity of big-picture ideas. This policy results in our giving all-too-brief treatment to certain topics that have dominated discussion in the non-classical-logic area of truth studies. (This is particularly so of the ‘suitable conditoinal’ issue: §4.3.) Still, we present enough representative ideas that one may fruitfully turn from this essay to the more-detailed cited works for further study. Throughout – again, due to space – we focus only on the most central motivation for standard non-classical-logic-based truth theories: namely, truth-theoretic paradox (specifically, due to space, the liar paradox).

Neil Tennant’s core logic is a type of bilateralist natural deduction system based on proofs and refutations. We present a proof system for propositional core logic, explain its connections to bilateralism, and explore the possibility of using it as a type theory, in the same kind of way intuitionistic logic is often used as a type theory. Our proof system is not Tennant’s own, but it is very closely related, and determines the same consequence relation. The difference, however, matters for our purposes, and we discuss this. We then turn to the question of strong normalization, showing that although Tennant’s proof system for core logic is not strongly normalizing, our modified system is.

This chapter explores the intersection of experimental philosophy and philosophical logic. It considers a distinction between pure and applied logic. It sketches some ways in which experimental results and empirical results more broadly, can inform and have informed debates within philosophical logic. The chapter lays out a way of looking at the situation that makes plain at least one way in which people should expect experimental and logical concerns to overlap. It turns to the phenomenon of vagueness, where people can see this overlap explored and developed from multiple angles, showing just how intimately related experiment and logic can be. Logic is not only useful for exploring hypotheses about truth conditions and entailments but also for exploring hypotheses about reasoning. Logical and experiment can fruitfully interact in a variety of applications, and that is all people need for experimental philosophical logic to be worthwhile.

We present an objection to Beall & Henderson’s recent paper defending a solution to the fundamental problem of conciliar Christology using qua or secundum clauses. We argue that certain claims the acceptance/rejection of which distinguish the Conciliar Christian from others fail to so distinguish on Beall & Henderson’s 0-Qua view. This is because on their 0-Qua account, these claims are either acceptable both to Conciliar Christians as well as those who are not Conciliar Christians or because they are acceptable to neither.

The recent development and exploration of mixed metainferential logics is a breakthrough in our understanding of nontransitive and nonreflexive logics. Moreover, this exploration poses a new challenge to theorists like me, who have appealed to similarities to classical logic in defending the logic ST, since some mixed metainferential logics seem to bear even more similarities to classical logic than ST does. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which ST itself is only the first step, that seems to become more and more classical at each level. I think this seeming is misleading: for certain purposes, anyhow, metainferential hierarchies give us no reason to move on from ST. ST is indeed only the first step on a grand metainferential adventure; but one step is enough. This paper aims to explain and defend that claim. Along the way, I take the opportunity also to develop some formal tools and results for thinking about metainferential logics more generally.

Uncut is a book about two kinds of paradoxes: paradoxes involving truth and its relatives, like the liar paradox, and paradoxes involving vagueness. There are lots of ways to look at these paradoxes, and lots of puzzles generated by them, and Uncut ignores most of this variety to focus on a single issue. That issue: do our words mean what they seem to mean, and if so, how can this be? I claim that our words do mean what they seem to, and yet our language is not undermined by paradox. By developing a distinctive theory of meaning, I show how this can be.

The recent development and exploration of mixed metainferential logics is a breakthrough in our understanding of nontransitive and nonreflexive logics. Moreover, this exploration poses a new challenge to theorists like me, who have appealed to similarities to classical logic in defending the logic ST, since some mixed metainferential logics seem to bear even more similarities to classical logic than ST does. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which ST itself is only the first step, that seems to become more and more classical at each level. I think this seeming is misleading: for certain purposes, anyhow, metainferential hierarchies give us no reason to move on from ST. ST is indeed only the first step on a grand metainferential adventure; but one step is enough. This paper aims to explain and defend that claim. Along the way, I take the opportunity also to develop some formal tools and results for thinking about metainferential logics more generally.

We present four classical theories of counterpossibles that combine modalities and counterfactuals. Two theories are anti-vacuist and forbid vacuously true counterfactuals, two are quasi-vacuist and allow counterfactuals to be vacuously true when their antecedent is not only impossible, but also inconceivable. The theories vary on how they restrict the interaction of modalities and counterfactuals. We provide a logical cartography with precise acceptable boundaries, illustrating to what extent nonvacuism about counterpossibles can be reconciled with classical logic.

This paper presents a new puzzle for certain positions in the theory of truth. The relevant positions can be stated in a language including a truth predicate T and an operation that takes sentences to names of those sentences; they are positions that take the T-schema A ↔ T to hold without restriction, for every sentence A in the language. As such, they must be based on a nonclassical logic, since paradoxes that cannot be handled classically will arise. The bestknown of these paradoxes is probably the liar paradox – a sentence that says of itself that it is not true – but our concern here is not with the liar. Instead, our focus is a variant of Curry ’s paradox – a sentence that says of itself that if it is true, everything is [3, 5, 7, 11]. In §1, we present the standard version of Curry ’s paradox and the strain of response to it we wish to focus on. This strain of response crucially invokes non-normal worlds: worlds at which the laws of logic differ from the laws that actually hold. In §2, we go on to argue that, in light of temporal curry paradox, this strain of response ought also to accept non-normal times: times at which the laws of logic in the actual world differ from the laws that hold now. We then consider, in §3, what this would mean for the theorists in question.