Ellie Robson

The aim of this paper is to provide an exposition of Susan Stebbing’s moral philosophy. Stebbing is increasingly recognized as a key figure in early analytic philosophy. However, there is no existing scholarship on her moral philosophy. We examine how Stebbing’s moral philosophy connects to that of two important figures who Stebbing herself identifies as influences on her work: Moore and Aristotle. We argue that while there are clear signs of influence from Moore, Stebbing is also critical of his abstract approach to moral theorizing. In a manner more reminiscent of Aristotle, Stebbing argues that moral philosophy must concern itself with “the ways in which men live.” We argue that Stebbing can plausibly be characterized as both a first level and second level ‘Aristotelian’ ethicist. This is significant since neo-Aristotelian ethics is usually understood as having emerged in the second half of the twentieth century in the work of thinkers like Foot, Hursthouse, and MacIntyre. We also raise an objection to Stebbing from her student, Margaret Macdonald, and reconstruct a response to that objection on Stebbing's behalf.