Elliott R. Jones

This paper examines the epistemological foundations of Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy in Leviathan, arguing that the sovereign operates according to "Perception Theory" (PT)—the view that knowledge is simply whatever one perceives to be true or false. Drawing on Plato's critiques of relativism in the Republic and Theaetetus and Aristotle's analysis of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Metaphysics, I demonstrate that Hobbes's sovereign embodies a fundamental paradox: while attempting to establish absolute political authority through a covenant that transfers subjects' rights and deliberative powers, the sovereign becomes the sole arbiter of truth and justice through voluntarism and relativism. Though Hobbes avoids the theoretical contradictions of PT by making subjects' perceptions identical to the sovereign's through the covenant, this mechanism merely obscures rather than resolves the deeper problem. The result is that subjects receive only an illusion of freedom, self-sovereignty, and truth while the sovereign alone possesses genuine autonomy. This analysis reveals tensions within Hobbes's liberal foundations and contributes to ongoing debates about relativism, voluntarism, and the grounds of political authority, demonstrating how ancient epistemological critiques illuminate fundamental problems in early modern political philosophy.