Emanuela Ceva

Institutional accountability is central to democratic governance, yet philosophical inquiry still lacks a conceptually refined and comprehensive map to appreciate its boundaries and defining features. This article offers such a map from a human‐centered view of institutional action. Institutions are not merely systems of rules and procedures; they are enacted through officeholders' interdependent and relatively discretionary conduct‐in‐role. Accountability, therefore, must be understood not only as a mechanism but also as a lived practice internal to office‐based action. The article develops a three‐tier taxonomy. First, it distinguishes the agents of institutional accountability—individual officeholders or institutional collectives—showing how this axis intersects, without collapsing, into vertical and horizontal relations. Second, it delineates two different but potentially integrated modes of institutional accountability: “answerability,” grounded in oversight, assessment, and potential sanctions, and “addressability,” grounded in reciprocal reason‐giving, mutuality, and co‐authorship. Third, it identifies the implications of accountability for institutional functioning, distinguishing between practices of correction and those cultivating cooperation. The resulting framework offers both an analytical vocabulary for accountability studies and a conceptual refinement of accountability suited to humanly enacted institutions.

This Editorial to the 20th Anniversary Issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice outlines key challenges and opportunities arising from the recent explosion of responsibility studies in different areas. The underlying ambition is to counter the trend of fragmenting the philosophical debate around responsibility by bringing together helpful insights on related dimensions. The discussion is organised around three main themes: (1) Accountability, Attributability, Answerability, Liability; (2) Individuals, Collectives, Practices, and Institutions; and (3) Harms and Wrongs.

This book discusses political corruption and anticorruption as a matter of a public ethics of office. It shows how political corruption is the Trojan horse that undermines public institutions from within via the interrelated action of the officeholders. Even well-designed institutions may go off track if the officeholders fail to uphold by their conduct a public ethics of office accountability. Most current discussions of political corruption and of why it is wrong have concentrated either on explaining and assessing it in terms of an individual’s corrupt character and motives or a dysfunction of institutional procedures. This book brings out the common normative root of these two manifestations of political corruption. It discusses them as instances of the same relationally wrongful practice that consists in an unaccountable use of the power of office by officeholders in public institutions. From this perspective, political corruption is an internal enemy of public institutions that can only be opposed by mobilizing officeholders to engage in answerability practices. In this way, officeholders are responsible for working together to maintain an interactively just institutional system.

Community-based opposition to large infrastructure projects, such as highways, rail lines, or energy facilities, exemplifies localized forms of protest. The paper clarifies when and how such forms of protest can enhance the democratic decision-making process to the extent that they highlight procedural failures alongside substantive ones. When this happens, these protests perform a heuristic communicative function for democracy and cannot, therefore, be dismissed as hypocritical ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) objections to public decisions and policies. When they draw attention to micro-level exclusions, power imbalances, and local knowledge claims that have been overlooked, localized protests can enrich democratic practice and reveal hidden deficits in decision-making. The result is a refined account of the democratic contributive significance of localized protest.

Recent years have seen a number of whistleblowers risk their liberty to expose illegal and corrupt behaviour. Some have heralded their bravery; others see them as traitors. Can there be a moral duty to emulate their example and blow the whistle? In this book, leading political philosophers Emanuela Ceva and Michele Bocchiola draw on well-known cases, such as those of Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, to probe the difference between permissible and dutiful whistleblowing. They argue that, insofar as whistleblowing is understood as an individual act of dissent, it falls short of constituting a duty, although it can be praiseworthy. Whistleblowing should, they contend, be seen as an institutional duty, embedded within the organizational practices of public accountability. This concise book will be invaluable for students and scholars of applied political theory, and political and professional ethics.

In this interview, Emanuela Ceva points to some of the practical and political issues (alongside various conceptual disagreements) associated with toleration. In particular, she stresses the centrality of l’affaire du foulard that galvanized contemporary discussions on toleration and the accommodation of diversity in general. Of particular relevance is her emphasis on the danger that the inflatory use of concepts such as toleration brings. In the final section of this interview, she accentuates the importance of studying the historical aspect of toleration as well as understanding that ‘the normative study of toleration […] seems to be an important feature of a public ethics for diverse democratic societies. […] To study toleration within this context is important to understand the extent to which the capacity to deal with diversity in a respectful manner, whether this means through forbearance or recognition, is an important way to grapple with human diversity and ensure that the richness of human forms of life is nurtured and not endangered’.

Practical philosophers within the analytic tradition have utilized methods such as conceptual analysis and thought experiments to articulate their theories in a clear and accessible way. However, these methods, while rigorous, have been critiqued as too concerned with abstraction and generalization to address the practical challenges faced by “real people” in specific societal and political contexts. Drawing on the innovative work of Elisabetta Galeotti, I argue for a “normative” turn in the methodology of practical philosophy, shifting from traditional conceptual analysis to “conceptual engineering.” Galeotti’s work on fundamental political concepts such as “toleration” and “respect” exemplifies this shift, highlighting the need for concepts to be not only analyzed but also improved normatively to enhance their practical relevance. Conceptual engineering acknowledges that concepts are embedded in contexts and must be adaptable to address concrete political and social phenomena. This methodology involves a reflective stance toward conceptual characterization, ensuring that concepts are engineered to better address the problems they are meant to solve. This approach is particularly important for public ethics, a problem-driven domain of practical philosophy requiring a similarly problem-driven methodology. Through examples from Galeotti’s work, I discuss how her methodological emphasis on practical relevance and contextualization provides valuable tools for addressing real societal challenges, such as those related to democracy, citizenship, and multiculturalism. By adopting conceptual engineering, public ethics can better guide the actions of real people facing real challenges within specific institutional settings.

Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on institutional operability requires the analysis and assessment of the officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. This article distinguishes two perspectives on operability: ‘outward’ and ‘inward.’ The outward view emphasizes predefined instructions for efficient execution, focusing on rule-following to achieve institutional purposes. The inward perspective highlights role-playing and reflective engagement among officeholders to uphold an institution’s raison d’être. The inward perspective brings to the fore the relational aspect of institutional life and officeholders’ interrelated responsibility for guiding institutional action.

In this response essay, Ceva and Ferretti reply to their critics and clarify some key aspects of their book. Specifically, the discussion starts by elaborating on the notion of an ethics of office accountability, explaining that the specification of institutional norms of officeholders behaviour is the result of practices of officeholders' interaction (including democratic practices) and reflection. The second theme is the responsibility for political corruption. The authors emphasise the importance of focussing not only on retrospective responsibility, for the sake of punishing corrupt behaviour, but especially on accountability as a form of self-reflection by the officeholders on the weaknesses of their institutional work together. This exercise is preliminary to their assuming forward-looking responsibilities for anti-corruption. The third and final part discusses political corruption as a specifically interactive wrong. For the authors, the magnitude and moral salience of the wrong of corruption, as well as the different wrongs implicated both from an interactive perspective and in consideration of the harm caused to third parties, must be assessed in light of the context and the moral standing of the public institution in question. In this sense, political corruption is a pro tanto wrong.

The article presents political corruption as a problem of public ethics of institutions. It first explains the theory of institutional action that underlies the conception of political corruption as a deficit of “office accountability”. Having clarified the officeholders’ duties in their institutional capacity, it portrays political corruption as an “internal enemy” of public institutions. A discussion follows of the normative implications for an approach to anti-corruption based on the officeholders’ direct engagement.

This article offers a conceptual framework for discussing the role of envy within processes of transitional justice. Transitional justice importantly includes the transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction in the aftermath of societal conflicts and upheavals. Such transformation aims to realise “interactive” justice in transitional justice by reshaping belief and value systems, and by moulding emotional responses between the involved parties. A nuanced understanding of the emotions at play in intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction is thus essential to transitional justice. Among the many emotions that we could address in such scenarios, we target envy. Envy, in its various forms, features prominently in many societal conflicts and upheavals, and has, therefore, the potential to undermine or, conversely, support just intergroup interactions. However, the ambivalent role of this emotion has been scantly analysed in the philosophical literature on transitional justice. We make a start on filling this lacuna by developing a conceptual framework which is necessary to appreciate how envy and its varieties are epistemically and practically relevant to realising interactive justice in transitional justice processes.

Recent attempts at making sense of toleration as an ideal of political morality have focused on how liberal democratic institutions generate political arrangements that protect people’s freedom to “live their life as they see fit.” We show how these views rely on a one-dimensional interpretation of the liberal democratic political project. In so doing, they underestimate an important “interactive” dimension. This dimension concerns what it means for liberal democracies to realize toleration as a property inherent to their constitutive political processes. We illustrate this claim with reference to the liberal democratic decision-making process. Such a process realizes toleration as forbearance in itself. It does so because it establishes the participants in the process as political agents who recognize their mutual standing to share the political authority to make collectively binding decisions, despite their grounds for reciprocal objection.

Should officeholders be held individually responsible for submitting to systemically corrupt institutional practices? We draw a structural analogy between individual action under coercive threat and individual participation in systemic corruption, and we argue that officeholders who submit to corrupt institutional practices are not excused by the existence of a systemic coercive threat. Even when they have good personal reasons to accept the threat, they remain individually morally assessable and, in the circumstances, they are also individually blameworthy for actions performed in their institutional capacity.

Scholars and international organizations engaged in institutional reconstruction converge in recognizing political corruption as a cause or a consequence of conflicts. Anticorruption is thus generally considered a centrepiece of institutional reconstruction programmes. A common approach to anticorruption within this context aims primarily to counter the negative political, social, and economic effects of political corruption, or implement legal anticorruption standards and punitive measures. We offer a normative critical discussion of this approach, particularly when it is initiated and sustained by external entities. We recast the focus from an outward to an inward perspective on institutional action and failure centred on the institutional interactions between officeholders. In so doing, we offer the normative tools to reconceptualize anticorruption in terms of an institutional ethics of ‘office accountability’ that draws on an institution’s internal resources of self-correction as per the officeholders’ interrelated work.

The paper explores some normative challenges concerning the integration of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms into anticorruption in public institutions. The challenges emerge from the tensions between an approach treating ML algorithms as allies to an exclusively legalistic conception of anticorruption and an approach seeing them within an institutional ethics of office accountability. We explore two main challenges. One concerns the variable opacity of some ML algorithms, which may affect public officeholders’ capacity to account for institutional processes relying upon ML techniques. The other pinpoints the risk that automating certain institutional processes may weaken officeholders’ direct engagement to take forward-looking responsibility for the working of their institution. We discuss why both challenges matter to see how ML algorithms may enhance (and not hinder) institutional answerability practices.

“Whistleblowing” has entered the scholarly and the publicdebate as a way of describing the exposure by the memberof an organization of episodes of corruption, fraud, or generalabuses of power within the organization. We offer acritical survey of the main normative theories ofwhistleblowing in the current debate in political philosophy,with the illustrative aid of one of the epitomic figures of awhistleblower of our time: Edward Snowden. After conceptuallyseparating whistleblowing from other forms ofwrongdoing disclosures, we introduce and discuss two familiesof normative views of this practice: the “Extrema Ratio”and the “Deontic” views. We show how the two views canbe usefully considered in tandem to offer an all-roundassessment of the moral justification of whistleblowingeither as an extraordinary individual conscientious act ofindictment or as an ordinary dutiful organizational practiceof answerability that enables the capacity of self-correctionof an organization.

The article discusses the resort to whistleblowing as a form of resistance to institutional wrongdoing that comes from within an institution. The resort to whistleblowing can take either an individual or an institutional form. As an individual act of resistance, whistleblowing has often been presented as a last resort against institutional wrongdoing whose justification draws on normative arguments for civil disobedience. The institutional form we present in this article shows a nontrivial sense in which a “normalized resort” to whistleblowing can be morally justified as an ordinary practice to resist institutional wrongdoing. Whistleblowing is thus a component of an institutional ethics of office that calls on officeholders’ responsibility to engage in practices of self-scrutiny and self-correction of institutional dysfunctions. The integration of the justification of the resort to whistleblowing within this framework emphasizes the importance of entrusting the oversight of institutional action primarily to institutional members.

The paper discusses the normative grounds for recognizing a watchdog role to the news media as concerns the dissemination of information about an institutional failure menacing a well-ordered society. This is, for example, the case of the news media’s role in the diffusion of whistleblowers’ disclosures. We argue that many popular justifications for the watchdog role of the news media (as a ‘fourth estate’; a trustee of the people’s right to know; expert communicator) fail to ground that role in some unique feature that makes the news media special as concerns the performance of the role. We offer an alternative argument that shows how the watchdog role of the news media shares a justificatory ground with the role that any member of a well-ordered society has in terms of a general duty of answerability in the face of institutional failures. Although this duty does not bear only on the news media, we concede that in some contingent circumstances the news media might be better positioned to discharge it and, therefore, to initiate corrective actions of institutional failures effectively and conscientiously. However, the establishment of the news media’s responsibility in this sense is an empirical, not a conceptual or a normative matter.

Political corruption is a contested concept. Both terms in the concept are the object of controversies in political theory, and concern what corruption is and how it is a politically relevant phenomenon. Political corruption has been contested across time, space, cultures, and philosophical traditions. Usually, political corruption is assumed to involve an exchange between a private corruptor and a public official who pursues her personal interest by abusing her power of office. While this account may be true with respect to some such instances as bribery, some significant uncertainties affect its plausibility. Practices such as patronage or state capture might escape this account either because they do not involve a corruptor or because the corrupted officer does not pursue her personal interest but, say, that of her party or faction. Interestingly, despite or perhaps in reason of this semantic uncertainty, political corruption is generally perceived as a disease of the public function, something which any sensible political theory of the good state should want to avoid. Why is such a negative intuition about the nature of political corruption so widespread? A growing debate in political theory is now starting to inquire into the exact nature of the wrongness of political corruption. In this timely book, Robert Sparling engages with such an important but still developing debate.

Abstract“Whistleblowing” has entered the scholarly and the public debate as a way of describing the exposure by the member of an organization of episodes of corruption, fraud, or general abuses of power within the organization. We offer a critical survey of the main normative theories of whistleblowing in the current debate in political philosophy, with the illustrative aid of one of the epitomic figures of a whistleblower of our time: Edward Snowden. After conceptually separating whistleblowing from other forms of wrongdoing disclosures, we introduce and discuss two families of normative views of this practice: the “Extrema Ratio” and the “Deontic” views. We show how the two views can be usefully considered in tandem to offer an all‐round assessment of the moral justification of whistleblowing either as an extraordinary individual conscientious act of indictment or as an ordinary dutiful organizational practice of answerability that enables the capacity of self‐correction of an organization.