Emanuele Antonelli

Recovering an ancient debate on the meaning of the Latin word pomoerium, I will show that if John Searle has offered the standard version of social ontology, Maurizio Ferraris has good reasons to claim that his ‘Theory of Documentality’ can go further. Nonetheless, his anti-post-modernism and his blindness about the religious origins of the social objects he deals with, reduce the width of his argument. Complementing his hasty analysis of mimesis with the mimetic theory of religion, violence and the sacred, put forward by René Girard, I will try to show that social objects always hide a scapegoating event and not just a document, as Ferraris would say. Recovering the underlying Derridean paradigm and adding a Girardian reading, such an investigation would turn Ferraris’ static and insufficient analysis into a dynamic ontology of actuality. Thus my aims are: 1) to verify to what extend Ferraris’ theory holds ground, 2) point out, through the application of mimetic theory, certain limits of the theory pertaining to the origins of the social objects investigated, and 3) hint at a new paradigm based on the graft of Derridean thought with the trace of Girardian thoughts on mimesis.

One might well wonder about the source of Girard’s knowledge. Where is it thought to have come from in the first place? From what vantage point are we supposed to be surveying the events he claims are originary? And what, then, is the condition for the very possibility of his Christian wisdom? In this paper, I argue that we can put forward a tentative solution by looking at one particular aspect of all the texts that Girard has interpreted: they are all written texts. Analyzing this in detail with the assistance of the proposals of Bernard Stiegler, I will claim that it is writing itself that has afforded us the possibility of paying attention. Moreover, in the second section, I shall also put forward an analysis of the gnoseological condition of the possibility of Christian wisdom. To do so, I expand on Stiegler’s reading of Kant’s notion of schema focusing on its relation with the hermeneutical notion of figura, as presented by Erich Auerbach. Commenting on the common rhetorical setting of both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Bible, I then show that these two written texts address a very similar problem—a critique of the way people judge—and also put forward, surprisingly, much the same solution: to properly judge, it would be better to take into account past examples of judgments and consider that, no matter whether we critique them or not, they will schematize our own experiences and influence our intentionality.

In Voyous, Jacques Derrida develops his argument starting from the presupposition that democracy as such is the entity whose integrity and immunity are at stake and, therefore, under investigation. This gesture reflects the setting in which ten years before, in Foi et savoir, he had cast his reasoning about the logic of immunity. There, it was one of the sources of religion, the immunity of the sacred, that operated according to this logic. The hyphen between these two essays, beside Derrida’s own crossed references, is the genealogical reasoning on the meaning and essence of the concept of democracy: contrary to what Derrida claims, it will be maintained that Athenian democracy had a clear immune matrix, whose constant exercise is clearly defined, in spite of himself, by Vernant, and it will be shown how modern democracy has been forced to change policy. Modern democracy is an entity characterized by an immune deficiency. In order to save Derrida’s intuition from both the collapse of different vantage points and from a quite bizarre reticence in taking into account of the immune value of rituals, our starting point will be René Girard’s œuvre and his reading of the role of immune logic in sacred systems and, more generally, in modernity. The threshold between the auto-immune reaction, immune deficiency and auto-immune disease, between the sacrifice who delimits and constitutes the self and the holocauste du peuple en détail, is the space where, constantly exposed to the risk of auto-denial, democracy lives.

In Voyous, Jacques Derrida develops his argument starting from the presupposition that democracy as such is the entity whose integrity and immunity are at stake and, therefore, under investigation. This gesture reflects the setting in which ten years before, in Foi et savoir, he had cast his reasoning about the logic of immunity. There, it was one of the sources of religion, the immunity of the sacred, that operated according to this logic. The hyphen between these two essays, beside Derrida’s own crossed references, is the genealogical reasoning on the meaning and essence of the concept of democracy: contrary to what Derrida claims, it will be maintained that Athenian democracy had a clear immune matrix, whose constant exercise is clearly defined, in spite of himself, by Vernant, and it will be shown how modern democracy has been forced to change policy. Modern democracy is an entity characterized by an immune deficiency. In order to save Derrida’s intuition from both the collapse of different vantage points and from a quite bizarre reticence in taking into account of the immune value of rituals, our starting point will be René Girard’s œuvre and his reading of the role of immune logic in sacred systems and, more generally, in modernity. The threshold between the auto-immune reaction, immune deficiency and auto-immune disease, between the sacrifice who delimits and constitutes the self and the holocauste du peuple en détail, is the space where, constantly exposed to the risk of auto-denial, democracy lives.

In this paper we argue that Pareyson’s notion of formativity is germane to the notion of self–transcendence recently put forward in the vast domain of the sciences of the self–organization of complex systems. Following Jean–Pierre Dupuy’s approach, we will not apply this notion to the analysis of Pareyson’s theory; we will, instead, show— by referring to thenumerous topoi where often surprisingly precise parallelisms, onvergences and semantic identities are to be found—that, though being largely independent in their genesis, the logics of the two notions are already consistent with each–other. As a result, we will claim that Pareyson’s theory of the work of art is best understood as a study on the integration of different layers of organizational closures.

Girard’s attempts to present his main ideas have been numerous and, according to himself, never fully satisfying: many problems arise when looking for the best way to explain what Mimetic Theory is about, mainly because the order of the discourse and the logic of the underlying long argument, just as the micro level of the analysis and the macro one, are twisted with one another in a hermeneutical circle that can easily be misinterpreted as vicious. A thorough work of analysis of the essential logical features of Mimetic Theory main hypotheses has been done by Jean–Pierre Dupuy. In what follows, we are going to use a few of his concepts in order to set the analysis of secularization and modernity and their consequences both at a micro level, dealing with modern pathologies, and at the macro one, investigating the displacement of the sacred.

In this paper we offer an interpretation of the inner relationship between nihilism and the tragic. With reference to the work of Heinz von Foester and to the sciences of complexity, we will argue that the essential feature of the tragic is “autoreferentiality”. Furthermore, arguing in favor of the use of the theological notion of kenōsis as the most precise description of the “history of nihilism”, we will show that the latter is to be understood in terms of the “weakening”, or lowering of all the reference points generated by autotranscendent, etheronomous, social phenomena. The consequence of nihilism is therefore autoreferentiality. This result will offer the opportunity to see both to what extent we are now, at the end of modernity, living a tragic situation and, eventually, to claim – by recalling that autoreferentiality is also the inner logic of freedom – that the tragic is the outcome of modernity, but not a necessary one.

The reflection elaborated in these pages, fleeing all submission to the now abused rhetoric of the prevailing economism, traces in the works of René Girard - the most serious pretender to the legacy of the masters of suspicion - and Jacques Derrida - the last great philosopher of the twentieth century - the constituent elements of a critical paradigm with which to interpret the present time. The volume investigates the multiple correspondences between the different legacies of deconstruction and the most recent developments of mimetic theory through the articulated reconstruction of the reflections, still little known in Italy, of some of the most brilliant contemporary exponents of those traditions. Formulating the features of an ontology of actuality hinged on the notions of mimesis and trace, the author proposes a philosophical diagnosis that recognizes in our time an age in the grip of panic.

In this paper we attempt to interpret Little Red Riding Hood’s most famous variants in light of its recent film adaptations. With reference to René Girard’s theory of sacrifice, we will argue that the latest one of these, Catherine Hardwicke’s 2011 adaptation offers the chance to see in Perrault’s “Little Red Riding Hood” the result of a diachronical evolution in four steps of the misrecognizing narration of a collective lynching, a full-fledged scapegoating of an anonymous villager accused and persecuted as werewolf. We will find further support in Vladimir Propp’s and Alan Dundes’s contributions.

What kind of feeling is shame? Why are we ashamed and what are the consequences that this emotion has on the subject? Is it a private or a "social" emotion? How many types of shame exist? Is vicarious shame always shameful? What are the ways in which art has represented shame? What are the relations between shame, guilt, embarrassment and censorship? Is it possible to be immune to shame? Would "Not being ashamed" count as a virtue or is it a morally reprehensible attitude? Sensibilia. Colloquium on Perception and Experience investigated the different ways in which shame can be described and staged, presupposed and understood. The proposals and the points of view collected in this volume relate in an original and interdisciplinary way different areas of research all equally interested in reflecting on a complex and stratified feeling. The result was a heated debate on (ancient and contemporary) inconvenient, thorny and "shameful" issues.

In this paper, we sketch out a simple scheme to evaluate different ways in which Western society has coped with the momentous and hidden problem of envy; afterward, we consider the consequences for the constitution of the social space that these changes entail. We will argue that envy, when considered as a primal feeling, can shed light on René Girard’s notion of metaphysical desire and on diasparagmos rituals. Then, taking into account Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s endogenous fixed point thesis—concerning the constitution of autotranscendent social structures that configure themselves around an attractor, a fixed point, revealed to be a product of the process of constitution, an effect and not a cause—we will consider envy as the main feedback in the system. Starting from this theoretical scenario, we will envisage three steps—on a line sketched according to mimetic theory—marked by the particular conditions and role of the feedback. We will show what kind of balance was guaranteed to Athens (taken as an exemplar archaic society, starting from its self-representation as given by Sophocles in Oedipus the King) by the complementary rituals of pharmakos and ostrakos; what equilibrium was offered to Christian medieval social structures by the doctrine of the deadly sins; and, finally, we will take a look at our own secularized society. Our aim is to apply René Girard’s theory systematically, to show how the philosophy of history that we can infer from his works can help us to detect a curious and at the same time quite dramatic change as far as the homeostatic equilibrium of our society is concerned. Thanks to this exercise, we will be able to show how the transcendental social space— by which we mean the region of possible outcomes, in terms of constraints and possibilities, of a human life in a social context—is constituted through the victimage mechanism as defined by Girard and how this constitution is affected by the performative unveiling of the mechanism itself.