Emanuele Mariani

What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of Gegebenheit? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “Grenze” or “Schranke”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of Ideen I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “Grenze” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of Gegebenheit is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”.

In the most recent debate of phenomenological as well as analytical provenance, Husserl’s reflection, although pioneer regarding ethics, seems to suffer of a general depreciation enrooted in his supposed excess rationalism. The husserlian ethics would remain subjected to the dominance of a logico-objectifying reason, which appears to be the fundamental dimension of intentionality. The wide range of life-experiences would then be crushed by the hegemony of objectifying acts. Are we really sure? Our contribution will rather consist in raising the originality of Husserl’s method which lastly to reconcile two seemingly contradictory requirements: the autonomy of ethical and its dependence towards logical reason. We shall notice thus a progressive dissociatoon from Brentano’s teaching leading to an overall revision of intentionality. If anything such as rationalism exists in Husserl’s thinking, it can only be asserted on the condition of a radical criticism of the concept of “representation” – from where, as we shall see, emerges a newly articulated relationship between “object” and “value”.

By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a proper account of phenomena. One need only to take a look at the history of philosophy, from Plato to Kant, as well as at the history of sciences, from physics to psychology, so as to register a wide range of uses concerning the concept of phenomenon. The understanding of what a phenomenon is, in a phenomenological sense, should therefore at least not be completely compatible with any other, if phenomenology has to exist as a discipline and as a method. That is one of the issues at stake in the debate between phenomenology and neokantianism, between Husserl, to a certain extent Brentano, and Natorp. It is on this debate that we shall draw attention, if we wish to grasp the reasons behind the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon, especially at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.

Within the Seinsfrage, the question of being, the «who» question, or Werfrage, arises at once. Who is this «who»? In other words, who am I? Questioning the being, inevitably means questioning ourselves. Would it thus be possible to conceive of a subject without being? This question, paradoxical as it may appear, nevertheless has a historiographical legitimacy, if we consider that «phenomenological anthropology», as the young Heidegger conceived it, precedes in effect the formulation of the Seinsfrage. From his very first lectures in Fribourg, an access into subjectivity, apprehended as a «wordly ipseity », is thereby opened. While criticizing Natorp who unreservedly denied such a possibility, Heidegger yet ends up conceding the point almost entirely. This, at least, is our hypothesis: the «I» exists only at the cost of a tension between facticity and existence, a tension which, in the eyes of Natorp, leads to a confirmation that the «I», strictly speaking, cannot be – and this allows us therefore a glimpse into the legitimate possibility of a Werfrage without Seinsfrage.

Pourquoi recourir à la pensée de Dietrich Bonhoeffer pour formuler une contribution philosophique au problème de la tolérance? Et, de surcroît, en dialogue avec la phénoménologie? Homme de pensée et d’action, Bonhoeffer n’est, à proprement parler, ni un phénoménologue ni un penseur de la tolérance. Il est, toutefois, légitime d’envisager sa lutte contre le totalitarisme, tant sur le plan théologique que politique, comme un cas limite susceptible de relever du questionnement sur la nature et la portée de la tolérance elle-même. Et cela en raison du paradoxe auquel Bonhoeffer s’expose dans la tentative de putsch visant l’élimination du Führer à laquelle il participe : la violation non seulement de la loi, mais d’un commandement divin – « tu ne tueras pas » – que Bonhoeffer justifie au nom de sa foi en Dieu. Notre hypothèse de lecture nous conduit dès lors à consacrer une attention particulière à sa thèse d’habilitation, Akt und Sein, où Bonhoeffer formule une critique originale de la phénoménologie notamment heideggérienne, inspirée par la theologia crucis de tradition luthérienne : renonçant à toute tentative d’autodétermination, l’homme, pour Bonhoeffer, ne peut se comprendre que par une ouverture radicale à la transcendance qui coïncide, en dernière instance, avec la dimension authentiquement personnelle de l’homme lui-même ainsi que de la relation entre l’homme et Dieu.

The presence of Persian sources in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra has been a topic of debate for decades. This paper summarizes the main results of a comparative study of Nietzsche and the ancient Persian scripture Avestā. In addition to several secondary sources Nietzsche repeatedly encountered, there is strong evidence that he read Johann Friedrich Kleuker’s German translation of the Avestā texts reconstructed by Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron. Analyzing Nietzsche’s diverse sources of Zoroastrianism as well as his knowledge of this religion, this paper shows that many metaphors, references and claims in both Thus Spoke Zarathustra and in Nietzsche’s notebooks can be traced back to Zoroastrianism. Taking these sources into consideration contributes significantly to our understanding of one of Nietzsche’s major works.

Just hearing the names of Brentano and Plato put together is enough to highlight the queerness of a matching which finds almost no evidence in critical literature. The study of the texts in which Brentano explicitly deals with Plato, in particular in his lectures on the history of Greek philosophy, does not change much of the negative impression that emerges from a general overview: the place of Plato in the history of philosophy depends, for Brentano, on Aristotle or, better, on the accomplishment of Greek philosophy occurs in Aristotle’s work. We shall turn our attention towards the of certain relevant problems in order to open up, if possible, a less negative prospect for the relationship of Brentano to Plato: not so much directly by examining Platonic philosophy from a Brentanian point of view as by considering the concrete solution that Brentano provides to some Aristotelian questions. To put it differently, we shall take into account not so much what Brentano says of Plato, as what Brentano does with Aristotle, by tracking the Platonizing traces that can be found in the Brentanian commentary to Aristotle’s categories, the philosophical consequences of which seem to be reflected in Brentano’s overall philosophical project.

Dans le dernier quart du xix e siècle, l’ambition d’une philosophie scientifique inspire la Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt de Franz Brentano. Appelée à refonder sur des bases empiriques l’univers de l’être, cette forme nouvelle de psychologie réactualiserait ainsi, en un sens, un certain héritage de la métaphysique ancienne. Et Brentano parviendrait à assembler dans une même vision systématique les sources de la pensée grecque, en particulier aristotélicienne, et moderne. Mais peut-on vraiment considérer Brentano comme un aristotélicien en raison de son projet psychologique? La question est bien connue et comme Franco Volpi, entre autres, le soutient, il semblerait que l’orientation épistémologique de la psychologie brentanienne ne trouve pas dans l’aristotélisme son véritable motif directeur. Une autre lecture est toutefois possible à nos yeux, si nous considérons qu’à aucun moment Brentano ne prétend faire de la psychologie un moyen pour revenir à Aristote. C’est notre hypothèse de recherche qui nous conduit à lire avec la plus grande attention le traité de 1867, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles : le recours à Aristote resterait alors nécessaire pour comprendre le projet d’une nouvelle psychologie qui n’oublie pourtant pas sa vocation métaphysique.

Riassunto: La fenomenologia, in virtù del suo stesso nome, pare rivendicare un diritto di prelazione sui fenomeni. È sufficiente, tuttavia, uno sguardo panoramico sulla storia della filosofia o, più generalmente, delle scienze per rilevare il vasto impiego che si va affermando, senza fenomenologia, del concetto di fenomeno. In cosa consisterebbe allora la specificità della comprensione fenomenologica dei “fenomeni”? Per rispondere a questa domanda, riconsidereremo il dibattito tra Edmund Husserl autore delle Logische Untersuchungen e Paul Natorp, filosofo neokantiano di Marburgo, le cui tesi presentano un duplice interesse: l’avere, per un verso, sollecitato lo stesso Husserl a una precisazione della proposta fenomenologica; l’aver, per l’altro, anticipato alcuni tra gli argomenti di maggior rilievo nell’ambito delle scienze cognitive in merito ai vari tentativi di naturalizzazione della coscienza. Parole chiave: Fenomeno; Intenzionalità; Oggetto; Edmund Husserl; Paul Natorp Phenomena With or Without Phenomenology. An Open Dialogue: Phenomenology, by its very name, seems to invoke a priority claim on the study of phenomena. Yet a glance at the history of philosophy or, more generally, the sciences, suffices to demonstrate how widely the concept of “phenomena” has been used outside phenomenology. So, what exactly is unique to the phenomenological understanding of phenomena? In order to formulate a possible answer, we reactivate the debate between the Husserl of the Logische Untersuchungen and Paul Natorp, a neo-Kantian philosopher from Marburg. This debate is of interest on two fronts: first, because Natorp’s criticism directly forced Husserl to clarify his views on phenomenology; second, because the debate anticipated some of the most important arguments on naturalizing consciousness in the cognitive sciences. Keywords: Phenomenon; Intentionality; Object; Edmund Husserl; Paul Natorp

Dans l’Allemagne du xix e siècle, l’édition intégrale du Corpus aristotelicum de l’Académie des sciences de Berlin constitue la condition ayant rendu historiquement possible le « retours à Aristote », dont l’une des figures majeures est sans doute A. F. Trendelenburg. Suivant comme fil conducteur les rapports grammaticaux inhérents aux différentes parties de la proposition, Trendelenburg, le premier, s’engage à démontrer l’ordre sous-jacent au nombre des catégories, laissé pourtant indéterminé par Aristote. Le but est, pour l’essentiel, de découvrir le point de contact originaire entre la pensée, le langage et l’être, en opposition frontale aux résultats de l’idéalisme allemand. C’est donc le lien entre logique et métaphysique qui est au centre de l’exégèse philosophique que Trendelenburg livre aux pages de l’ Aristoteles Kategorienlehre en 1846, sur laquelle nous portons notre attention afin de rétablir les lignes directrices d’un projet dont l’originalité a souvent été confinée aux hypothèses prétendument improductives d’une grammaire spéculative ou délaissée en faveur d’autres épigones du lignage aristotélicien – de Brentano à Heidegger.