The questioning of the introduction of new diseases is a typical feature of psychiatry: Does ADHD (attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder) exist? Why “hysteria” has not disappeared from diagnosis taxonomies? Here, we show that this characteristic is not exclusive to psychiatry. In the case of coeliac disease and non-coeliac gluten sensitivity (NCGS), an important tension arises between a pragmatist position, in favour of diagnosing NCGS, and an opposing essentialist conception, since no “biolo…
Read moreThe questioning of the introduction of new diseases is a typical feature of psychiatry: Does ADHD (attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder) exist? Why “hysteria” has not disappeared from diagnosis taxonomies? Here, we show that this characteristic is not exclusive to psychiatry. In the case of coeliac disease and non-coeliac gluten sensitivity (NCGS), an important tension arises between a pragmatist position, in favour of diagnosing NCGS, and an opposing essentialist conception, since no “biological core” specific to NCGS can be identified. When proposals for new diseases appear, practitioners adopt positions in favour or against their acceptance, supported by different epistemological approaches. In this work, we analyse these approaches, which lie behind many nosological and taxonomic discussions in medicine.
