Émile Torres

This paper examines a position within the ethics of human extinction called “pro-extinctionism.” It argues that there are many ways one could interpret this thesis. After exploring these possibilities, I critically examine a number of arguments in favor of pro-extinctionist views that aim for final human extinction, i.e., the extinction of our species such that we do not leave behind any successors. Such arguments are based on philosophical pessimism, empirical pessimism, antinatalism, radical environmentalism, negative utilitarianism, and misanthropy. I then turn to various arguments for terminal extinction without final extinction, i.e., the extinction of our species through replacement with a posthuman species. These are based on notions of cosmic evolution, maximization, and posthuman supremacy. I then examine a related idea called “extinction neutralism,” whereby the survival of our species into the posthuman era is a matter of moral indifference. I claim that extinction neutralism would likely entail pro-extinctionism in practice. My hope is that this paper offers some useful clarity to an increasingly urgent question: should our species die out in the near future?

Cet article examine si l’extinction de l’humanité provoquée par une super intelligence artificielle (SIA) aux valeurs divergentes serait néfaste, et pour quelles raisons. La question, selon moi, est faussement complexe. Je commence par présenter les trois principales positions de l’éthique existentielle, c’est-à-dire l’étude des implications éthiques et évaluatives de l’extinction de l’humanité. Il s’agit des points de vue de l’équivalence, des points de vue de la perte future et des points de vue pro-extinctionnistes. Je montre ensuite comment les tenants de chaque point de vue évalueraient un scénario dans lequel l’humanité s’éteindrait à cause de SIA. Bien qu’il y ait des points d’accord, ces trois positions divergent de manière significative, la plupart d’entre elles n’ayant pas été suffisamment explorées dans la littérature philosophique.

The topic of human extinction may be of growing importance and urgency. However, much of the discussion surrounding this topic is muddled by the fact that ‘human extinction’ can be defined in many different ways, and indeed different conceptions of human extinction can carry quite unique implications for how one assesses the ethical and evaluative implications of our collective disappearance. There are, furthermore, several additional distinctions that (a) are crucial for such assessments, and (b) philosophers have not yet made explicit in the ethics of human extinction literature—e.g., that between the process or event of Going Extinct and the state or condition of Being Extinct. This paper outlines a framework for thinking about the ethical and evaluative aspects of human extinction, which I hope can serve as a useful foundation for future research on the topic.