Emily Austin

Pleasure feels amazing! Anxiety, however, does not. The Ancient Greek Philosopher Epicurus rolled these two strikingly intuitive claims into a simple formula for happiness and well-being—pursue pleasure without causing yourself anxiety. But wait, is that even possible? Can humans achieve lasting pleasure without suffering anxiety about failure and loss? Epicurus thinks we can, at least once we learn to pursue pleasure of the right kinds in the right ways. Living for Pleasure offers a lively, jargon-free account of how Epicureanism can help us make and keep good friends, prepare for suffering, combat imposter syndrome, build trust, recognize personal limitations, value truth, develop healthy attitudes towards money and success, manage political anxiety, cultivate gratitude, savor food, and face death.

At the close of Plato’s Apology, Socrates argues that death is a benefit regardless of whether it results in annihilation or an afterlife. According to the standard interpretation, Socrates of the Phaedo rejects the idea that annihilation is a benefit, instead arguing that the soul is immortal and that annihilation would harm a philosopher. Socrates certainly suggests in a few passages that he would resent annihilation. In this paper, however, I argue that the Phaedo does not mark a significant shift in Socrates’ views about whether annihilation benefits. In both dialogues, he recognizes that if the gods choose to annihilate humans, they signal that human life is bad overall and that deprivation of a bad state is a benefit, albeit a benefit without an existing beneficiary. I contend that for Socrates, the possibility that humans benefit from annihilation entails neither the rationality of suicide nor the view that philosophers live miserable lives.

In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates claims (in defense of the poet Simonides) that a person must sometimes force herself to praise her unjust family or country for purposes of reconciliation. The passage has been largely overlooked because it occurs in a lengthy and bizarre interpretive interlude that scholars have hesitated to take seriously. Nevertheless, I argue that we should take it seriously and that doing so undercuts popular understandings of Socrates’ conception of sincerity, his submission to military authority, and his view about the relationship between virtue and psychic harmony.