-
An Essay on Private RemediesCanadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 6 (1): 89-112. 1993.One of the assumptions of our legal system is that when a violation of law has occurred, we (society) should provide a remedy for individuals who were harmed. More specifically, we should provide them with corrective remedies—remedies that place them as nearly as possible in the position they would be in if no wrong had occurred. This principle is not universal. There are legal wrongs, usually statutory, for which only public officials can seek a judicial remedy. And where private remedies do ap…Read more
-
7Los jueces como creadores de reglasProblema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho 1 (4): 127-167. 2010.Precedents are judicial decisions that form the bases of further judicial decisions by constraining those decisions. There are two aspects to the constraints exerted by precedent decisions: the scope of the constraint and the strength of the constraint. The scope refers to the range of decisions that are affected by the precedent. The strength refers to the conditions under which a court can escape being bound by the precedent. Models of precedential scope are discussed and evaluated, and the qu…Read more
-
10Actors may be called on to judge their reasons for action at two different points in time: once when they form an intention to act in the future and again at the time of action. At the time the actor forms her intention, her perspective is a general one, encompassing a range of possible circumstances that cannot be narrowed or fully specified in advance of action. At time of action, the actor's perspective is particularized, with more evidence available about reasons for action. This difference …Read more
-
13Book ReviewsAlan H. Goldman, Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 210. $55.00 (review)Ethics 113 (2): 414-417. 2003.
-
16One of the central dilemmas of law is what Larry Alexander has called "the gap:" general, determinate rules have significant benefits from the forward-looking perspective of a lawmaker, but generate outcomes that appear wrong from the perspective of individual actors. In this 25-year retrospective of Alexander's initial article on the gap, I examine a possible way out of the dilemma of the gap, and conclude that it does not work.
-
27How Liberal is Liberal Equality?: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Tanner LectureLegal Theory 1 (2): 227-250. 1995.Liberalism is a wonderful theory, but its adherents have a difficult time explaining why. In his Tanner Lecture entitledFoundations of Liberal Equality, Ronald Dworkin proposes to defend liberalism in a new way. Dworkin is not content to view liberalism as a political compromise in which people set aside their personal convictions in the interest of social peace. Instead, he undertakes to make liberal political theory “continuous” with personal ethics, by describing an ethical position that endo…Read more
-
22Designing judicial review: A comment on SchauerLaw and Philosophy 22 (s 3-4): 241-246. 2003.No Abstract
-
34Legality and rationality: A comment on Scott Shapiro's LegalityLegal Theory 19 (4): 403-421. 2013.One key premise in Shapiro's book Legality is that rationality requires those who have accepted the master plan for a system of law to obey the system's rules. In this paper, I question this premise, arguing instead that although it may be rational for agents to commit to follow the system's rule in all (or most) cases to which they apply, it is not rational for agents to follow the rules in fact when the rules appear to require the wrong outcomes in particular cases. My argument is based largel…Read more
-
64Infelicitous SexLegal Theory 2 (3): 209-231. 1996.Proposing and consenting to sex are things that ordinary people manage to do all the time, yet legal regulation of sex seems to be an intractable problem. No one is satisfied with rape law, but no one knows quite what to do about it
-
16Legal taxonomyLegal Theory 15 (1): 25. 2009.This essay examines the ambition to taxonomize law and the different methods a legal taxonomer might employ. Three possibilities emerge. The first is a formal taxonomy that classifies legal materials according to rules of order and clarity. Formal taxonomy is primarily conventional and has no normative implications for judicial decision-making. The second possibility is a function-based taxonomy that classifies laws according to their social functions. Function-based taxonomy can influence legal…Read more
-
28Demystifying Legal Reasoning (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2008.Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise speci…Read more
-
5JM Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 19 (3): 160-163. 1999.
-
28Rules and judicial reviewLegal Theory 6 (3): 299-321. 2000.Judicial review of statutes on constitutional grounds is affected by a cluster of doctrinal practices that are generally accepted, but not very well explained, by the courts and not entirely consistent with each other. Courts usually judge statutes rather than as written; 1 they favor of valid applications of statutes from invalid or possibly invalid applications when possible; 2 and they interpret statutes in ways that avoid constitutional difficulty. 3 These overlapping practices presumably ar…Read more
-
828 Law and Philosophy at OddsIn Francis J. Mootz (ed.), On Philosophy in American Law, Cambridge University Press. pp. 241. 2009.
-
1J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory Of Ideology (review)Philosophy in Review 19 160-163. 1999.
-
The rules of obligationsIn Andrew Robertson & Hang Wu Tang (eds.), The goals of private law, Hart. 2009.
-
Cornell UniversityRegular Faculty
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy |