Emmie Malone

While humans have long used bags to transport small items with them on their person, handbags as a modern gendered phenomenon did not emerge until the 18th century, with the rise of the French 'reticule'. This was eventually followed up by the emergence, in England, of more expensive and structured leather purses during the 19th century and the first attempt to explain the (gendered) appeal of bags during the same time. In this case, it was Sigmund Freud who argued that bags represent female genitalia and that the use of handbags by women represents a psychosexual enactment of a kind of sexual play. This is, at once, a theory of 1) what bags mean and 2) why women tend to like them. To this day, Freud’s theory remains the dominant account of the aesthetics of bags, both in terms of their value and their meaning. Here, I argue against Freud's answers to both 1 and 2. I also trace the history of both the development of handbags and the public and intellectual discourse around them. The lesson of this history is that while handbags don't mean anything in general, the way that Freud has argued, they can still mean in the same way that other forms of adornment can (and in some uniquely handbag ways). Finally, I also provide a kind of deflationary answer to 2, one which grounds the value of bags in a gender-neutral way and thereby calls us to ask why men don’t tend to recognize and take up this value.

There are many paradoxes of aversive or painful art. We enjoy being disgusted, scared, sad, and stressed in engaging with art in a way that we don’t, for instance, on the train into work. A similar problem arises in extreme music (metal, hardcore punk, and their various offshoots). In this case, the puzzle is explaining why we enjoy listening to screaming in extreme music but not in our workaday lives. Here, I argue that there is not one, but many answers to the screamed vocals problem. Particular kinds of musical screaming take on their character and value according to the function they play in different genre practices and in order to support the values and activities of those communities. Accordingly, we ought to be pragmatic pluralists about musical screaming. Beyond attempting to make sense of this one particular problem from the philosophy of popular music, I also argue that thinking carefully about the screamed vocals problem can help us clarify some merits of a good aesthetic explanation.

Now is a great time to be working in philosophy of popular music. Work is currently being done on rap and hip-hop, pop, E.D.M., country, metal, and punk. Besides this, the problem-space of popular music in general is growing as well. Topics of interest across all of these genres include the nature of versioning, the metaphysics of musical groups, hooks, and groove, among others. If there is any one scholar within analytic philosophy who can take credit for this explosion of work, it is Theodore Gracyk. Gracyk’s pioneering Rhythm and Noise (1996) definitively carved the philosophy of popular music off from the philosophy of music and the rest is, in many ways, history. Now, almost twenty years later, he has followed that work up with Making Meaning in Popular Song (2023), a collection of nine updated but previously published essays from between 2007 and 2017. This new collection, spanning ten years of work, brings together a variety of different threads and places them all into a larger context alongside one another. The emerging picture shows us a more complete vision of Gracyk’s pragmatics-driven philosophy of popular music. It is worth pointing out that the book recently won the American Society for Aesthetics Outstanding Monograph Prize, a fitting recognition of Gracyk’s enormous contributions to the philosophy of popular music. In what follows, I will very briefly summarize these essays in order, after which I will discuss the merits of the book along with one particular critical concern.

In “Authenticity: What is it, Does it Matter, and Why?”, Emmie Malone looks at the role that the concept of authenticity plays in art and our aesthetic lives. People often claim that they love their favorite musical artist because they are authentic, they debate whether popular restaurant chains are authentic Mexican food (for instance), and they seek out authentic travel experiences while on vacation. Yet, what does any of this mean, and why should we care at all? Malone explores a number of theories and cases (from Philly cheesesteaks to Drake, Blink-182, South African tourism, and Cajun cuisine), outlining the pros and cons of each. She also takes a critical look at the concept, discussing the ways in which it can be used to gatekeep, dismiss, and regulate the work and experiences of women and people of color. In the end, Malone argues that different aesthetic practices develop their own concepts of authenticity, and whether these concepts are worth having will depend on what function they serve within those practices.

Genres inform our appreciative practices. What it takes for a work to be a good work of comedy is different than what it takes for a work to be a good work of horror, and a failure to recognize this will lead to a failure to appreciate comedies or works of horror particularly well. Likewise, it is not uncommon to hear people say that a film or novel is a good work, but not a good work of x (where x is the genre of that work). A work can be good all things considered, but genre membership provides us with an additional set of evaluative criteria over and above those of the medium, which colors how we interpret and appreciate the work. Given this importance, it is not surprising that philosophers of art have been interested in providing an account of what, exactly, a genre is. Despite this interest, there is not widespread agreement about what it takes for something to be a genre, nor what kinds of considerations are relevant in determining whether a work is a member of that genre. Beyond this, we might also want to know to what degree we ought to consider genre in evaluating a work of art and why it should matter at all. Here, I explore the variety of recent theories that philosophers have taken up on the topic of genre and why we should ultimately think of genres as artistic practices rather than the alternatives.

Musicians, listeners, and record labels sort music into genres like jazz, punk, heavy metal, and so on. Metaphysically, what kind of thing is a genre? This paper explores the idea that music genres are historical individuals. The obvious way to develop this is to think of a music genre as being like a biological species. Although that approach has much to recommend it, we argue that it faces an insuperable difficulty: what we dub the problem of independent origins. We argue, instead, that a genre is a historical individual governed by an institution or social practice.

An Introduction to Contemporary Aesthetics: Art, Community, and Experience gives students and other readers a comprehensive sense of the dynamic issues and problems in aesthetics and philosophy of art today. Each of the 14 chapters is written by a different expert in the field and together they cover a wide range of methodological approaches and perspectives, including those from analytic and Continental philosophy, non-Eurocentric global traditions, and critical stances taken up by feminist philosophers and philosophers of race. In addition, the volume makes use of recent empirical work on art and beauty as well as examples of artistic expressions from cultures from around the world. In contrast to other coursebooks, which are often structured entirely around artforms, this volume frames much of its contents around core aesthetic concepts--like good or bad taste, interpretation, or authenticity--with each chapter devoted to a different concept. Within each chapter, the reader will find a range of engaging artforms and experiences. The contents of the volume are laid out in four sections: the first focuses on foundational questions in aesthetics, and the second on key aesthetic concepts. The third section focuses on applied questions relating to particular artforms and genres (e.g., horror, comedy, AI art, games). Finally, the last section of the volume takes a wider, but still practical, view; focusing on why aesthetic life matters to us, both as a society and as individuals. Key Features Written in a non-technical style for readers new to aesthetics and with little or no background in philosophy or the study of the arts Draws on examples readers encounter in everyday life and popular culture, from Drake to Philly cheesesteaks Deals with questions that concern many college students today: Does authenticity even matter and, if so, why? What's wrong with enjoying the work of an immoral artist? How are our homes and schools important places of aesthetic meaning? Each chapter is written as a biased survey, with clear coverage of the historical and contemporary literature on the topic but also from a distinct, subjective point of view Non-Eurocentric philosophies or examples are included throughout the book, highlighting the rich and diverse philosophical work from around the globe Discussion Questions offer student readers opportunities to engage more fully with the problems raised in the text Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of each chapter identify the most promising avenues for further research on the topic.

AI researchers and ethicists have long worried about the threat that automation poses to human dignity, autonomy, and to the sense of personal value that is tied to work. Typically, proposed solutions to this problem focus on ways in which we can reduce the number of job losses which result from automation, ways to retrain those that lose their jobs, or ways to mitigate the social consequences of those job losses. However, even in cases where workers keep their jobs, their agency within those roles might be severely downgraded. For instance, human employees might work alongside artificial intelligence (AI) but not be allowed to make decisions or not be allowed to make decisions without consulting with or coming to agreement with the AI. Here, we argue that this is a kind of epistemic harm (which could be an injustice if it is distributed on the basis of identity prejudice). It diminishes human agency (in constraining people’s ability to act independently), and it fails to recognize the workers’ epistemic agency as qualified experts. Workers, in this case, aren’t given the trust they are entitled to. This means that issues of human dignity remain even in cases where everyone keeps their job. Further, job retention focused solutions, such as designing an algorithm to work alongside the human employee, may only enable these harms. In response to this, we propose an alternative design solution, adversarial collaboration, which addresses the traditional retention problem of automation, but also addresses the larger underlying problem of epistemic harms and the distribution of trust between AI and humans in the workplace.

Inventing Knowledge: A Global & Historical Introduction to Philosophy is an open educational resource (OER) textbook designed for a cross-cultural historical-survey style Introduction to Philosophy course. While it was written with an undergraduate academic audience in mind, it should also be suitable for self-guided readers interested in philosophy. It covers ‘western' philosophy from the Presocratics of Ancient Greece through to the present day (and including the Islamic world). It also contains additional chapters on philosophy in India, China, Mesoamerica, and Africa. The text touches on issues concerning, but not limited to, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. Upon working through the material covered here, students should be able to identify and discuss many of the central figures, concepts, problems, theories, and schools of philosophy across history and across the world.

The increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in our daily life through various applications, services, and products explains the significance of trust/distrust in AI from a user perspective. AI-driven systems have significantly diffused into various fields of our lives, serving as beneficial tools used by human agents. These systems are also evolving to act as co-assistants or semi-agents in specific domains, potentially influencing human thought, decision-making, and agency. Trust/distrust in AI plays the role of a regulator and could significantly control the level of this diffusion, as trust can increase, and distrust may reduce the rate of adoption of AI. Recently, varieties of studies have paid attention to the variant dimension of trust/distrust in AI, and its relevant considerations. In this systematic literature review, after conceptualization of trust in the current AI literature review, we will investigate trust in different types of human-Machine interaction, and its impact on technology acceptance in different domains. In addition to that, we propose a taxonomy of technical (i.e., safety, accuracy, robustness) and non-technical axiological (i.e., ethical, legal, and mixed) trustworthiness metrics, and some trustworthy measurements. Moreover, we examine some major trust-breakers in AI (e.g., autonomy and dignity threat), and trust makers; and propose some future directions and probable solutions for the transition to a trustworthy AI.

Country music critics and scholars have noticed an apparent contradiction between the practical identity of country music and the image of the male country singer as the 'rhinestone cowboy'. In this case, the problem is one of how we can make sense of the rural, working-class, ruggedly masculinity persona common to the genre with its elaborately embroidered, brightly colored, and highly embellished male fashion. The intractability of this problem has led some to argue that the simplest solution is to just deny the legitimacy of country music authenticity discourse altogether. That is, all the genre’s talk of the rural working class is inauthentic and should be discarded. Here, I argue that by accounting for country music authenticity in terms of the genre being a dual character concept, we can fully address the skeptic's worries. Beyond merely being compatible with the Nudie suit however, this notion of authenticity is also our best way of understanding the aesthetic value of the rhinestone cowboy image at all. The resulting picture, in which the suit primarily serves as an epistemic signifier of one’s standing in the country music community, allows for the Nudie suit to function as a class, and sometimes queer, commentary on mainstream culture.

Genres inform our appreciative practices. What it takes for a work to be a good work of comedy is different than what it takes for a work to be a good work of horror, and a failure to recognize this will lead to a failure to appreciate comedies or works of horror particularly well. Likewise, it is not uncommon to hear people say that a film or novel is a good work, but not a good work of x (where x is the genre of that work). A work can be good all things considered, but genre membership provides us with an additional set of evaluative criteria over and above those of the medium, which colors how we interpret and appreciate the work. Given this importance, it is not surprising that philosophers of art have been interested in providing an account of what, exactly, a genre is. Despite this interest, there is not widespread agreement about what it takes for something to be a genre, nor what kinds of considerations are relevant in determining whether a work is a member of that genre. Beyond this, we might also want to know to what degree we ought to consider genre in evaluating a work of art and why it should matter at all. Here, I explore the variety of recent theories that philosophers have taken up on the topic of genre and why we should ultimately think of genres as artistic practices rather than the alternatives.

It has been over two decades since Miranda Fricker labeled epistemic injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their capacity as a knower. The philosophical literature has proliferated with variants and related concepts. By considering cases in popular music, we argue that it is worth distinguishing a parallel phenomenon of art-interpretive injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their creative capacity as a possible artist. In section 1, we consider the prosecutorial use of rap lyrics in court as a central case of this injustice. In section 2, we distinguish art-interpretive injustice from other categories already discussed in recent literature. In section 3, we discuss the relationship between genre discourse and identity prejudice. The case for recognizing the category of art-interpretive injustice is that it allows one to recognize a class of harms as being importantly related in ways that one would otherwise overlook.

Genre discourse is widespread in appreciative practice, whether that is about hip-hop music, romance novels, or film noir. It should be no surprise then, that philosophers of art have also been interested in genres. Whether they are giving accounts of genres as such or of particular genres, genre talk abounds in philosophy as much as it does the popular discourse. As a result, theories of genre proliferate as well. However, in their accounts, philosophers have so far focused on capturing all of the categories of art that we think of as genres and have focused less on ensuring that only the categories we think are genres are captured by those theories. Each of these theories populates the world with far too many genres because they call a wide class of mere categories of art genres. I call this the problem of genre explosion. In this paper, I survey the existing accounts of genre and describe the kinds of considerations they employ in determining whether a work is a work of a given genre. After this, I demonstrate the ways in which the problem of genre explosion arises for all of these theories and discuss some solutions those theories could adopt that will ultimately not work. Finally, I argue that the problem of genre explosion is best solved by adopting a social view of genres, which can capture the difference between genres and mere categories of art.

Groove, as a musical quality, is an important part of jazz and pop music appreciative practices. Groove talk is widespread among musicians and audiences, and considerable importance is placed on generating and appreciating grooves in music. However, musicians, musicologists, and audiences use groove attributions in a variety of ways that do not track one consistent underlying concept. I argue that that there are at least two distinct concepts of groove. On one account, groove is ‘the feel of the music’ and, on the other, groove is the psychological feeling (induced by music) of wanting to move one’s body. Further, I argue that recent work in music psychology shows that these two concepts do not converge on a unified set of musical features. Finally, I also argue that these two concepts play different functional roles in the appreciative practices of jazz and popular music. This should cause us to further consider the mediating role genre plays for aesthetic concepts and provides us with reason for adopting a more communitarian approach to aesthetics which is attentive to the ways in which aesthetic discourse serves the practices of different audiences.

In the small but growing literature on the philosophy of country music, the question of how we ought to understand the genre’s notion of authenticity has emerged as one of the central questions. Many country music scholars argue that authenticity claims track attributions of cultural standing or artistic self-expression. However, careful attention to the history of the genre reveals that these claims are simply factually wrong. On the basis of this, we have grounds for dismissing these attributions. Here, I argue for an alternative model of authenticity in which we take claims about the relative authenticity of country music to be evidence of ‘country’ being a dual character concept in the same way that it has been suggested of punk rock and hip-hop. Authentic country music is country music that embodies the core value commitments of the genre. These values form the basis of country artists’ and audiences’ practical identities. Part of country music’s aesthetic practice is that audiences reconnect with, reify, and revise this common practical identity through identification with artists and works that manifest these values. We should then think of authenticity discourse within country music as a kind of game within the genre’s practice of shaping and maintaining this practical identity.

Many widely divergent accounts of luck have been offered or employed in discussing an equally wide range of philosophical topics. We should, then, expect to find some unified philosophical conception of luck of which moral luck, epistemic luck, and luck egalitarianism are species. One of the attempts to provide such an account is that offered by Duncan Pritchard, which he refers to as the modal account. This view commits us to calling an event lucky when it obtains in this world, but fails to obtain in a wide class of nearby possible worlds. In support of this account, Pritchard argues that a theory of luck ought to capture the fact that luck comes in degrees and that luck is closely associated with risk. I argue against this claim by suggesting that an understanding of luck grounded in considerations of probability is better able to satisfy these demands, and that the probability theory better explains exemplary cases of luck like those brought up by Pritchard.