Emrys Westacott

From Socrates to Thoreau, most philosophers, moralists, and religious leaders have seen frugality as a virtue and have associated simple living with wisdom, integrity, and happiness. But why? And are they right? Is a taste for luxury fundamentally misguided? If one has the means to be a spendthrift, is it foolish or reprehensible to be extravagant? In this book, Emrys Westacott examines why, for more than two millennia, so many philosophers and people with a reputation for wisdom have been advocating frugality and simple living as the key to the good life. He also looks at why most people have ignored them, but argues that, in a world facing environmental crisis, it may finally be time to listen to the advocates of a simpler way of life. The Wisdom of Frugality explores what simplicity means, why it's supposed to make us better and happier, and why, despite its benefits, it has always been such a hard sell. The book looks not only at the arguments in favor of living frugally and simply, but also at the case that can be made for luxury and extravagance, including the idea that modern economies require lots of getting and spending. A philosophically informed reflection rather than a polemic, The Wisdom of Frugality ultimately argues that we will be better off—as individuals and as a society—if we move away from the materialistic individualism that currently rules.

In this work I examine the nature of, the motivations for, and some important objections to a relativistic conception of truth and rationality. I define relativism, in its most general form, as consisting of two claims: the truth value of all judgements is relative to some particular standpoint; no standpoint is supremely privileged over all others. These theses constitute the doctrinal kernel of most forms of contemporary relativism, and understood properly, I argue, they represent a coherent philosophical position. But critics of relativism often charge that relativists, because they refuse to grant a privileged status to the epistemic norms and standards which they employ, cannot consistently adopt a critical attitude to the beliefs and practices of any community, including their own. I examine this line of reasoning as it is advanced in different ways by two leading contemporary thinkers, Hilary Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. I agree with Putnam and Habermas that the concept of rationality is irreducible normative, that normative judgements can be objective in much the same way as factual judgements, and that social theorists should not try to render their analyses value-free. But I argue that they are mistaken in supposing that relativism entails the denial of any of these claims. Historically, because of the way it emerged in modern thought, relativism may have been associated with a distrust of normative judgements, but the form of relativism I wish to defend can accommodate them. ;Showing relativism to be theoretically coherent, however, is not the same thing as giving everyone a compelling reason to adopt it as their own position. Ultimately, I believe, inducements to embrace relativism have to be practical rather than theoretical. And while relativists can produce such arguments to justify their position, these are not usually powerful enough to persuade those who have no initial predisposition towards a relativistic outlook

Mill’s On Liberty is a seminal text in modern social/political philosophy, but there are several dimensions to this text that frequently confuse undergraduates. First, Mill’s uses of “utility” are not obviously consistent. Second, Mill offers varied formulations of his harm principle which are potentially conflicting. Third, lacking a greater context for the work, students sometimes mistake Mill’s goal for an attempt to draw a line between actions that should and should not be legal. This paper presents, explains, and defends some pedagogical aids for diminishing these confusions. Since most confusion stems from Mill’s harm principle, the author offers two diagrams, to be presented to students before wading into the text, which clarify Mill’s argumentative strategy and the place of his harm principle (as well as his various ways of qualifying it) within the work as a whole. By detailing the work and its aims at a highly general level, these diagrams help give students a roadmap with which to navigate the text and allow them to more easily understand the purpose and application of Mill’s project.

When is gossiping morally acceptable? In order to explore and develop a principled answer to this question, I pose the problem in a simplified, abstract form: What considerations govern what it is permissible for A to say to B about C? My approach involves first constructing a decision tree out of questions that apply general moral principles to any particular case. These principles filter out talk which, under normal circumstances, would be widely regarded as impermissible, such as breaches of confidence, deliberate falsehoods, or talk likely to produce more future harm than good. They also declare talk which is not contrary to C’s wishes, or which is likely to bring about some tangible further good, to be morally acceptable.The most interesting and controversial type of case is the kind that is not resolved by any of these considerations. People who view gossip in general with suspicion would presumably hold all such talk to be objectionable. I consider and reject several arguments in support of this view. I then look at reasons, mainly utilitarian, for declaring all such talk to be morally acceptable. I argue that these are not sufficient, either individually or collectively, to establish this universal conclusion; there are too many additional variables rendering our moral deliberations irreducibly complex. But they do bring out the many positive aspects of gossip that are often overlooked.

In discussions of racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice, two kinds of fallacious reasoning sometimes appear: the and the. The first fallacy treats someone's subjective response to a comment as sufficient evidence of prejudice or insensitivity. This fails to acknowledge that the reasonableness of the response is always an open question. The second fallacy involves dismissing what people accused of prejudice say in their defence on the grounds that the privileged always speak that way. This insultingly treats what is said as an effect of causes rather than the result of rational reflection. Both forms of specious reasoning risk bringing the worthy cause of combatting prejudice into disrepute

Chris Horner and Emrys Westacott present a clear and accessible introduction to some of the central problems of philosophy through challenging and stimulating the reader to think beyond the conventional answers to fundamental questions. No previous knowledge is assumed, and in lively and provocative chapters the authors invite the reader to explore questions about the nature of science, religion, ethics, politics, art, the mind, the self, knowledge and truth. Each chapter includes inset boxes providing links to classic philosophy texts on the issues discussed. In addition, the book relates the adventure of philosophy to some of the key principles of critical thinking.

Rudeness is normally viewed as a moral failing, but there are times when it is excusable or even justified. In this article I propose a definition of the concept that helps us ascertain whether, why, and to what extent a rude action is blameworthy or excusable. I consider the most common sorts of circumstance in which rudeness is morally acceptable, and I argue that the perceived increase in rudeness is, in large part, a consequence of our living in a dynamic society where egalitarian attitudes challenge established hierarchies.