Enrico Cipriani

_Abstract_: Immediately after introducing transformational grammar in _Syntactic structures_, Noam Chomsky began to employ the formal grammar he developed to investigate language from an internalist and nativist perspective. In doing so, he proposed that linguistics could be integrated into the core natural sciences. This ambitious project was met with immediate criticism, particularly targeting the abstract nature of the entities posited by linguistic theory. Chomsky responded by articulating the methodological principles underlying his work, known as methodological naturalism. According to Chomsky, in order for linguistics to qualify as a core natural science, it must adopt the same methodological framework as the hard sciences (e.g., biology, physics). In principle, Chomsky’s argument is persuasive; however, when applied to assess the validity of linguistic theory, it reveals a certain degree of arbitrariness. This issue is explored in §2. In §3, I address a deeper problem in Chomsky’s approach. After summarizing Lakatos’s concept of a research program, I turn to the theory of Universal Grammar (UG) and the Minimalist Program (MP) to argue that both lack the scientific status attributed to them by Chomsky and others. Specifically, following Lakatos, I propose replacing the notion of a UG _theory_ with that of a UG _research program_. I argue that both the UG program and the MP should be considered unscientific, as the _cores_ (in Lakatos’s sense) of these programs consist of unfalsifiable hypotheses, which prevent us from determining whether the programs are progressive or degenerative. _Keywords_: Methodological Naturalism; Transformational Grammar; Universal Grammar; Minimalist Program; Falsifiability; Research Program _Chomsky e il naturalismo metodologico. Sullo statuto scientifico dei programmi di ricerca di Chomsky__ _ _Riassunto: _Subito dopo aver introdotto la grammatica trasformazionale in _Syntactic structures_, Noam Chomsky iniziò a utilizzare la grammatica trasformazionale per indagare il linguaggio da una prospettiva internista e innatista. In questo modo, propose che la linguistica potesse essere integrata tra le scienze naturali di base. Questo ambizioso progetto ricevette critiche immediate, dovute soprattutto alla natura astratta delle entità postulate dalla teoria linguistica. Chomsky rispose articolando i principi metodologici alla base del suo lavoro, noti come naturalismo metodologico. Secondo Chomsky, affinché la linguistica possa qualificarsi come scienza naturale di base, deve adottare lo stesso quadro metodologico delle scienze dure (ad esempio la biologia e la fisica). In linea di principio, l’argomento di Chomsky è persuasivo; tuttavia, se usato per valutare la validità della teoria linguistica, rivela un certo grado di arbitrarietà. Questi aspetti saranno trattati nel §2. Nel §3 tratterò un problema più profondo: dopo una breve presentazione del concetto di programma di ricerca di Lakatos, prenderò in esame la teoria della Grammatica Universale (GU) e il Programma Minimalista (PM) per sostenere come entrambi manchino dello statuto scientifico che Chomsky e altri attribuiscono loro. In particolare, seguendo Lakatos, propongo di sostituire la nozione di _teoria_ della GU con quella di _programma di ricerca_ sulla GU e sostengo, inoltre, che sia il programma GU e che il programma minimalista debbano essere considerati non scientifici, poiché i nuclei (nel senso di Lakatos) di tali programmi consistono in ipotesi infalsificabili, che impediscono di stabilire se i programmi siano progressivi o degenerativi. _Parole chiave_: Naturalismo metodologico; Grammatica trasformazionale; Grammatica universale; Programma minimalista; Falsificabilità; Programma di ricerca.

My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be efficacious only under the assumption of conceptual innateness. I then focus on Chomsky’s analysis of necessary propositions. In particular, I present Chomsky’s objection to Kripke’s essentialism, and Chomsky’s hypothesis that the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is determined by the structure of the conceptual system and its relations with other systems of common-sense understanding. I highlight that this hypothesis is not compatible with Chomsky’s own objection to Kripke.

In this paper, I will focus on the debate between descriptivism and antidescriptivism theory about proper names. In Section I, I will propose an historical reconstruction of the debate, and I will focus in particular on Russell and Kripke's treatments of proper names. Some criticisms will be advanced against Kripke's hypothesis of rigid-designator and, more clearly, against the consequent distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical level that Kripke proposes to explain identity assertions between proper names. Furthermore, I will argue, that, pace Kripke, Russellian treatment of proper names allows to capture all our semantic intuitions, and also those semantic interpretations which concern context-belief sentences. I will close Section I by focusing on a criticism that Kripke rightly points out against an example that Russell proposes in his On Denoting. Section II will be devoted to Russellian solution: I will show that not only Russell's logical treatment of proper names allows to answer to Kripke's criticism to Russell's example, but also that such treatment can disambiguate and express all our semantic intuitions about Frege's puzzle sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. I will then show that, contrarily, Quinian solution (discussed in Section III) and Kripkian one (see Section IV) are not satisfactory to capture our semantic knowledge about Frege's sentence. Furthermore, in Section IV I will focus on Kripke's distinction between epistemic and metaphysical level to deal with identity assertions between proper names, and I will logically show that such distinction is not plausible. In Section V, then, I will show that Russellian solution allows to explain context-belief sentences, contrarily to what Kripke thinks. In VI, I will summarize what I have argued in the text and I will draw some morals.