Enrico Terrone

A pluralist ontology of art states that works of art can belong to distinct ontological categories whereas a monist ontology states that all works of art belong to one ontological category. A monist ontology would be preferable since it is more informative about the nature of art, and may pave the way for a definition of art. Yet, monist conceptions struggle to deal with cultural practices of art appreciation. In the first part of the paper, I will discuss the main monist strategies in the ontology of art, and I will argue that all these strategies find it hard to deal with the relevant cultural practices. Then, I will propose a new monist ontology according to which all works of art are norm‐constituted entities. Finally, I will show that this account deals better than its competitors with the relevant cultural practices.

This paper argues that the Kodak Carousel pitch in Mad Men functions as a piece of “television-philosophy” that articulates the nature of nostalgia. By situating Donald Draper’s speech within psychological and philosophical debates on emotions, the paper shows how Mad Men exemplifies nostalgia’s intentional structure—memory, imagination, and desire fused in a bittersweet attitude. Through Draper’s slideshow, visuals, and sound, the series highlights the dual role of nostalgia in identity: fostering self-continuity, esteem, and connection, while also masking existential fracture.

One can either take consciousness as the absolute focus of appreciation or rather focus on the contribution of consciousness to the aesthetic appreciation of another item. This paper focuses on a specific item to which consciousness might give a significant aesthetic contribution, namely, the universe. First, I will explain in which sense the universe can be an object of aesthetic appreciation. Then, I will consider how such appreciation is affected when consciousness enters the picture. Finally, I will wonder whether consciousness enriches the aesthetic value of the universe, weighing reasons for both the positive and the negative answer to this question.

Philosophical accounts of design aesthetics typically focus on either an object’s perceived fitness for function or on how well it fulfils its intended purpose. This focus, however, overlooks the phenomenology of using designed objects. This paper argues for the importance of this aspect of design aesthetics and subsequently considers how best to characterise this type of aesthetically pleasing agentive experience. First, drawing on work in the aesthetics of games and dance, we argue that aesthetically pleasing use is characterised by a feeling of effortlessness: the experience of performing complex actions with a sense of ease. Second, we argue that the agentive aesthetics of design differs from that of games or dance because it is embedded in everyday life in a way that games and dance are not. Unlike those made as part of a game or dance performance, the beautiful actions elicited by a well-designed object are performed in the light of a user’s goals, interests, and values.

This paper considers two issues raised by the claim that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. First, given that artifacts normally have functions, what is the function of a fictional character? Second, given that, in experiencing works of fictions, we usually treat fictional characters as concrete individuals, how can such a phenomenology fit with an ontology according to which fictional characters are abstract artifacts? I will indirectly address the second issue by directly addressing the first one. For this purpose, I will rely on the notion of a mental file. I will argue that the function of fictional characters is the generation of mental files of a special kind. I will show that our experience of fictional characters as concrete individuals depends on the kind of mental files that are generated by fictional characters as abstract artifacts. I will conclude that an appreciator of a work of fiction can open two files about a certain fictional character; one about the character as an individual in the fictional world, and the other about the character as an abstract artifact in the actual world. In this sense, our relation to a fictional character is characterized by a duality of files or ‘twofileness’.

This paper proposes a new account of depiction, namely the ‘artifactual theory’, which aims to supplement the so-called “experiential accounts”. The latter characterize pictures as eliciting a perceptual experience of what is represented. Drawing on philosophical accounts of technical artifacts and on their notions of structure and function, the artifactual theory casts the generation of a peculiar perceptual experience as the function that pictures perform in virtue of their structure. The paper argues that the artifactual theory leads us to a compelling taxonomy of pictorial kinds that accounts for not only paradigmatic two-dimensional pictures such as paintings but also “threedimensional pictures” such as statues, and even “immaterial pictures” such as those of virtual reality. Specifically, the artifactual theory enables us to individuate the three basic pictorial kinds thereby situating virtual reality, statues and paintings in the pictorial realm in an effective and insightful way that captures both what they have in common and what makes each of them special.

Despite numerous publications on the philosophy of technology, little attention has been paid to the relationship between being and value in technology, two aspects which are usually treated separately. This volume addresses this issue by drawing connections between the ontology of technology on the one hand and technology’s ethical and aesthetic significance on the other. The book first considers what technology is and what kind of entities it produces. Then it examines the moral implications of technology. Finally, it explores the connections between technology and the arts.

In this paper, we argue that Midjourney—a generative AI program that transforms text prompts into images—should be understood not as an agent or a tool, but as a new type of artistic medium. We first examine the view of Midjourney as an agent, considering whether it could be seen as an artist or co-author. This perspective proves unsatisfactory, as Midjourney lacks intentionality and mental states. We then explore the notion of Midjourney as a tool, highlighting its unpredictability and the limited fine-grained control users have over its outputs, which sets it apart from traditional artistic tools. We propose that creating images with Midjourney parallels a gardener's interaction with natura naturans—nature's autonomous generative processes. Similarly, Midjourney acts as machina naturans, where users engage with its dynamic recalcitrance to influence, but not fully control, the creative process. This approach presents Midjourney as an artistic medium shaped by its inherent unpredictability.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, or so we are told. Filippo Contesi, Enrico Terrone, Marta Campdelacreu and Genoveva Martí argue that the traditional view in philosophy of art is that, whilst most of us claim to believe that beauty is subjective, we actually act as though it is objective. The true problem of aesthetics then, is not whether or not we believe that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but why our behaviour around beauty doesn’t match up with our stated beliefs. Beauty, it seems, is more than skin-deep.

Works of art are usually meant to elicit psychological effects from their audiences whereas paradigmatic technical artifacts such as hammers or cars are rather meant to produce physical effects when used. This suggests that works of art and technical artifacts are sharply different entities. However, recent developments in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of technology have individuated special artifacts, namely cognitive and affective artifacts, which also generate psychological effects. In particular, affective artifacts, which have the capacity to alter the affective condition of agents, seem to share crucial features with works of art. Can we subsume works of art under that kind? I will argue that we cannot. Still, comparing art with affective artifacts will help us to clarify the relationship between art and technology, and to introduce a new category, namely the experiential artifact, which can properly encompass works of art.

This introduction accounts for three main elements characterizing digital media and the recent history of their interpretation and understanding. The authors label these three elements: “interaction”; “recording”; and “autonomy.” First, digital media somehow subvert the traditional notion of mass media. In digital media, the masses do not passively receive information; rather, they contribute to its creation and diffusion. Second, digital media involve a complete overlapping between communication, on the one hand, and recording, registration and keeping track, on the other. For sure, information production and communication remain important aspects of digital media. And yet, for a few years now, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand. The third element characterizing digital media is that a crucial role is assigned to software, which is not only able to transmit and store information, but also to manipulate it. Digital media do not limit themselves to help our minds or to interconnect us with other human subjects. In digital media, recording often involves the autonomous manipulation, combination, and recombination of what is recorded.

This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception, standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper proposes an ontology of depiction according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its standard of correctness.

In the debate on our engagement with and appreciation of fiction films, the thesis that the viewer of a fiction film imagines observing fictional events, and the thesis that these events are imagined to be presented by a narrator, are usually taken as two components of one theoretical package, which philosophers such as George Wilson and Jerrold Levison defend, while philosophers such as Gregory Currie and Berys Gaut reject. This paper argues that the two theses can be disentangled and investigates their logical connection. The investigation shows that the second thesis entails the first but there is no entailment the other way around. Endorsing the first thesis is thus compatible with two options, namely endorsing the second thesis or abandoning it. However, the paper argues that if we endorse the first thesis, endorsing the second provides us with a more compelling explanation of our engagement with and appreciation of fiction films.

According to the standard view of pictorial reference, a picture produces singular thought in virtue of both its appearance and its history. Zeimbekis (2010) challenges this view, arguing that the perception of the picture's appearance does not contribute to the production of singular thought. The paper defends the standard view from Zeimbekis' challenge, specifying the roles of appearance and history in pictorial reference. While knowledge about the picture's history allows one to identify the standpoint from which to see the scene depicted, the perception of the picture's appearance exploits that standpoint to single out individuals in that scene.

This paper casts the television series BoJack Horseman as a challenge to the genre that Stanley Cavell calls “the comedy of remarriage.” First, it is argued that the last season of the series explicitly suggests but finally contradicts the narrative pattern of the comedy of remarriage. Then, the impossibility of remarriage in BoJack Horseman is traced back to some structural features of the medium of television and its relationship to time. Finally, the impossibility of remarriage in BoJack Horseman is related to the capacity of the medium of television to enable self-defeating fictions which challenge fiction as a cultural institution.

A series of recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians have noted in our aesthetic judgments and practices, viz. the problem of taste. The existence of the problem has been acknowledged since Hume and Kant, though not enough has been done to analyse it in depth. In this paper, we remedy this by proposing six possible conceptualizations of it. Drawing on our analysis of the problem of taste, we argue that the experimental results in question are not a real challenge to its existence. By contrast, they provide empirical evidence in its support.

The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion‐based accounts proposed by Noël Carroll, Trevor Ponech, and Carl Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Gregory Currie's account can do so by relying on the notion of trace, but this involves an undesirable side effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces of their subjects, as, for instance, documentaries that resort to reenactment. Is there a way to exclude docudramas from the documentary without also excluding other films that we usually treat as documentaries? This article affirmatively answers by relying on the notion of perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form by endorsing the demonstrative content of one's perception. While documentaries primarily involve the formation of perceptual beliefs, docudramas invite us to form nonperceptual beliefs by primarily involving the formation of perceptual imaginings. That is why docudramas are not documentaries. By contrast, a documentary that resorts to reenactment primarily involves the formation of perceptual beliefs, namely, perceptual beliefs about the reenactment itself.

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Stacie Friend’s claim that fiction is a genre, her notion of genre can be fruitfully applied to a paradigmatic genre such as science fiction. This article deploys Friend’s notion of genre in order to improve the influential characterization of science fiction proposed by Darko Suvin and to defend it from a criticism recently raised by Simon Evnine. According to Suvin, a work of science fiction must concern “a fictional ‘novum’ validated by cognitive logic.” While Suvin conceives of his characterization as a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the genre, I propose to cast the notions of “fictional novum” and “cognitive validation” as standard features of the genre, which works of science fiction should have but might lack. I argue that this amended version of Suvin’s characterization can better account for two basic properties of science fiction as a genre, namely its historicity and its relevance to appreciation. Lastly, I show that the amended version can shed some light on the affinity between works of science fiction and philosophical thought experiments.