Eric B. Litwack

Recent work in robotics has produced highly realistic androids that both look and act increasingly like human beings. Examples include Hanson Robotics’ Sophia, and the robots produced by Hiroshi Ishiguro at Osaka University, widely displayed online. Not only do such humanoid machines represent a great design achievement; they also may come to pose something of a stimulus to our natural tendency to anthropomorphize the non-human for a variety of reasons, sometimes problematically. We are increasingly presented with hyperrealistic simulacra that are toward what Masahiro Mori has termed ‘the uncanny valley’—the point at which we are jarred by a near perfect android. The problem of other minds will thus likely emerge as yet another polarizing debate in the near future. I will here argue that such robots blur our very notions of mind and human personhood problematically, and that their development should therefore be subject to a moratorium, pending serious public discussion and potential policies. In order to justify my claim, I will here cite recent work in robot and design studies and invoke the thesis of moderate moralism in aesthetics.

Originally known for his groundbreaking work in literary studies, the Bulgarian-born French scholar Tzvetan Todorov (1939-2017) was one of the world's foremost cultural theorists. His interventions cover an astounding range of topics, from narratology to ethics, from painting to politics, and from the Enlightenment to current affairs. Written by an international team of experts, this volume - the first-ever comprehensive examination of Todorov as a cultural critic - discusses the crucial elements of his work as well as his place in European thought.

Recent developments in artificial intelligence—AI--have caused considerable discussion among both philosophers of technology and psychotherapists. In particular, the question of whether or not new forms of AI will complement or even replace traditional psychotherapists has emerged as a major contemporary debate. This debate is not entirely new, as it has its origins in the Turing Test of 1950, and an early psychotherapy chatbot named Eliza, developed in 1966 at MIT. However, recent developments in AI technology, coupled with long waiting lists and variable access to psychotherapists have raised the question of machine psychotherapists in an urgent manner. Already, there are psychotherapy apps that one can download onto a standard smartphone and use in lieu of a human psychotherapist. In the near future, this simulacrum of a human therapist may be enhanced by the use of android therapists, programed to duplicate the knowledge and behavior of human therapists instantly, appealing to convenience or self-gratification through technology. This raises a host of ethical questions: can such beings be equally effective, and if so, ought we to reason in a consequentialist manner in their favor so as to increase accessibility and reduce costs through technology? Would there be a psychological difference between automated and potentially anthropomorphic therapy and genuine human therapy, if only a subtle one? Even if a chatbot or robot therapist is transparently such, is there an element of emotional manipulation and potential dishonesty in this interaction? Can the security of clients and their data be thus secured? I will argue that key aspects of chatbot psychotherapy present major ethical and clinical challenges in these areas, although transparent forms of it should not be legally banned. Keywords: chatbots, technological momentum, automation, psychotherapy, trust, anthropomorphism, data

In this work, I attempt to elucidate those views of the later Wittgenstein that I consider to be significant for ethics, and in particular, for moral justification. I then proceed to analyse some of the key claims and arguments of a number of Wittgensteinian ethicists who have used Wittgenstein's views in a variety of ways. These authors have been chosen both because of the inherent interest of their ideas, and because they are representative of some of the main ethical claims in Wittgensteinian philosophy. ;I have interpreted Wittgenstein as a humanistic critic of modern scientism, engaged in a project of philosophical anthropology. This involves a repudiation of reductionistic accounts of human behaviour such as positivism and mechanistic theories of the mind and human society. I hold Wittgenstein to have elaborated a humanistic account of persons, in which expression, forms of life and appropriate backgrounds to truth-claims and certainty figure prominently. I discuss the significance of aspect-perception, religion and particular insight as part of Wittgenstein's humanistic philosophy. The relevant questions of absolutism and cultural relativism are herein examined

In this article, the author explores some possible applications of Wittgenstein’s humanistic psychology, epistemology and philosophy of culture for the philosophy of technology, and more particularly, for the question of valuing a possible future technocracy over contemporary democratic systems. Major aspects of the article involve a discussion of some of Wittgenstein’s key views on certainty, cultural relativism, the problem of other minds, and gradual socio-cultural change. In order to examine these problems, the author draws from both a wide range of Wittgenstein’s works, as well as secondary sources in Wittgenstein studies. An analogy is made between socio-cultural change over time and gradual visual loss. The author has incorporated important elements of Wittgenstein’s biography, both as a philosopher and as an engineer and architect, underlining the profound link between his life and thought.

Susan M. Turner has argued that the use of animal analogs ought to be considered categorically unethical on deontological, or rights-grounds, and that some but not all animal analogs are unethical on utilitarian grounds. I claim, on the contrary, that the use of most, if not all animal analogs can be justified from both the utilitarian and animal rights perspectives. Indeed, I believe that a convincing case is to be made for the thesis that animal analogs ought to be promoted actively, on ethical grounds. I hold this to be true of both food and clothing replacement analogs, although I agree with Turner’s categorical condemnation of secondhand animal skin. I also hold that the general question of the preference for animal analogs over their original flesh and skin-based inspirations raises important questions about the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. I examine these in sympathy with the moderate aestheticist claims that some degree of distinction between these two spheres of value is desirable, and that the sublimation of powerful and problematical urges is normally preferable to their suppression

Introduction -- Wittgenstein's early conception of value -- An outline of tractarian ontology -- Value, the self, and the mystical -- The lecture on ethics -- Language-games, the private language argument and aspect psychology -- Language-games -- The private language argument -- Aspect psychology -- The soul and attitudes towards the living -- Wittgenstein's general conception of the soul -- Ilham Dilman on the soul and seeing-as -- Religious contexts -- J.B. Watson and the denial of the soul -- Attitudes towards other minds and forms of life -- The soul and the face -- Aspect blindness and dawning -- Particularism, rule-following, and evaluations -- David McNaughton on the property of humanity and particularism -- John McDowell on rule-following and values -- Peter Winch on moral particularism -- The meaning and value of the religious point of view -- Wittgenstein on Frazer's golden bough -- Truth in religion -- Wittgenstein on art : reactions and causes -- Aesthetics, causes, and natural history -- A contemporary evolutionary account of aesthetic value -- Neuro-scientific accounts -- Aesthetic realism and the definition of art -- Aesthetic historicism and relativism -- Institutional and historical theories of art -- Forms of life, moral truth, and justification -- Cora Diamond on forms on seeing-as theory and imagination -- Paul Johnston on moral justification and truth -- D.Z. Phillips and H.O. Mounce on the justification of morality -- Doubt and certainty : framework beliefs and core values -- An overview of certainty -- Avrum Stroll, Anthony O'Hear , and Cyril Barrett on certainty and value -- Cultural relativism and institutional embodiment -- Peter Winch on cultural relativism -- Sabina Lovibond on moral facts and institutional embodiment -- Cyril Barrett on cultural relativism -- Conclusion: How to do things with Wittgenstein.

In this article I examine what I term epistemic arguments against epistocratic dictatorships against the background of Harry Frankfurt’s claim that truth is a fundamental governing notion, and some key reflections of Václav Havel and Leszek Kolakowski. Some of the key epistemic arguments offered by Karl Popper, Robert A. Dahl and Ross Harrison are outlined and endorsed. They underscore the insurmountable problems involved in choosing and maintaining a state of allegedly perfectly wise and efficient rulers. Such rule by virtue of supposed supreme knowledge and expertise denies a truthful recognition of the inevitable fallibility of the state, and of government policies. Moreover, the repression of both citizens’ commitment to truthfulness and their attempts at political falsification will necessarily render dictatorships both continually prone to error and inevitably oppressive. Fallibilistic epistemology is thus seen as a formidable philosophical arsenal for anti-totalitarian and democratic thought, alongside ethical and historical arguments against dictatorship.