Eric D. Perl

The classic “retorsion” argument that any claim that all thought is relative is a self-refuting dialectical contradiction not only decisively refutes relativism but also demonstrates the presence of absolute truth in all thinking as its implicit enabling condition. In Augustine’s version, this takes the form of showing that truth itself, which Augustine identifies as God, is the “light of minds,” found within the soul by thought’s self-reflexive discovery of the ever-present condition for its own acts of judgment. In recent philosophy this argument is taken up in the transcendental Thomism of Pierre Scheuer, S.J., and, with important clarifying distinctions, in the objective idealism of Vittorio Hösle. Thomas Nagel uses the same argument to reach what amounts to the same conclusion, though he does not call this conclusion ‘God.’ This concurrence indicates that there is no third alternative between complete nihilism and divinity as conceived by Augustine, Scheuer, and Hösle.

St. Augustine’s tremendous influence on Western thought continues to provide scholars from all fields with fresh insights and new connections to the philosophical and theological questions posed by modernity. The twenty essays collected here attempt not only to discuss perennial problems as found in Augustine—human willing, the nature of time, sin and free will, the soul’s relationship to the body—but also bring Augustine’s mind to bear on many post-Patristic concerns such as the alliance between theology and philosophy, linguistic analysis, the insights of various ethical systems, as well as the fundamental tenets of modern liberal thought.

The dissertation examines Maximus' doctrine of participation philosophically as the solution to the metaphysical problem of the One and the many, the relation between the world and its ground. The theory is briefly studied in Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, and at greater length in Proclus. It culminates in Pseudo-Dionysius' antinomic doctrine of participation as total identity and difference between God and the world , and of creation as the self-impartation and self-creation of God and the deification of the world. Gregory of Nyssa's idea of creation as participation embodies similar ontological principles. ;Maximus understands participation, in both creation and deification, in the same way, and adopts the Neoplatonic pattern of procession and reversion. His theory of "logoi" expresses the same metaphysics. Through neo-Chalcedonian Christology he understands the incarnation of the Word and the deification of his human nature in the same terms, as mutually implicative identity and difference between God and the creature. Thus participation, that is, creation and deification, is seen as the mystery of Christ. "Always and in all the Word of God and God wills to effect the mystery of his embodiment." ;But the world can be both other than and identical with God, and so be, only by its own choice to participate in him. The alternative is the fall, which is therefore a fall toward non-being. Since the creature's choice is necessary for its being, it is self-created, and this is not inconsistent, but rather mutually implicative, with its being created by God. This is comparable to the Neoplatonic doctrine of self-constituted beings, which also derive from their causes. ;Participation is thus realized only in Christ, and the world can exist only by being his body in a "realized eschatology." This takes place in the Church and the Liturgy, where the world becomes the Body of Christ. Here the world is created and deified by the joint activities of God and man in the person of the incarnate Word

DISCUSSIONS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS of Plato’s forms too often take for granted that immanence and transcendence are opposed to each other: if the forms are in instances then they are not separate from them, while if the forms are separate then they are not in instances. This assumption is sometimes associated with the theory that there is a change in Plato’s thought between the early or Socratic dialogues, in which forms are regarded as immanent, and the middle dialogues and Timaeus, in which they are seen as separate. I will argue, however, that immanence and transcendence are not opposed but that, on the contrary, the former implies the latter. That is to say, precisely in that the forms are present in their instances, they are ipso facto also separate from them in all the senses which Plato claims. The idea of sensibles as images of the forms, in turn, is an expression not of transcendence alone, but rather of the conjunction of immanence and transcendence: the paradigm is at once transcendent to and immanent in the image. The movement from the early to the middle dialogues, then, is not the rejection of one position and the adoption of another, but simply the express articulation of what was implicit in the original position. Thus we find, not a fundamental change in Plato’s thought from one period to another, but a single consistent and coherent theory of forms which is developed throughout these dialogues.

In addition to the complete Enneads and Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, this republication of the fourth edition of MacKenna's Plotinus includes a brief foreword from the publisher, extracts from MacKenna's "Explanatory Matter in the First Edition", and two appendices: an essay titled "A Suggestive Outline of Plotinian Metaphysics," and a concor dance of the chronological and systematic orders of Plotinus' works. It also provides, at the conclusion of each treatise, selected brief passages in other translations, including MacKenna's first edition, Armstrong, Guthrie, and Taylor.

Recent continental philosophy often seeks to retrieve Neoplatonic transcendence, or the Good, while ignoring the place of intellect in classical and medieval Neoplatonism. Instead, it attempts to articulate an encounter with radical transcendence in the immediacy of temporality, individuality, and affectivity.On the assumption that there is no intellectual intuition (Kant), intellectual consciousness is reduced to ratiocination and is taken to be “poor in intuition” (Marion). In this context, the present paper expounds Plotinus’ phenomenology of intellectual experience to show how intellect, for Plotinus, is rather the richest mode of intuition, coinciding with the intelligible content of reality. This content, however, cannot be ultimate, but is the manifestation and apprehension of the transcendent Good as the condition of intelligibility. The Good, therefore, can be encountered only through the ascent to intellectual apprehension, and the visionof the Good is a transcendent moment within the intellectual apprehension of being, not a repudiation of or alternative to it.

This paper defends Plotinus’ reading of Sophist 248e-249d as an expression of the togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being. Throughout the dialogues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness of knower and known, expressing this through the myth of recollection and through metaphors of grasping, eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible paradigm is in the thought that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as extrinsic “objects” but as the contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading of Sophist 248e-249d shows that the “motion” attributed to intelligible being is not temporal change but the activity of intellectual apprehension. Aristotle’s doctrines of knowledge as identity of intellect and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as thinking itself, are therefore in continuity with Plato, and Plotinus’ doctrine of intellect and being is continuous with both Plato and Aristotle.