Pascal Brixel has proposed a diagnostic, unifying account of Marxian alienation by positing that we are alienated from our activity when we act on an incentive. I argue that Brixel has successfully identified a necessary but not sufficient condition of alienized activity by showing that there are cases in which our activity is incentivized but not alienized. I then propose that incentivized activity is alienized when it occurs in contexts of domination that threaten the incentivized agent's Will…
Read morePascal Brixel has proposed a diagnostic, unifying account of Marxian alienation by positing that we are alienated from our activity when we act on an incentive. I argue that Brixel has successfully identified a necessary but not sufficient condition of alienized activity by showing that there are cases in which our activity is incentivized but not alienized. I then propose that incentivized activity is alienized when it occurs in contexts of domination that threaten the incentivized agent's Williamsian integrity.
