Eric L. Hutton

Although studies in the history of philosophy look backward to the past, developments in contemporary philosophy can often contribute to such studies by teaching us how to analyze particular issues more carefully, and sometimes the lessons learned from reconsidering past thinkers in such a light can in turn contribute to current work in philosophy by highlighting problems or approaches that might otherwise go unnoticed. This phenomenon is not limited to the Western tradition alone: scholars of Asian thought may benefit from the conceptual tools offered by contemporary Western philosophers, and contemporary Western philosophers may find value in insights from the Asian tradition. This chapter hopes to provide support for this last claim by means of a concrete example involving contemporary theories of extended knowledge and an ancient Chinese Confucian thinker, Xunzi.

This dissertation examines the philosophy of the early Chinese Confucian thinker Xunzi . With his focus on good traits of character such as "benevolence," and on moral paragons such as the "sage, " there is a strong similarity between Xunzi's thought and the contemporary Western philosophical movement known as "virtue ethics." In this work, I investigate the extent to which Xunzi can be understood as espousing a form of virtue ethics, as a way of applying to his writings revealing new interpretive tools, and as a way of showing how he may have something to contribute to current philosophical debates. To do so, I first articulate an interpretation of virtue ethics based on the work of John McDowell, R. Jay Wallace, and Jonathan Dancy. The three most significant features of this model are the ideas that proper moral judgment is not codifiable, that such judgment is instead best understood as analogous to the cultivated expertise of a connoisseur, and that the sort of reasoning in which the moral connoisseur engages is a kind of constitutive or specificationist reasoning. I then argue that Xunzi shares these three views in relation to the highest moral standard in his ethical system, the Dao, and that therefore he can be regarded as presenting a form of virtue ethics. Next, using the topic of the unity of virtue as an organizing theme, I analyze Xunzi's conception of virtue in order to highlight the distinctively Confucian features of his version of virtue ethics. Finally, I argue that the way Xunzi combines a belief in the uncodiliability of proper moral judgment with a strong emphasis on ritual can provide contemporary virtue theorists with a helpful example for thinking about problems of social co-ordination and moral education, as well as how to effect an accommodation between their conviction, on the one hand, that right action is not reducible to a set of principles and people's need for specific practical guidance, on the other.

Confucian thinkers have traditionally stressed the importance of li 禮, or “ritual” as it is commonly translated, and believed that ancient sages had established an ideal set of rituals for people to follow. Now, most scholars of Confucianism understand li as distinct from law, and hence do not typically discuss Confucian sages as great lawgivers. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is something valuable to be learned from considering the similarities and dissimilarities between great lawgivers and the sages. In particular, this essay reviews some of the challenges for, and virtues of, great legislators, and compares and contrasts these with the challenges for, and virtues of, master inventors of ritual, with the aim of showing how such observations might deepen our understanding of the conception of sages in the Confucian tradition, while perhaps also bringing out certain insights about good lawgivers. I end by using these reflections to point to some challenges for developing rituals to fit our modern context.

This book compares Hume with Mencius, a fourth-century B.C.E. Chinese Confucian thinker, and according to his introduction, Liu aims to use Mencius and Hume to articulate and defend a particular meta-ethical position. This meta-ethical position, which he calls “Mencius-Hume moral theory”, is intended as an improved version of the so-called “sensibility theory” advocated by David Wiggins and John McDowell. The book is thus a work of constructive meta-ethics. However, Liu also resolutely defends particular interpretations of Mencius and Hume. Hence, he may appear to be offering equally a historical study, but for reasons discussed below, the book is less convincing as a historical study and is instead best approached as a constructive enterprise.

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton's translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index.

This volume presents a comprehensive analysis of the Confucian thinker Xunzi and his work, which shares the same name. It features a variety of disciplinary perspectives and offers divergent interpretations. The disagreements reveal that, as with any other classic, the Xunzi provides fertile ground for readers. It is a source from which they have drawn—and will continue to draw—different lessons. In more than 15 essays, the contributors examine Xunzi’s views on topics such as human nature, ritual, music, ethics, and politics. They also look at his relations with other thinkers in early China and consider his influence in East Asian intellectual history. A number of important Chinese scholars in the Song dynasty sought to censor the Xunzi. They thought that it offered a heretical and impure version of Confuciansim. As a result, they directed study away from the Xunzi. This has diminished the popularity of the work. However, the essays presented here help to change this situation. They open the text’s riches to Western students and scholars. The book also highlights the substantial impact the Xunzi has had on thinkers throughout history, even on those who were critical of it. Overall, readers will gain new insights and a deeper understanding of this important, but often neglected, thinker.

Several scholars have recently proposed that Confucianism should be regarded as a form of virtue ethics. This view offers new approaches to understanding not only Confucian thinkers, but also their critics within the Chinese tradition. For if Confucianism is a form of virtue ethics, we can then ask to what extent Chinese criticisms of it parallel criticisms launched against contemporary virtue ethics, and what lessons for virtue ethics in general might be gleaned from the challenges to Confucianism in particular. This paper undertakes such an exercise in examining Han Feizi, an early critic of Confucianism. The essay offers a careful interpretation of the debate between Han Feizi and the Confucians and suggests that thinking through Han Feizi's criticisms and the possible Confucian responses to them has a broader philosophical payoff, namely by highlighting a problem for current defenders of virtue ethics that has not been widely noticed, but deserves attention.