Eric Lam

Against the impression that Fichte embarked on a new project in Berlin and abandoned the Jena Wissenschaftslehre, I defend the thesis of a fundamental continuity. I interpret Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre as a philosophy of life and life is the guiding concept of his transcendental philosophy. The concept of life is already grounded in the early phase and does not first enter with the later lectures. Continuity is measured not by the mere occurrence of the letter but by the systematic function of the concept: in both phases, life constitutes the starting point and the final end of the system. I develop this thesis in three steps. First, I reconstruct the Jena concept of life: the early Wissenschaftslehre conceives of freedom as a manifestation of life; morality proves to be the highest form of freedom. I then show that in the Berlin period Fichte expands this same concept of life by adding a religious dimension: he explicitly connects life with God without relinquishing his transcendental-philosophical conception. Finally, I bring out the ascent–descent structure of the Wissenschaftslehre. At its center stands not the absolute in itself but its appearance: life. The distinction between an “early” and a “late” Fichte therefore has a merely heuristic function: from Jena to Berlin, the Wissenschaftslehre proves to be a doctrine of life.

Kant wurde oft dafür kritisiert, dass seine Moralphilosophie gegen die Glückseligkeit gerichtet sei. Ich argumentiere gegen dieses Missverständnis und konzentriere die Analyse auf die Idee, dass Glückseligkeit, obwohl es nicht das primäre Motiv moralischen Handelns ist, dennoch in der Moral verankert ist. So kann Glückseligkeit aus der Moral deduziert werden. Zudem betone ich die Differenz zwi­ schen Moral und Glückseligkeit, sowohl in ihren transzendentalen Dimensionen als auch in den engeren und weiteren Bedeutungen kantischer Moral, indem ich darlege, dass Glückseligkeit nur im Rahmen der Moral begriffen werden kann. Ich werde verdeutlichen, dass Glückseligkeit nicht als Gegensatz zur Moral betrachtet wird, sondern vielmehr als eine potenzielle und notwendige Zukunftsperspektive, die durch moralisches Handeln und die Bildung einer Gemeinschaft erreicht werden kann. Dies zeigt, dass Kants Moralphilosophie vielfältig ist und sowohl eudämonistische Aspekte als auch seine Pflichtethik integriert.

In this paper, I examine how Fichte, in his Wissenschaftslehre, presents the concept of freedom through a theory of action. I will investigate the inner connection between the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (1795) and the System of Ethics (1798). The interrelation of these two texts has not been thoroughly thematized in the scholarship. I contend that freedom is not an abstract idea but an active process that operates both on a transcendental level and in empirical practice. Moreover, I address the central significance of the primacy of practical reason, which I argue serves as the foundation for both theoretical knowledge and ethical action. I further maintain that, for Fichte, freedom is not solely an individual matter but a communal responsibility, aimed at creating a future shaped by reason. Through this analysis, I integrate theoretical, practical, and ethical perspectives into a comprehensive philosophical theory of action that offers guidance for the formation of a rational society.

This paper addresses contemporary interpretations of Fichte’s System of Ethics (1798), focusing on the readings by Michelle Kosch, Allen Wood, and Owen Ware. My goal is to systematically review their interpretations and propose a revised approach to better understand Fichte’s ethical framework as a whole. Kosch interprets Fichte’s ethics as a form of consequentialism, suggesting that the constitutive end of absolute independence can be achieved through controlling nature via modern technology. In contrast, Wood characterizes Fichte as a radical Kantian, viewing his concept of moral vocation as a plausible variation of Kant’s, where moral rightness is guaranteed by conscience. I align with Ware’s interpretation that Fichte should be regarded as a perfectionist. I argue that Fichte’s concept of striving must be given more prominence as the foundation of a perfectionist account. The striving subject seeks to attain independence, which, though practically and ultimately unattainable, remains a moral imperative. The agent is duty-bound to pursue perfection and explore every possible avenue to achieve this goal. In this context, Fichte’s ethics represents an infinite process central to the constitutive task of attaining absolute freedom.