Eric Sampson

ABSTRACT The prevailing interpretation of the relationship between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger frames it in terms of an opposition between theism and atheism, according to which Rosenzweig’s purported interpersonal ethics rooted in divine revelation exposes Heidegger’s deficient grasp of the interpersonal and the ethical. This article argues for a different framing, one that reveals Rosenzweig’s more radical contribution to philosophy as well as a more significant convergence with Heidegger. By examining Rosenzweig’s and Heidegger’s respective reappropriations of Paul, the article offers a reading of eternity in both thinkers not as supratemporality but as the sudden temporalization in the Augenblick or kairos. This reading sheds new light on an ethical dimension emphasized in both thinkers, one that concerns less the anticipation and realization of the good than openness to what arrives in its event-character.

People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is “yes.” But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues “no.” On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent’s resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical rationality apply to all agents needs revision. I argue that Morton’s arguments fail on empirical and philosophical grounds. What’s at stake? If Morton is correct, poverty relief agencies ought to re-design their incentives so resource-scarce agents can rationally respond to them. If I’m correct, resource-scarce agents do act irrationally in the cases under discussion, and we shouldn’t be shy about saying so. Instead of declaring them rational, we should try to understand the causes of their irrational behavior and help them better succeed by their own lights.