Eric Sancho-Adamson

Una de las cuestiones que caracteriza la crítica kantiana es la reflexión metafilosófica entorno a lo que la filosofía puede y no puede lograr mediante el pensamiento discursivo. No obstante, han sido poco estudiados los argumentos en Crítica de la razón pura (1781/1787) sobre la imposibilidad de ofrecer definiciones reales de determinados conceptos. A saber, Kant sostiene la indefinibilidad (i) los conceptos filosóficos en general y, de modo más específico, de (ii) la verdad y de (iii) las categorías. En esta contribución se examinan estos argumentos de indefinibilidad, en base a los cuales se muestra cómo los tres indefinibles ofrecen por vía negativa algo que no encontrábamos des del lado de la teoría positiva de la definición. En particular, se reconstruyen estos argumentos en base a una distinción en común, a saber, las condiciones de definición (cómo debe ser un juicio para que sea una definición) y condiciones de definibilidad (cómo debe ser un concepto para que sea definible). Mostramos cómo en estos casos dichas condiciones entran en conflicto mutuo.

In this paper I shed light on the nature of a problem that transcendental philosophy faces through a comparison to Meno’s Paradox (Meno: 80d): the capacity to ask and solve its questions: "The question now is whether […] we have enough of a concept of [an object placed before us by reason] to be able to raise a question about it, but are so entirely lacking in means or faculties that we can never give the answer." (KrV: A 477/B 505) I characterize a strain of objections that have been directed at the alleged incoherence of the limits inherent to the human standpoint established by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I unpack on what grounds Kant claims that transcendental philosophy is capable of solving all of its questions, and how this implies that the strain of objections has misportrayed the nature of the limits established by Kant's philosophy.

L’obra Somnis d’un visionari, il·lustrats mitjançant els somnis de la metafísica (1766) d’Immanuel Kant presenta un tractament juxtaposat i obertament irònic de dues temàtiques a primera vista heterogènies: la manera de fer metafísica habitual al context germànic del s. xvii i les visions sobrenaturals d’Emmanuel Swedenborg. Aquest article revisa una ambivalència interpretativa interna a l’obra, inicialment identificada per Moses Mendelssohn, que sorgeix d’aquesta juxtaposició temàtica. Segons les dues postures oposades de l’ambivalència pot classificar-se la recepció històrica de l’obra. Seguidament, es mostra la insuficiència d’algunes estratègies habituals d’interpretació del text, i se’n proposa una de nova basada en dues nocions del text, a saber, la voluntat d’assegurar un món comú i la noció de saviesa. A partir d’aquestes nocions i d’una carta que Kant escriu a Mendelssohn s’aporta una lectura del text que, finalment, se situa en referència a les dues lectures de l’ambivalència interpretativa presentada inicialment. Immanuel Kant’s Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics (1766) presents a juxtaposed and openly ironic treatment of two apparently heterogeneous subjects: the way of doing metaphysics common in the Seventeenth-Century German context and Emmanuel Swedenborg’s supernatural visions. This article reviews an interpretative ambivalence internal to the work originally identified by Moses Mendelssohn, which springs from its thematic juxtaposition. One may classify the work’s historical reception according to the two stances on the ambivalence. Furthermore, the insufficiency of some common strategies for interpreting the text will be shown, and a new one is proposed on the basis of two notions that appear within the text, that is, the will to ensure a common world and the notion of wisdom. As a result of these notions and on the basis of a letter that Kant wrote to Mendelssohn, a reading of this work is proposed, which is finally situated with respect to the two readings of the interpretative ambivalence initially presented.

Among the passages which are suggestive of a philosophy of language in Kant’s writings are his remarks and arguments on appropriate terminology for philosophical concepts. I ask what it is for Kant that makes some words more suitable than others. I reconstruct the arguments from the Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) that defend that there is no such thing as a proper, real definition for philosophical concepts (only nominal definition and exposition); in addition, philosophical concepts are only represented by terms in abstracto, not in concreto. On these grounds, in the Inquiry, Kant sustains that the reference of a term to a philosophical concept is ultimately sanctioned by the term’s ‘linguistic usage’ (Redegebrauch). I argue that this is the basis for Kant’s criterion in the Critique of Pure Reason of employing traditional terminology, words from ordinary language, or even words from extinct languages, to refer to philosophical concepts, and for his rejection of coining new terms – even for distinctly new philosophical thoughts.

The change in the semantics of the word ‘subject’ in the epistemological-metaphysical meaning is a conceptual development which may be observed by historiographical means in various languages: it shifts from signifying a thing itself to a cognizing being which can consider things. From this development onward, some of the differentiated senses of the term ‘subject’ have ended up narrowly linked to one another. In particular, in philosophical contexts the juridical-political subject and the epistemological-metaphysical subject coalesce at the beginning of the 19th century. The conceptual developments that are correlated to this linking of meanings can be traced from medieval scholasticism and the modern political tradition, through German Enlightenment to Immanuel Kant’s works, and is finally traced to some of the consequences for the current understanding of subjectivity in contemporary thought.