Eric Wilkinson

Dans cette introduction, nous définissons brièvement la philosophie canadienne et discutons de son importance avant de présenter les auteurs qui ont contribué à ce numéro spécial et leurs articles. L’histoire de la philosophie canadienne a été peu étudiée et il est nécessaire de réaliser de nouveaux travaux philosophiques sur les défis auxquels le Canada est confronté. Certains articles rassemblés dans ce numéro spécial examinent l’histoire de la philosophie au Canada, tandis que d’autres soumettent des questions contemporaines à une analyse philosophique. Les contributeurs à ce numéro spécial incluent Ian H. Angus, Robert Timko, Anna Brinkerhoff, Stefan Lukits, Charles Blattberg, Ronald A. Kuipers, Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp, Delphine T. Raymond, Frédérique Jean, Rémi Poiré, Matthew Robertson, Janet C. Wesselius, et R. Bruce Elder.

In this introduction, we briefly define Canadian philosophy and discuss its importance before introducing the authors who contributed to this special issue and their articles. The history of Canadian philosophy has been understudied, and there is a need for new philosophical work on the challenges facing Canada. Some articles collected in this special issue examine the history of philosophy in Canada, while others subject contemporary issues to philosophical analysis. The contributors to this special issue include Ian H. Angus, Robert Timko, Anna Brinkerhoff, Stefan Lukits, Charles Blattberg, Ronald A. Kuipers, Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp, Delphine T. Raymond, Frédérique Jean, Rémi Poiré, Matthew Robertson, Janet C. Wesselius, and R. Bruce Elder.

Logical rationalism asserts that we can acquire immediate, non-inferential justification for beliefs in basic logical principles. The intuitions that arise when we consider particular cases of validity can offer justification for our foundational logical beliefs about rules of inference. I motivate rationalism through an argument from the indispensability of intuitions. This argument shows that rationalism is the theory best equipped to solve the problem of background logic. This is the challenge of explaining how we gain justified beliefs in rules of inference without using those rules in a viciously circular way to arrive at the beliefs. As rationalism is the best epistemology which solves this important challenge, it is our best account of logical knowledge. In addition, I argue that a second major motivation for logical rationalism arises from work on logical practice. Recently, it has been claimed that we should attend to the practices of logicians when selecting an epistemology of logic. I argue that these considerations from logical practice also favour the adoption of logical rationalism.

The querelle des femmes was an intellectual debate over the status of women that occurred in the early modern period, between the 1400s and 1700s. A common argument for the superiority of men and inferiority of women that appeared during the debate is that women are less physically strong than men, and are therefore inferior. In response, two distinct argumentative strategies were developed by defenders of women. First, some argued that men and women did not in fact differ in physical strength. A second strategy was to deny that physical strength is relevant to the question of superiority. In this case, one would argue that a difference in strength is not normatively relevant to evaluations of worth. I argue that this second strategy was the more effective response to the argument that women were inferior because of their alleged physical weakness compared to men.

In Harmonie Universelle, Marin Mersenne identifies two rules that must be applied to produce good music. First, “it is necessary to follow and imitate the passion that one wants to arouse in the listeners.” Secondly, one must use “the same intervals or degrees followed by the passions one wants to arouse.” Here I explain Mersenne’s overlooked theory of song creation. I argue that his two rules are general principles that particular rules of composition can be derived from. To argue this, I compare them to Cicero and Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric, and how ethos, pathos, and logos indicate particular oratorical imperatives. I then assess Mersenne’s two principles, arguing that they must be understood in terms of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions. This insight helps to explain how Mersenne’s two rules can offer direction to the practicing musician by guiding their efforts to stoke the appropriate emotions in their audience.

Indigenous philosophy from the 17th century and earlier is often thought to be irretrievable because of a lack of extant works. There are at least two reasons that this view is mistaken. First, it overlooks the role oral traditions play in preserving the thought of Indigenous peoples. Second, some Indigenous thinkers had their philosophical views recorded by European interlocutors shortly after contact. With these sources, the same techniques used to recover the views of philosophers like Prodicus, whose works are lost, can be applied to Indigenous thinkers. By reconstructing the philosophy of Kondiaronk, I show how this can be done.

In this article, I explain and defend the concept of multicultural nationhood. Multicultural nationhood accounts for how a nation can have a cohesive identity despite being internally diverse. In Canada, the challenge of nation-building despite the country’s diversity has prompted reflection on how to conceive of the national identity. The two most influential theories of multiculturalism to come from Canada, those of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, emerged through consideration of Canada’s diversity, particularly the place of Québécois, Indigenous peoples, and immigrants in society. I begin by synthesizing Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s theories. I then propose a new subjective definition of nation, wherein the character of a nation is determined by how its members conceive of themselves. Once these concepts are explained, they are combined in an account of multicultural nationhood. Multicultural nationhood involves the cultivation of a national identity wherein various cultural groups are recognized as constitutive of the nation.

At the heart of Anders Pettersson’s 2017 book, The Idea of a Text and the Nature of Textual Meaning, is his proposed “cluster” definition of a textual work. On this view, a text is a cluster of three kinds of objects: all the physical exemplars of the work, the work’s meaning, and the complex signs that convey that meaning. Pettersson contrasts this with the “ordinary conception” of a text, wherein a text is a unitary object made of the signs and meaning, and each exemplar is an instance of the supervening textual work. The cluster definition is preferable because it is able to overcome contradictions plaguing the ordinary conception and its competitors. This cluster conception of a textual work is both original and deserving of more critical attention. Pettersson not only motivates the view well through his consideration of key examples, but deftly handles the obvious objections. Although the cluster conception is revisionary of our ordinary conception, he makes a strong case. However, I do not focus here on the heart of Pettersson’s work but on something akin to its spleen; Pettersson’s criticism of David Davies’ “Pragmatic Constraint” (PC) on the ontology of artworks.