•  354
    Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4): 411-432. 2020.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants of logical pluralism that meet …Read more
  •  239
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you …Read more
  •  231
    Quotation Marks and Kinds of Meaning. Arguments in Favor of a Pragmatic Account
    with Daniel Gutzmann
    In Elke Brendel, Jörg Meibauer & Markus Steinbach (eds.), Understanding Quotation, De Gruyter Mouton. pp. 161-194. 2011.
    The strategy of this paper is twofold: First, we carry out a systematic investigation of the question of what specific kind of meaning quotation marks contribute to the overall meaning of an utterance. We consider the following kinds of meaning: literal meaning (§ 2.1), conventional implicature (§ 2.2), presupposition (§ 2.3), and conversational implicature (§ 2.4). We present arguments in favor of a pragmatic analysis of quotation marks, claiming that the notion of conversational implicature se…Read more
  •  90
    Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective
    Philosophical Studies 177 (11): 3329-3350. 2020.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. I then discuss a …Read more
  •  48
    How quotation marks what people do with words
    with Daniel Gutzmann
    Journal of Pragmatics 43 (10): 2650-2663. 2011.
    Most existing theories of quotation are restricted, sometimes implicitly, to certain aspects of quotation mark usage. In this paper, we have the somewhat ambitious aim of outlining an all-encompassing theory of quotation in (written) natural language. We first provide a naïve but neutral definition of quotation – quotation is everything between a pair of quotation marks – followed by a brief typology. Then, we develop an account of quotation which relies mainly on pragmatic mechanisms in order t…Read more
  •  30
    Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations
    In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 185-198. 2016.
    The notion of epistemic standards has gained prominence in the literature on the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Defenders of Epistemic Contextualism claim that in certain scenarios the truth value of a knowledge-ascribing sentence of the form “S knows p (at t)”—where S is an epistemic subject and p is a proposition S is said to know at time t—can change even if S, p and t are assigned constant values. This sort of variability, contextualists claim, is due to the epistemic standards governin…Read more
  •  16
    Kontextualistische Wissenstheorien
    In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, Metzler. pp. 70-78. 2019.
    This is a survey article about epistemic contextualism. It introduces the basic ideas and the semantic and epistemological aspects of the view. It also outlines some applications and provides brief discussions of a number of challenges.
  •  6
    The book (written in German) develops four criteria of adequacy which a theory of knowledge attributions should meet. It reviews how epistemic contextualism, subject sensitive invariantism, and relativism about knowledge attributions compare with respect to these criteria. Finally, a presuppositional strict invariantist account is developed and defended. It is argued that, under certain restrictions, it meets all of the criteria and, thus, offers a compelling analysis of knowledge attributions.
  • Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations
    In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 185-198. 2016.