Erin Kelly

The chapter focuses on cases that mark a clearer distinction between our moral appraisal of an action and our attitudes toward the agent. The chapter focuses on cases that fully and directly challenge the familiar link between wrongdoing and blameworthiness. Excuses the chapter considers apply under conditions in which an agent acted wrongly and in so doing demonstrated moral disregard for others. In these cases, the act is clearly ascribed to the agent and the action was not morally justified or permissible. An excuse establishes that although the agent acted wrongly she should not be blamed, or should not fully be blamed. The chapter argues that excuses function by undermining what normally are reasonable moral expectations about how a person should be motivated. Excuses do not, however, challenge our notions about how a morally motivated person would act. For this reason, they do not challenge our evaluations of right and wrong action. The point of excuses is to address obstacles to moral motivation both cognitive and emotive. In evaluating an agents blame-worthiness, we assess how morally reasonable it is to expect an agent to act morally in the face of the obstacles she faces. Blameworthy persons are those whom we think should have remained committed to moral ends, under difficult circumstances and despite internal psychological obstacles. Those who are not blameworthy are those persons whose commitment to morality is too much to require obstacles to success are too devastating. Moral expectations would be strangely inhuman.

Sir Thomas More transforms material from Foxe’s Acts and Monuments to offer through the character More a defense of poets, playwrights, and theatre. Foxe describes More as a poet, equating his writings with Catholicism and with lying. The authors of the play deviate from this source in presenting poets as tolerant and moral. Their More rejects the oppositional thinking that makes martyrdom possible and, therefore, is not a straightforward martyr figure as he goes to his death. Rather, he is a representative poet whose open-mindedness and empathy for all people serve as a defense of poetry and thus also of plays.

ABSTRACT Should forgiveness be considered a civic virtue that promotes peace and justice following injustice? In the aftermath of conflicts as severe as state-sponsored genocide, how can relationships be restored, communities reconciled, and justice achieved? We interviewed 15 adults in Rwanda—survivors of the 1994 genocide, nominated as exemplars for their youth-serving roles in their communities and their experiences with forgiving the traumas of the genocide—about their approaches to conflict resolution, their ideas about justice and forgiveness, and their community work. Phenomenological analysis supported considering forgiveness as a civic virtue, as exemplars described a restorative approach to conflict in which justice facilitates, and is completed by, forgiveness. Implications for education emerged from exemplars’ accounts, including describing a process of conflict resolution that works toward peace and justice by means of listening, uncovering the truth, acting impartially, encouraging apology and forgiveness, advising for solutions, restoring rights and relationships, and fulfilling justice.

This book brings together a team of leading theorists to address the question 'What is the right measure of justice?' Some contributors, following Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that we should focus on capabilities, or what people are able to do and to be. Others, following John Rawls, argue for focussing on social primary goods, the goods which society produces and which people can use. Still others see both views as incomplete and complementary to one another. Their essays evaluate the two approaches in the light of particular issues of social justice - education, health policy, disability, children, gender justice - and the volume concludes with an essay by Amartya Sen, who originated the capabilities approach.

Hume’s moral philosophy is a sentiment-based view. Moral judgment is a matter of the passions; certain traits of character count as virtues or vices because of the approval or disapproval they evoke in us, feelings that express concern we have about the social effects of these traits. A sentiment-based approach is attractive, since morality seems fundamentally to involve caring for other people. Sentiment-based views, however, face a real challenge. It is clear that our affections are often particular; we favor certain persons over others. This poses a problem when it comes to determining the proper content of morality. The ties of sentiment would seem to be in tension with the aspirations of morality toward impartiality and universality.

Rawls's signature is the thought experiment he introduced to sort out the requirements of justice. Rawls argues that “justice as fairness” will be a form of political liberalism. Rawls claims that under free institutions we should expect “profound and irreconcilable differences” in people's religious and philosophical worldviews, and in people's basic notions of what makes life worth living. In his vision of democracy, the solidarity required to support common political values and egalitarian norms of distributive justice must be built through productive and fair social cooperation. Social solidarity is needed to support democratic equality, and this solidarity must be built through the mutual production and reciprocal sharing of the fruits of social cooperation. Constraining socioeconomic inequality is an essential aspect of a just scheme of social cooperation and a necessary basis for securing a mutual commitment to the rights, liberties, and opportunities that give democracy its substance and meaning.

Moral condemnation has become the public narrative of our criminal justice practices, but the distribution of criminal sanctions is not and should not be guided by judgments of what individual wrongdoers morally deserve. Criteria for evaluating a person’s liability to criminal sanctions are general standards that are influenced by how we understand the relative social urgency and priority of reducing crimes of various types. These standards thus depend on considerations that are not a matter of individual moral desert. Furthermore, the moral desert is doubtful when members of socially disadvantaged groups face unequal prospects for being subjected to criminal justice sanctions. Social injustice is an intolerable context for distributing punishment according to individual desert. A rightsprotectingscheme of criminal justice might permissibly burden individual offenders, but not as an expression of what they morally deserve.

Multiculturalism is not a flag that political philosophers seem eager to wave these days. Conservatives complain about the supposedly hazardous effects of the notion that non-Western societies have ideas and ways of life that are worthy enough to compete with those of Western societies for study and respect. Progressives worry that multiculturalism can be too uncritical of certain non-Western attitudes, especially about the nature and role of women. Perhaps this helps to explain why Hans Oberdiek is reluctant to associate his views too closely with multiculturalism, despite endorsing an ideal of tolerance that is quite sympathetic to it.

The standard, non‐repeated prisoner's dilemma poses no true dilemma about rationality, we argue. What the prisoners ought rationally to do, unless they are selfless, depends on the relationship of trust that they have or lack with one another. This helps to diffuse the apparent conflict between individual and collective rationality. If the prisoners have reason to trust one another, pursuing a joint strategy would be rational for them. In the absence of trust, pursuing an individual strategy would be rational. The solution that is supposed to be puzzling – because each prisoner confessing is worse for both than the alternative on which both remain silent – is simply the rational solution for persons who have no reason to trust one another. Philosophers have been misled by the apparent availability of the better alternative. Collective rationality is not relevant for persons who do not stand in a trusting relationship. When they do, there is no unresolved conflict between their individual and collective points of view.1.

Hume argued against claims about the role of reasoning in moral thought that had been defended by moral rationalists. In doing so, he criticized the doctrines of the rational intuitionist Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). Clarke has not received much attention from contemporary moral philosophers, and given that rational intuitionism has long fallen out of favor, he may seem an unlikely thinker to defend. Nevertheless, attention to his writings reveals some interesting arguments. By considering how Clarke could respond to Hume's attacks, I believe we can make progress in understanding the nature of moral agency and what it is for reasons to have a justifying as well as an explanatory role.

Liberal political philosophers have underestimated the philosophical relevance of historical injustice. For some groups, injustices from the past—particularly surrounding race, ethnicity, or religion—are a source of entrenched social inequality decades or even hundreds of years later. Rawls does not advocate the importance of redressing historical injustice, yet political liberalism needs a principle of historical redress. Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity, which is designed to prevent the leveraging of class privilege, could be paired with a supporting principle of historical redress that would contend with partiality and bias in open access to positions.

In Recognizing Wrongs, John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky develop and defend “civil recourse theory,” according to which torts are injurious wrongs that give rise to a claim of redress. My discussion extends beyond tort law to explore the ethics of reparations for historical injustice, in particular, regarding the case of Black Americans. I begin by relating the notion of wrongdoing that figures prominently in civil recourse theory to morality. Then I explore the idea that the relevant sort of wrongdoing is relational and injurious, and how this claim applies to historical injustice. Finally, I take up the idea that a redress claim is one a victim is entitled but not obligated to make in order to think about whether the discretionary nature of tort action is empowering to persons who have been wrongfully injured.

Faith in the power and righteousness of retribution has taken over the American criminal justice system. Approaching punishment and responsibility from a philosophical perspective, Limits of Blame takes issue with a criminal justice system that aligns legal criteria of guilt with moral criteria of blameworthiness. Many incarcerated people do not meet the criteria of blameworthiness, even when they are guilty of crimes. The author underscores the problems of exaggerating what criminal guilt indicates, particularly when it is tied to the illusion that we know how long and in what ways criminals should suffer. Our practice of assigning blame has gone beyond a pragmatic need for protection and a moral need to repudiate harmful acts publicly. It represents a desire for retribution that normalizes excessive punishment. Kelly proposes that we abandon our culture of blame and aim at reducing serious crime rather than imposing retribution. Were we to refocus our perspective to fit the relevant moral circumstances and legal criteria, we could endorse a humane, appropriately limited, and more productive approach to criminal justice.--

The belief that people convicted of crimes deserve punishment is commonplace. Yet the punitive conception of individual responsibility commonly associated with ‘just deserts’ exaggerates the moral meaning of criminal guilt, normalizes excessive punishment, and distracts from shared responsibility for social injustice. The problem is, many people who get caught up in the criminal justice system cannot reasonably be thought to deserve their fate. Mental illness, intellectual disability, addiction, trauma, and poverty are morally mitigating factors when it comes to assessing how blameworthy a person is for criminal behavior. But with the exception of extreme forms of mental illness that fall into the very narrow legal category of ‘insanity,’ people who struggle with serious difficulties are not treated as less blameworthy by the criminal justice system. The criteria of legal guilt does not match up well with the moral concept of blameworthiness.The solution might seem to be somehow to refine legal practice to make blame more context-sensitive, but I argue that rather than try to revise our criminal justice practices to fit better with common notions of blame and desert, we should get out of the public blaming business altogether. A determination morally to condemn individual offenders is not helping us to resolve the disaster of mass incarceration or the problems faced by returning citizens. It does not help us to see clearly the connection between crime and other problems of social injustice, like poverty, lack of mental health care, drug addiction, racial discrimination, and violence. Were we to be less fixated on individual responsibility, and more cognizant of our shared responsibility to treat all members of society as equal persons, entitled to the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, we might be in a better position to work collectively to address problems of social injustice that contribute to the problem of crime.