Erli Mertika

This dissertation argues that Nietzsche thought he was a genuine philosopher despite seeming at times to suggest that he was not. I arrive at this conclusion by comparing his thoughts on genuine philosophers with his thoughts about himself in an effort to show that his self-professed task is identical to theirs. There are two types of genuine philosophers in Nietzsche’s late works: an old species that relied on a belief in “God” to legislate their values, and a new one that must do so without it. The former cannot perform their task after the death of God, which is why I argue that he counted himself among the latter. Nietzsche suggests that the task of the new species of philosophers is to create, command, and legislate values. Past philosophers did not have to command, because their belief in “God” enabled them to view the values they legislated as pre-authorized by a higher authority. The new philosophers must command, and to do so, they must view themselves as a legitimate source of authority. To accomplish this, they must first overcome an age-old resentment toward the body, which Nietzsche suggests is ultimately rooted in a physiological sickness. Unlike their predecessors, the new philosophers must therefore become physiologically healthy and well-disposed towards the body, because if they do not, they will be unable to regard the values they create as legitimate. As such, whether Nietzsche thought of himself as a genuine philosopher hinges on whether he thought that he was fundamentally healthy. I argue that he emphasizes his choice of diet, climate, recreation, etc., to argue precisely this point, namely, that he successfully convalesced from his period of sickness and decadence and, therefore, possessed the physiological constitution necessary to command his values and become the first truly godless genuine philosopher.