Erman Kaçar

Lacan ayna deneyiminin bizi cogito merkezli düşünme modelleriyle karşı karşıya getireceğini bildirir. Lacanyen kuramda öznenin varlık düzeni, kendini dolaysız kavrayabilen Kartezyen bilinç üzerinden değil, yanılsamalı bir benlik imgesiyle özdeşleşen bebeğin simgesel düzene kaydolma kapasitesi üzerinden temellendirilir. Bu çalışmada, ayna deneyimindeki sahte varlık imgesinin narsisistik sonuçları ile cogito’nun tekbenci sonuçları arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Lacan’a göre Kartezyen argüman boyunca cisimsel dünyanın kavranışı, aslen doğru bilgiyi koşulsuz aktaran -aldatıcı olmayan- bir Tanrı’nın var olduğunun gösterilmesiyle mümkündür. Buna karşın Lacan’ın imgeselin ötesinde gerçekliğin kurucusu olarak işaret ettiği simgesel Öteki, dış gerçekliğin garantörü olarak “bildiği varsayılan Tanrı’dan” kategorik olarak ayrılır. Lacan, yalnızca imgesel ben yanılsamasını narsisistik bir tuzak olarak görmez; aynı zamanda imgesel bene kendi öznelliğini verme iddiası taşıyan bir bildiği varsayılan özne fikrini de en az onun kadar tehlikeli bulur. Lacan’ın cogito’ya yönelik bu yeni yaklaşımı, aynadaki imgesel kısa devrenin, Kartezyen cogito’da bilincin kısa devresi olarak yeniden değerlendirilmesini mümkün kılmaktadır.

Lacan wrote and generated ideas at the intersection of structuralism and poststructuralism, and the question of where he stands in this intersection is crucial to understand his conception of the subject. This essay takes the multiplicity of views on Lacan as a structuralist and a poststructuralist as its starting point and aims to weigh these labels against the background of his specific theories and views. We suggest that in his early phase when he was categorised as a structuralist, he had the seeds of his later poststructuralist phase, and when he was generating his poststructuralist ideas, he was building them on his structuralist legacy. This evolution is similar to that of Roland Barthes in that he establishes an ongoing dialog between structuralism and poststructuralism: he is both a threshold figure suggesting an amalgam of these movements, but he is also a dividing figure as his evolution points at the unbridgeable rupture between structuralism and poststructuralism.

The being is derived by a difference in Lacanian ontology. This difference is the basic element in Lacanian theory that grounds the unconscious subject. Because according to Lacan, the existence of the subject can not be self-proclaimed and it is represented by a signifier. Lacan gives the name "object a" to this paradoxical being which is distinguished by this difference or lack, and uses some topological transformations in order to be able to explain the structural paradoxes in the psychological theory. The aim of this study is to explore the ontology of these paradoxical situations and try to decipher the function of topology in Lacan's theory.

This paper explores a new and post-structuralist discourse on the relationship between Lacan’s theory of mirror stage and the story of Narcissus as a mythological narrative. According to this discourse, subject is a construction posterior to the ‘I’. Lacan suggests that in the mirror stage 6-18 months old infants discern the I as something distinct from and outside of themselves for the first time through a reflective surface. An infant comprehends the image they see in this reflective surface as a being independent of their mother and an object belonging to themselves, and they greatly admire this independent object as an ideal-I. That is, by discerning their own being through an image, the infant achieves a feeling of unity via this image and perceives their own being as an admirable unity. This feeling of I and unity, however, is doomed to decay as to become subject by means of the elements of Lacanian reality, namely language and the laws of society. Within the reality, Narcissus – exactly like in the Lacan’s theory of mirror – lost the confrontation of perceiving the image he admired in his reflection. The I of Narcissus, which he has been holding on as an image in this world, is drawn and demised whilst going beyond the water mirror so as to become a subject. In other words, the I that Narcissus admired in the reflection of the water underwent an unsurmountable deformation and he paid the price with his life. In this study, from the perspective of the Lacanian theory of subject it will be argued that the tragic split between imaginary and symbolic order represented by the death of Narcissus is not only a psychopathologic fact, but it is also a fundamental narrative about the construction of subject in the history of philosophy.