Errol Boon

This essay explores Plato’s rudimentary epistemology of non-discursive thought. I will proceed in three steps, beginning with a general view of Plato’s philosophy, subsequently focusing on the Meno, and ending with a close reading of the passages on music in Republic. In the first section, I will outline a general framework to examine the relation between truth (alētheia) and discourse (logos) in Plato’s philosophy. My central argument is that, for Plato, discourse is a necessary yet not sufficient condition for truth. Accordingly, I identify two sides of Plato’s philosophy: his “logocentric” project, which aims to demonstrate the necessity of discourse in truth-finding, and his “logoskeptic” project, which underscores the insufficiency of discourse in truth-finding. This double philosophical undertaking, then, raises the question of how both aspects—discourse’s necessity and its insufficiency—relate to each other in a combined extra-discursive pursuit of truth. In the subsequent two sections, I will focus on two Platonic dialogues to characterize the relation between logoskepticism and logocentrism as a dialectical circle. First, I will analyze this relation through a reading of the Meno, in particular the aporia of the ‘‘paradox of inquiry”. This interpretation aims both to solidify the general framework presented in the previous section and to introduce the notion of “dialectics” to conceptualize the relation between one’s discourse and that which transcends one’s discursive abilities. In the Meno, I argue, this dialectic unfolds as a circular mode of thinking in which a form of passivity ultimately proves decisive. However, in the Meno, the dialectical mode of thought remains largely confined to the realm of discursivity, leaving unresolved the question of how discourse and the non-discursive might collaborate in a similarly dialectical yet extra-discursive mode of reason. Finally, in the third section, I argue that a close reading of the passages on music in Book III of the Republic (398b–403c) reveals an insight into the dialectical relation between discursive and non-discursive reason. Throughout these passages, Plato launches a paradoxical theory of musical pedagogy. In short, Plato makes a case for the cognitive value of music’s non-discursive nature, while simultaneously explaining this non-discursive quality in a thoroughly logocentric manner. Much of the scholarship on Plato’s philosophy of music tends to emphasize only one side of this paradox. However, I contend that by recognizing both contrasting aspects of Plato’s musical pedagogy, by preserving rather than resolving their circular relation to each other, we can see how discourse and non-discursive material interact dialectically in music. In doing so, I aim to show how Plato’s paradoxical theory of music bridges two key aspects of his overall philosophy, namely discourse’s necessity and its insufficiency in the pursuit of truth.

This thesis aims to emancipate the ancient Greek question of artistic truth. First, I will demonstrate that the question of artistic truth is raised rather than answered by Plato. Second, I will show that this question is extended rather than solved by Aristotle’s attempt to answer it. Third, I claim that, partly as a consequence of this Aristotelian heritage, the question is currently absent in contemporary aesthetics, yet needed for contemporary art practices. Through my discussion of Plato and Aristotle, I develop a conceptual framework that can help to employ, develop and compare various theories of artistic truth. In short, this conceptual framework encompasses a transcendental scheme of three truth conceptions (i.e. metaphysical truth, discursive correctness and aesthetic plausibility) of which each corresponds to a distinct metaphysical modality (i.e. necessity, reality and possibility) and a specific form of representation (i.e. preceding, succeeding and simultaneous with the represented). With this differentiated account of truth, I present a systematic metaphysical framework in which truth is not identical with correctness, thinking not with discursive thinking, and the intellectual value of art not with the knowledge it bears. With this, I aim to aid a more critical inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of non-discursive thought in general, and its value of truth in particular.

This paper offers a philosophical account of the specific form of romantic love underlying the ideal of love-based marriages. Rather than examining the institution of marriage, it considers marriage as the promise of infinite love between finite persons. Although this promise may seem irrational, even those who never formally marry still invoke phrases like ‘I love you forever’. In three steps, this paper explores what we could possibly mean by infinite love and how it can be rationally promised throughout a finite life. First, I trace the concept of infinite love back to the metaphysical discussions surrounding the emergence of the love-based marriage among German Idealists and Jena Romanticists. Next, drawing on John Searle’s speech act theory, I examine how the ideal of infinite love can be articulated as a promise. Finally, I turn to early existentialist thought—particularly the notions of passion (Lidenskab, Leidenschaft), repetition (Gjentagelsen, Wiederkehr), and the moment (Øjeblik, Augenblick) as developed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche—to justify the meaning of the marital promise. In short, I propose that instead of interpreting the marital promise as a description of an expected reality, we should approach it as a passionate necessity that discloses the world in a fundamentally indeterminate way. By reframing the marital promise in this light, I aim to show that marital love is compatible both with the ideal of personal autonomy and with an alternative conception of rationality and temporality.