Esteban Echaniz

This thesis analyses Inquisitive Semantics (IS), which aims to unify the treatment of declarative and interrogative sentences, treating them as proposals for the actualisation of a common ground. The common ground is a set of shared information that has been established in the conversation; it is usually characterised as a set of possible worlds, those worlds that are compatible with the common beliefs and assumptions of the participants in the conversation (Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009, p. 2). In this research, we aim to show that (IS) falls into a prevalence of style in which pragmatic aspects are displaced. The arguments in question are: 1. Firstly, it is argued that (IS) ignores Grice’s maxim of Manner. The maxim of Manner is excluded in the first instance from the modelling and adaptation of Grice’s maxims by Groenendijk y Roelofsen (2009). Subsequently, Brandenburg (2014) argues that the maxim in question is partially contained in other adapted maxims, but that this is not sufficient for (IS) to capture the maxim in its entirety. This reduction of the maxim is also replaced by a formal architecture that captures a notion of meaning that is totally opposed to the approach followed by the Mode maxim. Therefore, this blindness to perspicuity results in a theory that is pragmatically incomplete. 2. The second argument aims to analyse the limits and applications of the computability of one of the fundamental elements of (IS): compliance. In particular, we will analyse the compliance algorithm offered by Ciardelli et al. (2009), which is evidently more complex than classical satisfiability, given the conditions of compliance. Furthermore, it is of little use for modelling real conversations due to its restriction to closed worlds, which is counterintuitive, since conversations are more akin to open worlds. 3. The last argument analyses the collapse of the elegance of inquisitive logic. In particular, the first-order inquisitive logic system InqBQ is the most incomplete and immature of all, as it lacks multiple clarifications regarding its metalogical properties. Thus, when Inquisitive Logic moves from its propositional level to the quantified level, the system becomes a logically inhospitable and unsafe structure for logicians who desire systems with their metalogical properties already clarified. Finally, it is concluded that (IS) is the triumph of formal elegance, but it overlooks practicality and eliminates any pragmatic nuance that exists within it.

Elemer Nemesszeghy, S. J. (1925-2007), a Hungarian philosopher living in Chile between 1956 and 1971, taught Mathematical logic for fifteen years in a country that lacked a local tradition in the field. Despite his contributions, his figure has been omitted by both the historiography of logic and Chilean intellectual history. This article seeks to reconstruct Nemesszeghy’s philosophical and logical trajectory and to characterize his work from a historical-philosophical point of view. To this end, it analyzes his intellectual formation within the framework of the Central European neo-scholastic tradition, his links with the Lwów–Warsaw school and the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain, and his institutional contributions to the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso. The article examines in detail his academic production, both solo and co-authored. From these texts, the technical and philosophical character of his production, its critical reception and its theoretical limitations are evaluated. It is argued that, although his work was neither propositional nor original in a strong sense, it constitutes a significant contribution to logical education in Chile and an early example of local appropriation of Mathematical logic. Finally, the structural and historiographical reasons that explain the relative oblivion of his figure are discussed, placing his legacy in the broader framework of the intellectual history of the formal sciences in the country.

This article reviews the main criticisms made to David Lewis's Counterpart Theory (CT) intwo distinct periods: 1971-1979 and 2001-2012. A counterpart, according to Lewis, is anentity that exists materially in another possible world, and the quality of that entity is thatit is similar, almost identical, to an individual in the actual world. The early critiques, byFeldman, Plantinga and Hazen, address fundamental problems related to the debate ontransmundane identity, the counterpart relation and the role of similarity in thecounterpart relation. Later critiques, by Chihara, Sider, Divers, Mackie and Hazen, focus on mainly logical and semantic aspects of CT, the intuitive character and its limitations incapturing modal properties. The article shows that, although CT has been influential inmetaphysical debates, its reliance on comparative similarity and lack of a sound logicalframework make it vulnerable to objections. Despite these challenges, the theory remainsa significant contribution to modal metaphysics, inspiring contemporary discussions ofpossible worlds and counterpart relations. This article seeks to provide a structuredoverview of the evolution of criticisms of CT and their implications for the philosophy of modality.