Esteban Marín-Ávila

En este artículo se abordan aspectos centrales del pensamiento de Luis Villoro que se desprenden de la relación crítica que mantuvo con la fenomenología trascendental de Edmund Husserl. Algunos de ellos son las preguntas sobre el sentido que tenga la reflexión filosófica en los contextos vitales y sociales concretos en los que se lleva a cabo, así como sobre la tarea de la filosofía misma, los temas sobre los que no puede dejar de hablar y el tipo de conocimiento al que debe aspirar. En la parte final se sugiere que las perspectivas que se abren con el estudio comparativo de estos dos pensadores son importantes para reivindicar la tarea crítica de la filosofía respecto de la realidad en la que se cultiva y se despliega.

According to Husserl, the mathematization of the lifeworld involves reducing it, as object of knowledge, to what is measurable, as well as excluding other forms of knowledge of it. This has important implications in relation to the modern conception of rationality, and, significantly, of practical rationality. More precisely, it issues in an impoverishment of the notion of reason. This article examines the idea that the process of commodification associated with the consolidation and expansion of capitalism has motivated another aspect of the mathematization of nature to which Husserl alludes: the mathematization of value. Born from capitalist economy and from practical attitudes, this mathematization of value is a tendency to reduce all value to use value. In such context, this article offers a phenomenological reflection on the crisis of modern rationality, especially in relation to the difficulty to undertake collective actions that follow logics that are different from that of the accumulation of capital, based on the examination of this other aspect of the mathematization of the lifeworld.

Este artículo plantea que ciertas situaciones en las que nos vemos obligados a prestar atención a los riesgos que tomamos al confiar, como la amenaza de violencia o la ruptura de la confianza, motivan una forma particular de confianza en la cual nos interesa tomar consciencia de las creencias, valoraciones e intenciones prácticas implicadas al confiar. Tras describir fenomenológicamente, desde una perspectiva husserliana, la estructura de esta forma de confianza, denominada confianza reflexiva o racional, se expone por qué su análisis filosófico puede contruibuir a aclarar problemáticas epistemológicas y éticas que se desprenden del carácter social de nuestra existencia. En la parte final del artículo se sugiere que el concepto de confianza reflexiva o racional puede servir para entender problemáticas relacionadas con la posverdad y para discernir algunas formas básicas de dominación y de complicidad con la dominación.

Sense and Uncertainty presents a phenomenological account of the possibility of rational action amid the challenges posed by violence, volatile conditions, uncertain outcomes, and social dependence. The book asks us to consider the following: We are often forced through violence to do things that do not make sense for us except to avoid retaliations, punishments, or the various evils that others might inflict on us. We inhabit a world that escapes our control. This involves living in uncertainty concerning the things that we might suffer and do, that is, the things that might happen to us and the results of our actions. We are dependent on others and collaborate with them in ways that make it impossible to fully understand the sense of our own actions and practical intentions. Rationality involves insightful thinking about the world and our emotional responses to it, something we do in our everyday lives, whether consciously or without awareness. Sense and Uncertainty attempts to make explicit and to clarify the implications of this conceptually neglected aspect of our rationality: namely, that it involves paying attention to our emotions and values. An ethical life in which we can act meaningfully in the face of violence and uncertainty, and in which we can make sense of our vulnerability and dependence on others, demands that we think about and seek insight into how we love, why we hope, and in whom or in what we trust. The phenomenological ethics presented in Sense and Uncertainty draws on the works of Western canonical philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Simone de Beauvoir, Anthony Steinbock, and José Ortega y Gasset, as well as on those of Latin American thinkers such as Luis Villoro, Rita Segato, and Augusto Salazar Bondy, among others.

La cuestión de la evidencia del valor ocupa un lugar central en la teoría de la racionalidad práctica y la ética de Husserl. Actuar de manera racional implica entre otras cosas hacer lo que uno valora. ¿Pero cómo sabe una persona qué es lo valioso para ella? Husserl responde que alguien tiene evidencia de que algo es valioso cuando este valor se manifiesta a través de sentimientos. La conciencia del valor es una vivencia intencional en la que se aprehenden valores de objetos o situaciones de forma afectiva o sentimental, a través de sensaciones que incluyen sentimientos. Al denominar a este tipo de vivencia “valicepción” [Wertnehmung], Husserl sugiere tiene rasgos estructurales análogos a los de la percepción [Wahrnehmung]. Se aborda, desde una perspectiva husserliana, el problema de la descripción fenomenológica la evidencia del valor, destaca aspectos que hacen que sea más complejo que el de la descripción de la percepción. Primero, la valicepción no es independiente de la evidencia dóxica y está vinculada a la intencionalidad práctica. Segundo, los sentimientos en los que se manifiestan los valores son más opacos y difíciles de identificar que las sensaciones de la percepción. Finalmente, a diferencia de los objetos percibidos, lo que se valora está sujeto a cambios constantes. Se reflexiona sobre el papel de los instintos en la consciencia del valor, así como sobre la relevancia de la fantasía y el arte en la constitución de nuevos valores, sugiriendo que la valicepción tiene una relación flexible e indeterminada con su objeto intencional.

In this paper I examine the structure of hope and trust from a phenomenological perspective in order to analyze the kinds of beliefs, valuings, and practical dispositions involved in them. I claim that there are some basic aspects of the social world that would be inconceivable without the feeling components of these attitudes. However, since these attitudes are only rational in as far as they involve rational beliefs, valuings, and practical assumptions, a complex theory of reason that deals with these three domains is necessary to understand what is at stake in them. Accordingly, I attempt to sketch central aspects of the Husserlian pluralistic conception of reason and highlight the way in which, when they are rational, the valuings involved both in hope and trust open new possibilities to act in rational or meaningful ways. This leads me to stress the role of the feelings involved in these attitudes, for I claim that such valuings or axiological assessments are based on them. I argue that hope allows us to act rationally in the face of uncertainty and what lies beyond our control. In the final part I elaborate on the idea that trust is founded on hope. I examine what happens when hope is expressed and how being found trustworthy by others implies being capable of establishing all kinds of social relationships, including relationships in which the trusted one is dominated. This opens the possibility of raising ethical questions concerning trusting and responding to the trust of others.

Resumen En este artículo reflexiono sobre la posibilidad de conceptualizar los derechos humanos como hechos institucionales, lo cual permite enmarcarlos en una perspectiva más amplia que las meramente jurídicas y morales. La propuesta se basa en la ontología social de John Searle, aunque intento replantearla desde la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl y la teoría de los actos sociales de Adolf Reinach. En la parte final introduzco problemáticas relacionadas con el papel de los Estados nacionales en la institucionalización de los derechos humanos. Para ello me apoyo en la idea de Hannah Arendt de que los derechos humanos presuponen el derecho a tener derechos y la pongo en relación con observaciones más recientes de especialistas.In this paper I reflect on the possibility of conceptualizing human rights as institutional facts. This aims to frame them in a broader perspective than a merely legal or moral one. The proposal is based on John Searle’s social ontology, but I attempt to think it over with the support of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Adolf Reinach’s theory of social acts. In the final part I set forward problems related with the role of national States in institutionalizing human rights. To elaborate this point, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s idea that human rights presuppose the right to have rights and relate it with more recent observations of experts.

The work of Anthony J. Steinbock on emotions―particularly moral emotions―and on religious experience is closely related to a methodological claim. This claim is that the concepts of “experience” and “manifestation” should be understood in a broader manner than that of classical phenomenology, particularly Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In this paper, I examine the way in which Steinbock understands and conceptualizes the kind of givenness to which he refers with the notion of “vertical experience”. I focus on his claim that vertical experiences are irreducible to the kind of experiences that can be described in terms of what he calls “provocation”, “presentation” and the “noesis-noema structure”. Even though I make a criticism of his assertion that the latter implies that they should not be understood as forms of givenness founded on the above-mentioned structure, I agree with some major implications that he draws from them. In the last part of the paper, I discuss his suggestion that the Husserlian conceptualization of emotional givenness should be revised to set forward their structure in terms of what he calls “evocation” and try to give additional reasons, drawn from Husserl himself, to support this claim. The paper comes concludes by stressing the relevance of Steinbock’s analyses concerning what he calls “idolatry”. I argue that his analyses of attitudes that negate the vertical dimension of experience have far reaching implications that go beyond the field of philosophy of religion and open new, promising paths for phenomenological research on social and moral problems.