Esther Neuhann

This paper contributes to the methodological debate on how to deal with sexist passages in classical works by examining how ‘deeply’ anchored Fichte’s and Hegel’s sexism is in their philosophies. We argue that Fichte’s and Hegel’s patriarchal conceptions of gender relations, marriage in particular, are not based on biological determinism – that is, they do not derive social norms from given natural relations. In doing so, we introduce a distinction between simple and transformative biological determinism. In contrast to biological determinism, Fichte and Hegel provide philosophical justifications for the ‘patriarchal organization of nature’ which, as it were backwardly, underpins their defenses of patriarchal society. On a philosophical level, their theories thus exemplify Judith Butler’s thesis that not only gender but also sex is socially constructed. If Fichte and Hegel are not biological determinists, as we contend, their patriarchal views cannot be removed from their philosophies by simply correcting them with up-to-date biological knowledge.

The Soviet feminist Alexandra Kollontai has gained renewed attention in contemporary feminist discourse. In particular, family-abolitionist perspectives draw on her critique of the family and bourgeois love, invoking her idea of free (‘red’) love as a form of solidarity. We share this revived enthusiasm, as Kollontai's work continues to offer valuable and inspiring insights today. As we argue in this article, it is especially her dual analysis of gender inequity, including a ‘moral’ or psychic and an economic or material dimension, that proves relevant for current debates. Her work holds the potential for bridging subject-centred and materialist approaches. However, we also recognise pitfalls in Kollontai's conception of the relationship between economic structures and subjectivity which are echoed in contemporary appropriations of her work. We maintain that re-reading Kollontai can raise awareness of the complicated nature of combining a materialist and ‘moral’ perspective on gender. While Kollontai does not fully achieve this mediation, she provides resources for this project that have thus far been overlooked and may still prove useful today.

The philosophical foundations of human rights are as complex as they are controversial. For some years, the debate has been dominated by the rather gridlocked opposition between moral and political conceptions of human rights. Moreover, a profound examination of the social and relational dimension of human rights has been lacking. Against this background, this volume brings together contributions which scrutinise the multi-faceted foundations of human rights. It is a valuable collection for philosophers, political scientists and legal scholars interested in fresh insights into the idea and practice of human rights. With contributions by Markus Abraham | Andreas Busen | Johannes Haaf | Christoph Herrler | Justine Lacroix | Franziska Martinsen | Luise Müller | Esther Neuhann | Niklas Plätzer | Ned Richardson-Little | Regina Schidel | Tatjana Noemi Tömmel | Alexander Weiß | Markus Wolf.

The paper reconstructs Fichte’s relational conception of human rights in the Foundations of Natural Right (1796/7) and brings it into conversation with the current debate on the philosophy of human rights. Fichte’s thus far underappreciated account is thereby made accessible, and its original and attractive philosophical features highlighted. I proceed in three steps. First, I argue that Fichte has a complex understanding of human rights. He defends ‘one true human right’ (das eigentliche Menschenrecht) to be part of a legal community in which two ‘original rights’ (Urrechte) are secured: a right to bodily inviolability and a proto-property right to secure access to a (sufficient) part of the world. Second, I show that, for Fichte, the substantive aim of original rights is to establish and secure a non-violent intersubjective relation called ‘free reciprocal efficacy’ (freie Wechselwirkung) which is normatively less demanding than a full relation of right and recognition in Fichte’s sense, or of justice. In this context, I unpack Fichte’s specific understanding of the human body (Leib) as a medium of free (reciprocal) efficacy rather than a biological entity in the original right to bodily inviolability. Third, I elaborate on the peculiar normative status of Fichtean human rights, in particular as non-positive and non-moral.

The article shows that Fichte's conception of human rights implies concrete guidelines for the economic organization of states and international relations. First, I elucidate Fichte's view on human rights at the domestic level. Fichte's complex theory of human rights consists in a meta-right to live in a state that secures at least two “original rights”: a right to bodily inviolability and a right to sufficient property. I focus on the latter. Due to Fichte's unorthodox view of property rights as rights to actions rather than objects, this amounts to a right to work. This right, according to Fichte, must be realized in a planned economy. Second, I focus on the global level. Fichte's right to sufficient (unorthodox) property has implications for three dimensions of global justice: cosmopolitan right, the right of nations and commercial relations. Third, I draw some insights from thinking through Fichte's global material constitution for long observed conceptual tensions regarding his political and legal philosophy, namely between freedom and security as well as cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and for current debates in politics and political theory.