Eszter Kollar

Global equality of opportunity and national self-determination are two central principles of a liberal theory of international justice, but the relationship between them remains contested. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a sound understating of the contention – where the tensions and possible contradiction between self-determination and global equality of opportunity lie – and then propose a way forward. To this end the chapter reviews the main approaches to this issue in contemporary political theory: the incompatibility thesis, the trade-off thesis, and moves on to lay out the possibility of reconciliation between self-determination and equal opportunity.

This paper develops a two-fold critique of Patti Lenard’s citizenship-for-contribution argument, according to which access to citizenship can ‘ease’ the harm of exploitation that migrant workers endure. Firstly, I argue that the remedial duties for exploitative labor should rest not with the state but with the actual exploiter, namely, the employer drawing the unfair advantage from devalued immigrant labour. Secondly, I argue that Lenard’s distributive conception of the harm of exploitation omits important relational harms whose impact goes beyond the exploited individual workers. The social marginalization of racialized migrant workers as a class and the devaluing of their labour on a global scale cannot be so readily offset by granting a few access to Western citizenship. Such relational harms must be carefully reckoned with before one can conclude that citizenship-for-contribution schemes further or hinder global migration justice.

Should immigrants have fewer cultural and language rights than citizens and long-settled groups, and if so, on what moral ground? In the first part of the paper, we develop a novel critique of Kymlicka’s account of voluntary cultural rights alienation, arguing that it is only plausible in the context of emigration, not immigration. We argue that the choice to immigrate cannot be considered voluntary without it being sufficiently clear to the migrant what her rights and duties will be in the new society. If so, then voluntariness cannot morally ground a particular rights regime in the destination country. Any such rights regime must be justified on independent moral grounds. Secondly, we argue that voluntariness can play a different role in a normative argument for cultural rights-differentiation between citizens and denizens. It can i) mitigate the overall injustice of differential treatment; and it can ii) instantiate the justice of how rules apply to the immigrant in a reasonably just society. Thirdly, we sketch an alternative moral grounding of cultural and language rights differentiation that rests, not on voluntariness, but on a contextual analysis of the relevant interests involved. While the protection of these relevant interests gives us reasons to prioritize the language(s) of long-settled groups in many cases, there is no general case for restricting the full recognition of language and culture to long-settled groups.

The concept of voluntariness permeates the ethics and politics of migration and is commonly used to distinguish refugees from migrants. Yet, neither the precise nature and conditions of voluntariness nor its ethical significance for migrant rights and state obligations has received enough attention. The articles in this collection move the debate forward by demonstrating the complex ethical judgments involved in delineating voluntary from forced migration and in drawing out its political and institutional implications. In addition to highlighting the interplay between the voluntary and nonvoluntary elements of migration over time and across different sites of the migration journey, they provide a nuanced account of the various conditions of voluntariness and they challenge common ideas about its normative political consequences.

Inequality causes a variety of social ills, which give egalitarians reasons for concerns of justice. In particular, inequality is deemed to undermine people’s fundamental moral capacity of self-respect. In this paper, we explore the complex relationship between inequality and self-respect from a philosophical and an empirical angle, arguing that a theory of justice should take both into account. To this purpose, we first clarify the normative objection to inequality from the alleged erosion of self-respect. Then, we elaborate on empirical findings showing the crucial role that ‘relative deprivation’ plays in the causal mechanism that connects inequalities to the erosion of self-respect. We conclude that this role is best understood in philosophical terms as a form of deprivation that affects thesignificance that people attach to the value of the choices they make

The immigration debate in political theory has produced a series of accounts that justify the state’s right to exclude potential immigrants, where the right of self-determination figures prominently. We challenge two prominent accounts of the self-determination-based right to exclude and defend a circumscribed right to exclude and a corollary duty to admit immigrants, based on our ‘people relationship goods’ account of self-determination. Our conception reconciles the moral claims of global opportunity migrants with the well-being and non-alienation interests of the locals. It therefore provides a principled answer to the philosophical question underlying pressing political conflicts today, namely what is the permissible scope of exclusion by self-determining political communities, in light of weighty global moral demands of inclusion.

Health-worker migration, commonly called "medical brain drain", refers to the mass migration of trained and skilled health professionals from low-income to high-income countries. This is currently leaving a significant number of poor countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, with critical staff shortages in the healthcare sector. A broad consensus exists that, where medical brain drain exacerbates such shortages, it is unethical, and this review presents the main arguments underpinning this view. Notwithstanding the general agreement, which policies are justifiable on ethical grounds to tackle brain drain and how best to go about implementing them remains controversial. The review offers a discussion of the specific ethical issues that have to be taken into account when deciding which policy measures to prioritise and suggests a strategy of policy implementation to address medical brain drain as a matter of urgency.

Michael Blake holds that liberal states are precluded from introducing compulsory medical service to improve access to health care under conditions of critical health worker shortage. "Emergency circumstances" are the only exception when the suspension of liberty may be justified. I argue that there are three problems with Blake's emergency justification of compulsory service. First, his concept of emergency is vague. Second, his account does not really rely on emergency as much as liberty. Third, his conception of permissible restrictions of liberty is too narrow. I argue that liberties may be limited to some degree, temporarily, for the sake of attaining the capacities necessary for the exercise of liberties and for safeguarding the social conditions of the right to health. I conclude that in poor societies, temporarily delaying emigration through a highly qualified compulsory medical service can sometimes be justified.

Multidimensional theories of well-being are locked into a debate about value judgment. They seek to settle which dimensions should matter for measurement and policy, and, more importantly, on what grounds to decide what should matter. Moreover, there is a gulf between theory and practice, given that measurement and policy are rarely rooted in a coherent ethical framework. Our paper engages in the debate concerning the legitimate grounds for selecting dimensions. Combining Amartya Sen's capability approach and John Rawls’ method of political constructivism, we explore whether the constitution and its public culture can be used as an ethically sound informational base for selecting dimensions, and if so, why. We apply this ‘constitutional approach’ to the Italian case with the aim of deriving a set of publicly justifiable dimensions of well-being. It is a long-standing Constitution with broad public consultation at its base, which still enjoys a wide consensus. We seek to show why there is a need for more ethically sound methodological approaches to measuring well-being, pointing out the advantages of the constitutional approach, and how it may enrich the work of practitioners engaged in the policies of well-being.

ABSTRACT One of the most ambitious and sophisticated recent approaches to provide a theory of global health justice is Sridhar Venkatapuram's recent work. In this commentary, we first outline the core idea of Venkatapuram's approach to global health justice. We then argue that one of the most important elements of the account, Venkatapuram's basis of global health duties, is either too weak or assumed implicitly without a robust justification. The more explicit grounding of the duty to protect and promote health capabilities is based on Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. We argue that this foundation gives rise to humanitarian duties rather than duties of justice proper. Venkatapuram's second argument from the social determinants of health thesis is instead a stronger candidate for grounding duties of justice. However, as a justificatory argument, it is only alluded to and has not yet been spelled out sufficiently. We offer plausible justificatory steps to fill this gap and draw some implications for global health action. We believe this both strengthens Venkatapuram's approach and serves to broaden the basis for future action in the area of global health.

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. David Miller’s political philosophy of immigration employs two complementary argumentative strategies to challenge open border theories. The first strategy is to defeat the principled case for open borders, such as the global equality of opportunity argument for more lax immigration control. The second strategy is to establish the democratic community’s prima facie right to determine the shape of its future, including membership and the right to exclude. First, I argue that Miller’s conception of global equality of opportunity is overly narrow and that his objections to the principle, to the metric and to what counts as feasible political action misfire against other, more plausible, accounts. Second, I argue that his democratic interpretation of collective self-determination does not solve the pressing question concerning the morally justified scope and content of self-determination and the moral limits of the right to exclude. I conclude by questioning Miller’s general strategy: whether theories of immigration should be engaged in an exercise of shifting the burden of proof between open and closed borders. By contrast, I argue that a more desirable task for the political philosophy of immigration is to find ways in which the joint requirement of global equality of opportunity and collective self-determination can be coherently upheld.

One of the most ambitious and sophisticated recent approaches to provide a theory of global health justice is Sridhar Venkatapuram's recent work. In this commentary, we first outline the core idea of Venkatapuram's approach to global health justice. We then argue that one of the most important elements of the account, Venkatapuram's basis of global health duties, is either too weak or assumed implicitly without a robust justification. The more explicit grounding of the duty to protect and promote health capabilities is based on Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. We argue that this foundation gives rise to humanitarian duties rather than duties of justice proper. Venkatapuram's second argument from the social determinants of health thesis is instead a stronger candidate for grounding duties of justice. However, as a justificatory argument, it is only alluded to and has not yet been spelled out sufficiently. We offer plausible justificatory steps to fill this gap and draw some implications for global health action. We believe this both strengthens Venkatapuram's approach and serves to broaden the basis for future action in the area of global health