•  90
    Fragmentation and the Preface Paradox
    Episteme 23 (1): 95-104. 2026.
    The preface paradox is often taken to show that beliefs can be individually rational but jointly inconsistent. However, this received conflict between rationality and consistency is unfounded. This paper seeks to show that no rational beliefs are actually inconsistent in the preface paradox.
  •  89
    Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account
    Dissertation, Lingnan University. 2019.
    This thesis investigates the metaphysical nature of necessity. My study focuses primarily on the reduction of metaphysical necessity and the question of whether a necessary truth can be reductively defined. Theodore Sider develops a new reductive account of metaphysical necessity. Unfortunately, the multiple realizability problem posed by Jonathan Schaffer undermines the credibility of Sider’s account. This underlies my motivation to search for a revised Siderian account of necessity. On this ba…Read more