Ethan Lowe

California Baptist University
  •  6
    Book reviews (review)
    with Maria J. Frapolli, Ignacio Angelelli, Curt C. Christian, K. Misiuna, Albent C. Lewis, J. B. Gould, A. Urquhart, L. Kreiser, G. Roussopoulos, H. L. L. Busard, Wolfe Mays, Miriam Franchella, Rezensiert Von Dominik Perler, Michele Di Francesco, Donald Felipe, R. Smith, and B. Smith
    History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1): 127-156. 1995.
    Daniel Laurier and Francois Lepage, Essais sur le langage et Vintentionalité. Montréal; Bellarmin:Paris; Vrin: 1992. 366 pp. Can $34.95 Dino Buzzetti, Maurizio Ferriani and Andrea Tabarroni...
  •  7
    Book reviews (review)
    with Maria Frapolli, Ignacio Angelelli, Curt Christian, K. Misiuna, Albent Lewis, J. B. Gould, A. Urquhart, L. Kreiser, G. Roussopoulos, H. L. L. Busard, Wolfe Mays, Miriam Franchella, Rezensiert Von Dominik Perler, Michele Di Francesco, Donald Felipe, R. Smith, and B. Smith
    History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1): 127-156. 1995.
    Daniel Laurier and Francois Lepage, Essais sur le langage et Vintentionalité. Montréal; Bellarmin:Paris; Vrin: 1992. 366 pp. Can $34.95 Dino Buzzetti, Maurizio Ferriani and Andrea Tabarroni...
  • Review of Metaphysical Essays (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
  •  259
    A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent
    In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-248. 2011.
    Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are ‘relational’ and those that are ‘constituent’ (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle ’s Metaphysics – a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an a…Read more
  •  58
    Universais
    Critica -. forthcoming.
  •  1
    A defence of the four-category ontology
    Argument Und Analyse 225--240. forthcoming.
  •  161
    E. J. Lowe; Coinciding objects: in defence of the ‘standard account’, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 171–178, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/5.
  •  207
    The determinists have run out of luck—for a good reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.
    In his paper ‘‘Bad luck once again’’ Neil Levy attacks our proof of the consistency of libertarianism by reiterating a time-worn compatibilist complaint.1 This is, that what is not determined must be due to chance. If A has a choice of X or Y, neither X nor Y being causally determined, then if A chooses X it can only be by chance, never for a reason. The only ‘‘reason’’ that could explain the choice of X over Y would have to be a causally sufficient reason, which would rule out A’s having a genuin…Read more
  •  141
    Indeterminist free will
    with Storrs McCall
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3). 2005.
    The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological…Read more
  •  111
    Sortals and the Individuation of Objects
    Mind and Language 22 (5): 514-533. 2007.
    It has long been debated whether objects are ‘sortally’ individuated. This paper begins by clarifying some of the key terms in play—in particular, ‘sortal’, ‘individuation’, and ‘object’. The term ‘individuation’ is taken to have both a cognitive and a metaphysical sense, in the former denoting the singling out of an object in thought and in the latter a determination relation between entities. ‘Sortalism’ is defined as the doctrine that only as falling under some specific sortal concept can an …Read more
  •  265
    On the identity of artifacts
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 220-232. 1983.
  •  41
    Indeterminist Free Will
    with Storrs McCall
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 681-690. 2007.
    The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological…Read more
  •  211
    The thesis of 3D/4D equivalence states that every three-dimensional description of the world is translatable without remainder into a four-dimensional description, and vice versa. In representing an object in 3D or in 4D terms we are giving alternative descriptions of one and the same thing, and debates over whether the ontology of the physical world is "really" 3D or 4D are pointless. The twins paradox is shown to rest, in relativistic 4D geometry, on a reversed law of triangle inequality. But …Read more
  •  290
    In the Second Meditation, Descartes famously asks at one point, ‘But what then am I?’ – to which his immediate answer is ‘A thing that thinks.’ It is this question, or rather the plural version of it, that Eric Olson examines in this excellent book. He thinks that it is – today, at least – a rather neglected question. He points out that it is wrong to confuse the question with the much more frequently examined question of what personal identity consists in. In fact, he thinks that possible answe…Read more
  •  33
    Objects and criteria of identity
    In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 1997.
    'Object' and 'criterion of identity' are philosophical terms of art whose application lies at a considerable theoretical remove from the surface phenomena of everyday linguistic usage. This partly explains their highly controversial status, for their point of application lies precisely where the concerns of linguists and philosophers of language merge with those of metaphysicians. This chapter explains the possession of determinate identity‐conditions. It argues that the distinction between 'abs…Read more
  •  333
    Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: A response to Olson
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 369-372. 2002.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In…Read more
  •  154
    Entity, identity and unity
    Erkenntnis 48 (2-3): 191-208. 1998.
    I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the same K…Read more
  •  89
    Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution
    Analysis 55 (3): 179-182. 1995.
    E. J. Lowe; The problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 179–182, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/
  •  6
    The Determinists Have Run Out of Luck---For a Good Reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.