Ethan Moore

The ‘Now What?’ Problem for error theorists concerns what we should do with moral discourse, if it transpires to be systematically untrue. The recommendation that we abolish moral discourse (abolitionism) is often attacked on the basis that it sacrifices the useful functions morality performs. One such function is morality’s use as an intrapersonal commitment-device – it (supposedly) bolsters self-control and prevents us from frustrating our future goals, despite our momentary temptations to do so. Abolitionists attack this argument by claiming that error theorists lack the means to preserve moral judgements as a commitment-device, arguing that (for example) whatever attitudes error theorists could have towards moral claims, they could not be robust enough to inspire the required motivational change (to sustain a commitment-device). Few abolitionists, however, have considered the range of effective amoral commitment-devices at their disposal. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that these might be as effective as, if not more effective than, moral commitment-devices. If this is true, it demonstrates that preservationists have seriously overestimated the indispensability of moral judgements as commitment-devices.

The ‘Now What?’ problem for moral error theorists concerns whether (and how) error theorists should maintain or abolish moral discourse. If moral discourse is systematically error-ridden, one must decide whether to abandon it, as we have abandoned talk of phlogiston, or maintain it, as most mathematical error theorists retain number discourse. Prompted by companions-in-guilt arguments, some moral error theorists have also endorsed prudential error theories. These developments pave the way for a novel metanormative debate — a ‘Now What?’ problem for prudential discourse. Just as moral error theorists must decide what to do with their error-ridden discourse, so must prudential error theorists decide what to do with theirs. This paper addresses this novel problem, by (i) arguing that multiple forms of moral error theory lead to prudential error theory, (ii) characterising the prudential ‘Now What?’ problem, and (iii) proposing a method for how error theorists can answer it (and practically deliberate in general). Finally, (iv) the paper takes a substantive position on the debate by recommending that moral and prudential error theorists adopt metaphorist prudential fictionalism.