Étienne Brown

Within democracies, the capacity to influence political outcomes through speech depends not only on the right to express oneself, but also on the opportunity to reach relevant audiences. In this paper, I argue that the unequal distribution of algorithmic reach on social media platforms undermines equality of opportunity for political influence (EOPI), which is a central democratic ideal. Drawing on Niko Kolodny’s work, I contend that current recommendation algorithms create and perpetuate informal inequalities by concentrating attention among a small minority of already-amplified speakers while systematically marginalizing others. To address this problem, I propose recommendation floors as a mechanism for equalizing political speech. To help users achieve meaningful participation, each verified account would receive guaranteed minimum recommendation for up to a limited number of political posts per week. Although this measure represents one component of the structural reforms needed to move the digital public sphere closer to democratic ideals, it offers a feasible pathway to reducing informal inequalities in political influence online.

Can we philosophize about Trust and Safety? This chapter highlights the similarities between trust and safety policy and academic philosophy. First, we argue that trust and safety professionals regularly engage in philosophical thinking as their daily work relates to conceptual analysis, harm mitigation, and freedom of expression. We then suggest that such professionals would benefit from engaging in philosophical efforts to define overarching trust and safety principles and conceptualize the power wielded by social media platforms in contemporary democratic societies. In our view, philosophers, too, can also learn from trust and safety professionals, especially those who craft content moderation policies. By familiarizing themselves with Trust and Safety, they can gain awareness of pressing social issues and edge cases that challenge their intuitive judgments. Lastly, we discuss what we have learned by participating in PhilMod, a community of academic researchers and technology professionals interested in the philosophical implications of content moderation and social media platform policy.

By allocating their attention to pieces of content, algorithmic filtering shapes the daily behavior of billions of users when they interact with a digital platform. Beyond conditioning what we do, can recommendation algorithms influence who we are? This paper suggests that they do. Specifically, I contend that recommender systems affect users’ capacity to be their authentic selves in both positive and negative ways. I start by offering an account of authenticity that builds on two central concepts: volitional alignment and self-understanding. I then explain how algorithmic filtering works and impacts authenticity. While recommender systems frustrate users’ second-order desires by relying on uninformative behavioral signals, they also facilitate self-understanding by inciting users to question their identity. I end by discussing how controllable and explainable recommenders would best enable users to be authentic.

In The Right to Know, Lani Watson forcefully argues in favor of recognizing epistemic rights to all humans. In this paper, we apply Watson’s framework to three hard cases. First, we consider interpersonal relationships and suggest that there is room to explore how epistemic rights bear on, e.g., whether parents can permissibly lie to or mislead their children by asserting the existence of Santa Claus. Second, we turn to social media platforms and contend that Watson’s framework is compatible with contrasting moderation policies and transparency requirements. Third, we examine a foundational case of legal ethics—the buried bodies case—which raises the question of how professional and moral duties might be weighed alongside Watson’s epistemic ones. In exploring these cases, we hope to incite practically minded philosophers to reflect upon the implications of Watson’s theory for contemporary debates in applied ethics and political philosophy.

I suggest that shaping knowers of facts implies the teaching of intellectual virtues. To justify this claim, I do not appeal to the intrinsic value of epistemic goods such as truth or knowledge. Instead, I suggest that we have political reasons to teach intellectual virtues to high school and college students. The current epistemic environment – especially that found on social media – is not conducive to good democratic decision-making, but acquiring intellectual virtues can prepare students to make good political decisions and increase the epistemic potential of democracy. For this reason, we should envision intellectual virtues as civic virtues, that is, excellencies that relate to the democratic process and that can help individuals become good citizens.

Attempts to influence people’s beliefs through misinformation have a long history. In the age of social media, however, there is a growing fear that the circulation of false or misleading claims will be more impactful than ever now that sophisticated technological means are available to those who desire to spread them. Should democratic societies worry about misinformation? If so, is it possible and desirable for them to control its spread by regulating it? This chapter offers an answer to these questions. First, I propose a definition of misinformation and explain how it proliferates in online contexts. Second, I consider four reasons to worry about misinformation by discussing its likely impact on people’s political opinions, emotions, physical safety and personal autonomy. Third, I assess three strategies for regulating misinformation—individual self-regulation, platform-based innovations and governmental action—and suggest that the most effective ones are those that spare human agents from having to successively review individual pieces of content.

According to recent discussions, trolls attempt to spark the anger of internet users by feigning engagement in serious conversations with unsuspecting targets who are turned into objects of ridicule in front of a complicit audience. In this chapter, I extend the traditional definition of trolling to non-conversational endeavours. In my view, trolling is the deceptive disruption of joint action regardless of whether such action is conversational or non-conversational in nature. In conjunction, I propose an account of the moral wrong in trolling according to which trolls hinder the pursuit of valuable human goods such as knowledge, mutual understanding, friendship, empathy and play by deceptively engaging their targets in spurious forms of joint action. To illustrate these claims, I consider a recent case of non-conversational.

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement.

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news.

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings.

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement among contemporary philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources.

Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative.

Aristotelian virtue theorists are currently engaged in a discussion with philosophers who use psychological findings to question some of their main assumptions. In this article, I present and argue against one of these psychological challenges—Jesse Prinz’s Normativity Challenge—which rests on the claim that findings in cultural psychology contradict the Aristotelian thesis that the normativity of virtues derives from nature. First, I demonstrate that the Normativity Challenge is based on three problematic assumptions about contemporary Aristotelianism. Second, I argue that it presupposes the truth of a metaethical framework that Aristotelians reject: moral relativism.