•  28
    Normative Reasons are not Good Bases: a Reply to Gregory
    Philosophia 47 (3): 723-731. 2019.
    In a recent paper, Gregory defends the claim that a normative reason is a good basis for Φ-ing. He claims that a “basis” is what is commonly known as a motivating reason. By “good” Gregory means good in its attributive sense, as something which is good as a kind. In this paper I argue that it is not plausible that normative reasons are motivating reasons that are good as an instance of their kind. I argue that in order to assess this claim, pace Gregory, we need to know what it is for a motivati…Read more
  •  46
    How to be a deontic buck-passer
    Philosophical Studies 177 (11): 3193-3211. 2020.
    Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic properties, such as ‘ought’, ‘requirement’, and ‘permission’ on the one hand, and normative reasons on the other. However, it is far from obvious what, precisely, the connection consists in, and this topic has suffered from a paucity of discussion. This paper seeks to address that paucity by providing a novel deontic buck-passing view, one that avo…Read more