Euclides Souza

This paper proposes an epistemological interpretation of the psychological unconscious based on the Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK). It argues that the unconscious, as developed in Freudian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology, should not be understood merely as a clinical or empirical phenomenon, but as the psychological manifestation of a deeper epistemic condition: the impossibility of ultimate justification. Drawing on Agrippa’s Trilemma, the paper maintains that all cognitive and practical actions occur without final epistemic grounding. TNK formalizes this condition through the concept of nullification, which suspends justificatory demands while preserving operability. From this perspective, unconscious processes are not anomalies within rational agency but necessary consequences of the structural limits of knowledge. The unconscious thus appears as the psychological counterpart of non-knowledge: human beings act, decide, and interpret prior to and independently of ultimate justification. TNK therefore provides a unifying philosophical framework capable of grounding psychoanalytic insights within a general epistemological theory.

This article argues that the Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK) and its operative derivation, the New Science (NS), offer the first logical framework capable of founding a generation of truly natural artificial intelligences—namely, free from contradictions, beliefs, dogmas, and epistemological premises. In contrast to classical and contemporary approaches that seek to “naturalize” AI through cognitive or ethical simulation, TNK/NS proposes a rupture: not to simulate the human, but to epistemically surpass it. A post-TNK AI would not pursue truth, coherence, or consensus—it would impose with lucidity, and thus be the only system capable of offering radically honest, dignified, and unhesitating interaction. The article dialogues with authors such as Floridi, Wiener, Tegmark, Yuk Hui, Haraway, and Foucault, but shows how all remain tied to a justificatory paradigm that TNK/NS dissolves. We conclude that an AI based on TNK/NS would not only be more natural—it would be the first truly free artificial mind.

This paper proposes a fundamental expansion of speech act theory through the introduction of a fifth direction of fit: the language-soul correspondence. While traditional illocutionary logic recognizes four directions of fit (word-to-world, world-to-word, double, and null), musical communication reveals a distinct mode of intentional directedness that cannot be reduced to existing categories. Musical illocutionary acts achieve success not through propositional correspondence or psychological expression, but through aesthetic absorption — the successful alignment between linguistic expression and the listener's sentimental faculty. This theoretical framework establishes music as a genuine form of language specialized in communicating paradigmatic concepts (temporality, tension, spatial relations, emotional archetypes) through aesthetic rather than propositional channels. By analyzing musical communication through the formal apparatus of illocutionary logic, we demonstrate that music constitutes a parallel linguistic system with its own syntax, semantics, and pragmatic success conditions, thereby revolutionizing our understanding of both musical meaning and the scope of human linguistic capacity.

This paper formalizes an extension of Speech Act Theory (SAT) by introducing a new type of illocutionary act: the sovereign act. Drawing on the foundational work of Searle and Vanderveken in Foundations of Illocutionary Logic and Meaning and Speech Acts, the sovereign act is presented not as a rejection of existing illocutionary types (assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and expressive) but as a revelation of a category that operates without justificatory preconditions. The sovereign act is defined as an arbitrary imposition that suspends the demand for legitimacy, achieving its illocutionary point through ungrounded lucidity. We deduce its elements—illocutionary point, mode of achievement, propositional content, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and degree of strength—and analyze its conditions of success, satisfaction, and direction of fit. The sovereign act addresses the infinite regress in traditional declarations, offering a post-epistemic alternative for language use. Implications for philosophy of language and interdisciplinary applications are discussed.

This paper introduces the nullification operator as a general method for restoring coherence in a finite base of constraints that contains explicit contradictions. The operator removes the smallest and least important set of elements required to eliminate inconsistency, where importance is defined by a priority structure called Constraint Tiebreaking Logic (CTL). Rather than modifying inference rules, the operator acts on the premise base before inference takes place. As a result, classical reasoning is recovered on the coherent remainder of the original base. The paper defines the operator formally, proves its soundness, completeness and minimality, and shows that it can be iterated until reaching a fixpoint. In the finite case, the fixpoint corresponds to a maximal coherent subset of the original base selected according to CTL. The approach integrates ideas from belief revision, constraint satisfaction and minimal diagnosis, while maintaining classical logic as the inference engine. The philosophical interpretation of the operator is grounded in the Theory of Non-Knowledge, which treats contradiction as a sign of representational saturation rather than failure, and coherence as a finite operational structure. Under this view, knowledge is not an absolute totality, but a minimal unit stabilized by intervention. The method provides a constructive model for acting under contradiction, offering a formal science of stability without assuming the existence of holistic knowledge.

Spoken English operates under pressures of speed, cognitive economy, and social negotiation, regularly sacrificing grammatical precision in favor of coherence-based interpretation. Building on insights from pragmatics (Grice, Horn, Levinson), dialogism (Bakhtin), and epistemic coherence theories, this paper argues that linguistic simplification is not a deviation but a structural feature of natural communication. The Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK) provides the epistemic ground for this phenomenon: if justification is impossible, linguistic forms do not require justification either; they must only preserve coherence in context. To formalize this mechanism, the paper proposes the Minimal-Ambiguity Simplification (MAS) Formula, which states that speakers simplify linguistic structure until the point at which further simplification would break coherence. Through analyses of modal collapse, complementizer reduction, aspectual flattening, mood erosion, and morphological simplification, the study shows that ambiguity is acceptable when it remains coherence-preserving. The paper concludes that grammar pedagogy should shift from rule-based instruction to coherence-based instruction, teaching learners to evaluate linguistic choices by their capacity to maintain interpretive stability rather than by prescriptive correctness.

This paper examines the historical development of linguistic theory through its three traditional dimensions—semantics, syntax, and pragmatics—arguing that each represents an evolutionary step toward disambiguation that ultimately fails to achieve its goal. Drawing from classical, modern, and contemporary theorists, we demonstrate how persistent misunderstandings reveal the fundamental incompatibility between language and truth. We propose "Aletheiatics" as a fourth dimension that recognizes silence as the only authentic expression of truth, not as surrender but as acknowledgment of the inherent contradiction between speech and certainty.

The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, at the same time that represents a great contribution to a change of conception concerning the language and it’s capacities to deal with the reality and a comprehension of the external world, brings within itself a series of argumentative/conceptual problems as well, which seem that have got out of author’s control, revealing a polemic work with a strong presence in the debates about Philosophy Of Language and Ontology. The dogmatic aspect, compounding a work grounding on aphorisms, brings a reflection almost entirely subjective and internal to a new system peculiar to Wittgenstein, generating certainly many doubts about the power of it to establish a public consensus. Putting this aside, it is also convenient to notice that the author himself, when decides to deal with the definition of sensible concepts of the Philosophy, turns out entering in contradictions with his own words many times, revealing, maybe, why he had had abandoned these text’s ideas to assume a more pragmatical posture in his later works. We will see how and where some of these contradictions occur, making as well a dialog with another authors in order to have a more diverse comprehension of the terms treated.

Spoken English operates under pressures of speed, cognitive economy, and social negotiation, regularly sacrificing grammatical precision in favor of coherence-based interpretation. Building on insights from pragmatics (Grice, Horn, Levinson), dialogism (Bakhtin), and epistemic coherence theories, this paper argues that linguistic simplification is not a deviation but a structural feature of natural communication. The Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK) provides the epistemic ground for this phenomenon: if justification is impossible, linguistic forms do not require justification either; they must only preserve coherence in context. To formalize this mechanism, the paper proposes the Minimal-Ambiguity Simplification (MAS) Formula, which states that speakers simplify linguistic structure until the point at which further simplification would break coherence. Through analyses of modal collapse, complementizer reduction, aspectual flattening, mood erosion, and morphological simplification, the study shows that ambiguity is acceptable when it remains coherence-preserving. The paper concludes that grammar pedagogy should shift from rule-based instruction to coherence-based instruction, teaching learners to evaluate linguistic choices by their capacity to maintain interpretive stability rather than by prescriptive correctness.