Eunseol Lee

This paper examines the philosophical and legal foundations of the principle of free proof in criminal adjudication through a critical analysis of the theories of Jeremy Bentham, Larry Laudan, and Mirjan Damaška. While Bentham and Laudan support the broadest possible inclusion of evidence to promote truth-seeking and reduce judicial error, Damaška emphasizes the institutional, structural, and cognitive constraints that limit evidentiary reasoning. Through comparative legal and epistemological inquiry, the paper challenges the assumption that admitting more evidence necessarily advances the discovery of truth. It argues that, although conceptually aligned with truth-seeking, the free use of evidence is constrained in practice by human biases, procedural safeguards, and epistemic limitations. The study advocates a shift from the uncritical expansion of admissible evidence toward a standard of justified fact-finding—where factual conclusions are rationally and legally grounded within a procedurally legitimate framework. Ultimately, the paper calls for a reorientation of evidentiary theory that integrates epistemic justification with institutional design, ensuring both fairness and the responsible approximation of truth in criminal trials.