•  42
    Affect-biased attention and predictive processing
    with Madeleine Ransom, Sina Fazelpour, Jelena Markovic, James Kryklywy, and Rebecca M. Todd
    Cognition 203 104370. 2020.
    In this paper we argue that predictive processing (PP) theory cannot account for the phenomenon of affect-biased attention prioritized attention to stimuli that are affectively salient because of their associations with reward or punishment. Specifically, the PP hypothesis that selective attention can be analyzed in terms of the optimization of precision expectations cannot accommodate affect-biased attention; affectively salient stimuli can capture our attention even when precision expectations…Read more
  •  3
    From Protest to Survival: The Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures
    Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 6 (2). 1987.
  •  7
    This paper is a response to Christian Coseru, ‘The Middle Way to Reality: On Why I Am Not a Buddhist and Other Philosophical Curiosities.’ I address Coseru’s critical comments about naturalism, evolutionary psychology, scientific realism, and Madhyamaka philosophy. I argue that scientific naturalism is not the right framework for relating Buddhism to science; rather, the proper framework is the ethics of knowledge. I argue that Coseru’s defence of evolutionary psychology is unconvincing and rest…Read more
  •  64
    Obituary
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4): 220-222. 2021.
  •  7
    This symposium devoted to Christian Coseru's book, Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy, stems from an invited 'Author Meets Critics' session that I organized and chaired at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, which was held in Vancouver, 1-5 April 2015. Coseru began the session with a précis of his book; this was followed by critical commentaries from Laura Guerrero, Matt MacKenzie, and Anand Ja…Read more
  •  12
    Jonardon Ganeri’s Transcultural Philosophy of Attention
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2): 489-494. 2020.
  •  56
    Living Ways of Sense Making
    Philosophy Today 55 (Supplement): 114-123. 2011.
    Evan Thompson’s paper has four parts. First, he says more about what he means when he asks, “what is living?” Second, he presents his way of answering this question, which is that living is sense-making in precarious conditions. Third, he responds to Welton’s considerations about what he calls the “affective entrainment” of the living being by the environment. Finally, he addresses Protevi’s remarks about panpsychism
  •  20
    Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science
    with Adrian Palacios and Francisco J. Varela
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1): 1-26. 1992.
  •  188
    In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to the…Read more
  •  3
    Why I Am Not a Buddhist
    Yale University Press. 2020.
    _A provocative essay challenging the idea of Buddhist exceptionalism, from one of the world’s most widely respected philosophers and writers on Buddhism and science_ Buddhism has become a uniquely favored religion in our modern age. A burgeoning number of books extol the scientifically proven benefits of meditation and mindfulness for everything ranging from business to romance. There are conferences, courses, and celebrities promoting the notion that Buddhism is spirituality for the rational, c…Read more
  •  29
    Mind-Wandering as a Scientific Concept: Cutting through the Definitional Haze
    with Kalina Christoff, Caitlin Mills, Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna, Zachary C. Irving, Kieran C. R. Fox, and Julia W. Y. Kam
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (11): 957-959. 2018.
  •  30
    This paper critically examines Jay Garfield’s accounts of the self, consciousness, and phenomenology in his book, Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. I argue that Garfield’s views on these topics are shaped, in problematic ways, by views he takes over from Wilfrid Sellars and applies to Buddhist philosophy.
  •  10
    Color vision: A case study in the Foundations of Cognitive Science
    with Francisco J. Varela
    Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 129-138. 1990.
  •  36
  •  36
    Does Consciousness Disappear in Dreamless Sleep?
    with Jennifer M. Windt and Tore Nielsen
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (12): 871-882. 2016.
  •  18
    Enaction Without Hagiography (review)
    Constructivist Foundations 13 (1): 41-44. 2017.
    Vörös and Bitbol provide a helpful account of the depths of enaction but their hagiographic rhetoric and neglect of important historical facts and recent developments work at cross-purposes to their account.
  •  55
    Problem umysł-ciało-ciało
    with Robert Hanna
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T). 2012.
    Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson offer a solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem. The solution, in a nutshell, is that the living and lived body is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one’s consciousness, on the one hand, and one’s corporeal being, on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one’s lived body. One’s living and lived body can be equated with one’s being as an animal; therefore, this solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem amounts to an “animalist” version of the…Read more
  •  34
    Umysł w życiu. Streszczenie „Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind”
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (T): 83-95. 2011.
    [Précis of Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind] The theme of this book is the deep continuity of life and mind. Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the formal or organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life.
  •  303
    The Philosophy of Mind Wandering
    In Fox Kieran & Christoff Kalina (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought and Creativity, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for…Read more
  • Empathy and consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7): 1-32. 2001.
    This article makes five main points. Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, understood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. Empathy is the precondition of the science of consciousness. Human empathy is inherently developmental: open to it are pathways to non-egocentric or self-transcendent modes of intersubjectivity…Read more
  • Précis of Mind in Life
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6): 10-22. 2011.
    The theme of this book is the deep continuity of life and mind. Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the formal or organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. I take a twofold approach to these ideas in Mind in Life. On the one hand, I try to show that to be a living organism is physically to realize or instantiat…Read more
  • Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?
    with A. Noe
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 3-28. 2004.
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness. A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive. No longer need one spend…Read more
  • The Mind-Body-Body Problem
    with Robert Hanna
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T): 23-42. 2012.
    Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson offer a solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem. The solution, in a nutshell, is that the living and lived body is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one’s consciousness, on the one hand, and one’s corporeal being, on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one’s lived body. One’s living and lived body can be equated with one’s being as an animal; therefore, this solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem amounts to an “animalist” version of the…Read more
  • In this thesis, I show how decisions about the ontology of colour depend upon the empirical and conceptual relations among levels of explanation for vision. In Chapter 1, I show how the "received" Lockean view of colour is linked to Newton's theory of light and colour. In Chapter 2, I review extensively recent biological, psychophysical, and computational models of colour vision, and I discuss their relations. I also show how the ontological status of colour is linked to these levels of explanat…Read more
  •  2
    Philosophical theories of consciousness: Asian perspectives
    with George Dreyfus
    In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
  •  20