Eve A. Isham

Past studies have shown that the perceived time of actions is retrospectively influenced by post-action events. The current study examined whether rewarding performance feedback altered the reported time of action. In Experiment 1, participants performed a speeded button press task and received monetary reward for a presumed “fast,” or a monetary punishment for a presumed “slow” response. Rewarded trials resulted in the false perception that the response action occurred earlier than punished trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, the need for a speeded response and reward were independently manipulated in order to decouple the cognitive and reward components in the feedback signal. When tested independently, neither variable affected the judged time of action. We conclude that meaningful feedback is only used when made salient by reward, to modulate the judged time of an action

A seminal experiment found that the reported time of a decision to perform a simple action was at least 300 ms after the onset of brain activity that normally preceded the action. In Experiment 1, we presented deceptive feedback (an auditory beep) 5 to 60 ms after the action to signify a movement time later than the actual movement. The reported time of decision moved forward in time linearly with the delay in feedback, and came after the muscular initiation of the response at all but the 5-ms delay. In Experiment 2, participants viewed their hand with and without a 120-ms video delay, and gave a time of decision 44 ms later with than without the delay. We conclude that participants' report of their decision time is largely inferred from the apparent time of response. The perception of a hypothetical brain event prior to the response could have, at most, a small influence.

Previous work suggested the association between intentionality and the reported time of action was exclusive, with intentionality as the primary facilitator to the mental time compression between the reported time of action and its effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In three experiments, we examined whether mental time compression could also be observed in an unintended action. Participants performed an externally cued key press task that elicited one of two possible tones. The reported time of action shifted closer to the tone when the tone was used to indicate the winner of a race (Exp.2) compared to when the tone was meaningless and did not indicate winning (Exp.1). This suggests that reported time of an unintended action could shift toward the effect in some contexts. Furthermore, the results from Exp.2 and Exp.3 (tones were substituted with verbal feedback) showed that a presumed winning action was judged to occur earlier whereas a presumed losing action was judged to be later. These findings therefore support the view that the reported time of action is reconstructed from known temporal information rather than determined by intentionality.

Authorship of a painting affects the evaluation of the artwork. In particular, prestigious authorship predicts an evaluation bias in favor of eminent artists. In the recent years, however, the art appreciation movement has focused attention on youth art. This reverse prestige bias effect raises a number of concerns about the virtue of art and the art evaluation bias. In this study, we asked what specific aspects of children's artworks contribute to the accentuated aesthetic response. Recent theories suggest that the final evaluation of aesthetics is emotionally driven. We proposed that youth authorship would elicit a stronger positive emotional response from the viewers than prestige authorship. In 4 experiments, we examined the effects of prestigious authorship and emotional authorship on aesthetic, creativity, and proficiency evaluations. Experiment 1 was a survey of expected qualities of artworks by artists of various backgrounds (e.g., famous artists, youth, or athletes). The results served as baselines for discussion in subsequent experiments. In Experiment 2, participants judged artworks presumably produced by famous artists or children. We predicted higher ratings for youth. In Experiment 3, participants judged artworks presumably produced by famous artists or athletes. Assuming that athletes do not receive the same compassion as children, we predicted the ratings to be higher for the famous artists. To emphasize the role of compassion, participants in Experiment 4 judged artworks presumably produced by privileged or underprivileged youth artists. Inconsistent with the emotional hypothesis, artistic preference was equal in these two groups. Alternative explanations are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)