Evie Filea

The aims of this paper are twofold. First, we draw attention to the contributions that Catharine Trotter Cockburn and her niece Anne Hepburn Arbuthnot made to Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and argue on these grounds that they should be acknowledged as Scottish philosophers. Second, we highlight how Cockburn and Arbuthnot, who, like other women of their day, were excluded from attending universities created spaces for learning outside institutional settings. Cockburn’s parents and husband were Scottish and she lived in Scotland from 1726 until sometime between 1738 and 1740. Arbuthnot lived in Scotland for her entire life. Cockburn prepared her Remarks upon some Writers during the years that she spent in Scotland. We argue that her moral views share sufficient common ground with other Scottish writings that her Remarks upon some Writers deserves to be recognized as contributing to the moral debates in Scotland and beyond. The only extant writings by Arbuthnot that we are aware of are her correspondence with Cockburn and with the Scottish philosopher James Beattie. Based on a close analysis of Cockburn’s and Arbuthnot’s correspondence, we show that both women had detailed familiarity with the philosophical debates of their day. Furthermore, we highlight Arbuthnot’s own independent philosophical thinking.

Drama education has demonstrated its potential to enrich teaching across disciplines, yet its application in philosophy education remains largely unexplored. This article aims to highlight the unique advantages of drama in fostering reflection and deep engagement, particularly through the use of fictional contexts that emphasize human interconnectedness within complex relationships. A comparison with more conservative methodologies like Philosophy for Children (P4C) underscores the more radical and vivid nature of drama education. Additionally, I explore the philosophical underpinnings of this practice, drawing on European philosophical perspectives, notably Heidegger's notion of situatedness. Finally, I delve into the details of theoretical dispute within drama education circles regarding the role of conventions and uninterrupted action as reflective practices. This debate, initiated by Edward Bond's critique of Brecht, resonates with Heidegger's critique of traditional philosophical traditions. I conclude that this discussion brings fundamental questions about experience, understanding, and cognition to the forefront, while also inspiring new ways of understanding the dramatic form.

In this paper I explore some common themes as well as some key differences between Heidegger’s account of temporality in Being and Time and mindfulness’ approach to temporality and time experience. Both views seem to share the same starting point, observing that in daily life we get caught up in different pragmatic projects or rushing through activities always attending to something, expecting something to happen in the future, or reckoning something that appened in the past. Such perception of temporality, as an infinite sequence of ‘nows’ or as a time-forsomething, is considered by both accounts to be distracting us from getting in contact with our unique and whole self. For both Mindfulness theorists and Heidegger, primordial temporality, the only authentic time, is timeless and cannot be accessed when one is caught up in everyday activities. Both accounts put a lot of emphasis on the conditions required for one to shift their common perception of time, which involves a certain form of detachment from the everyday way of living one’s life to be able to see things anew. This is the main characteristic of both meditation practice and the authentic mode of resoluteness respectively. They are both described as the moments when one, perceiving and accepting things as they are in the present moment, reconnects with their true self and realises their full potential. Main requirements to achieve such a phenomenological shift, is for one to acknowledge their past as an ineradicable part of their present life, and to adopt a certain orientation towards their own lived experience with is characterised by curiosity, openness and freedom from conditioned perceptions and reactions about their past and future. However, whereas in both accounts the daily perception of temporality is similarly viewed as functioning on autopilot, as daydreaming, as one being numb, asleep, or unconscious, the moment of ‘breaking free’ from it, is described radically differently. For Heidegger, the moment of detachment from the everyday, inauthentic, and irresolute way of existing, which he calls the moment of vision (Augenblick), is always linked to anxiety in the face of grasping the full complexity and depth of one’s finitude. It is seen as an almost violent event which forces Dasein to confront its own most potentiality for selfhood. This is in straight contrast to how mindfulness practitioners describe the interruption from this infinite dealing with things in our environment which typically abord us. Mindfulness practitioners suggest that this phenomenological shift happens through residing in stillness and when shifting our attention to an eternal present. This moment is associated with peacefulness, and calmness, in opposition to the preoccupation by our daily encountering with the world which for mindfulness practitioners is seen as an always stressful and overwhelming experience.