Eyo Ewara

ABSTRACT: This paper draws on Michel Foucault’s work to offer a critique of how two problems – COVID 19 and the racism that gave rise to the 2020 racial uprisings – were conjoined under one language of disease and, consequently, one model of disease management. Drawing on Foucault’s account of apparatuses [ dispositifs ] of security, it argues that the conjunction of COVID and racism tacitly invokes what I call a model of inoculation, wherein the goal is to nullify and normalize a threat. Invoking this inoculation model by analogizing COVID and racism tacitly oriented understandings of both what the problem around the racial uprisings was and how it ought to be solved. I argue that this analogy mobilized anti-racist practices toward stabilizing reforms over potentially more thoroughgoing societal changes.

ABSTRACT This article offers a philosophical exploration of, and critical engagement with, the antiracist slogan “I understand that I will never understand. However, I stand.” Drawing on Charles Mills’s discussions of white ignorance and Édouard Glissant’s conception of the “right to opacity,” it first offers several interpretations and philosophical reconstructions of the claim that white allies “understand that they will never understand,” reading this as potentially articulating either an epistemic failure or a kind of ethical self-limitation. It then draws on the work of Saidiya Hartman to offer a caution about the affirmation and naturalization of this delimited understanding as its ambiguity threatens to reinvoke and re-entrench certain racist conceptions already present within an antiblack context.

This reading of Chiara Bottici's Anarchafeminism asks whether, as an extension of Bottici's project, we need an anarchafeminist account of agon. It explores whether her monist ontology – despite its roots in Spinoza’s Ethics – underemphasizes the question of the need for an anarchafeminist ethics that would help us to explain, interpret, and mediate conflict. Despite the claim that we cannot assume a pre-existent blueprint for anarchafeminist struggle, this piece wonders if Bottici’s commitments to the unity of life and freedom require an account of how to understand, evaluate, and respond to the – at least seeming – conflicts between what she calls "transindividuals" and, further, between different iterations of feminism. It argues that an account of a unified substance with a plurality of different individuations in process requires an explanation of how conflicting and contrasting individuals and processes can all – simultaneously – be free. To that end, it asks: First, how do we normatively differentiate between oppressive individuals and relations and oppressed ones? Second, how do we mediate between conflicting processes particularly as these involve potentially mutually antagonistic definitions of “woman?”

This paper explores the selective uptake of Martin Heidegger’s work in critical philosophy of race and in black studies. While scholars have drawn from Heidegger’s thinking on technology to offer accounts of the technological production of race in general and of blackness in particular, few have engaged with Heidegger’s response to technology: his discussions of Gelassenheit or “releasement.” This paper analyzes this avoidance of Gelassenheit, arguing that its interpretation as passivity points to broader anxieties about the need to act that are symptomatic of Heidegger’s account of technology itself. These anxieties lead to a potentially damaging tacit prioritization of action at the expense of thought, and a reduction of black people to their value as actors or workers, even among thinkers like Saidiya Hartman who valorize a resistant waywardness.

This chapter explores the relationships between subjection, abjection, and race in Judith Butler's work. That the practices and processes of subjection are central in Butler's thinking is hardly in question. From her early work on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in Subjects of Desire (1987) through her thinking in Gender Trouble ([1990] 1999), Bodies That Matter ([1993] 2011), The Psychic Life of Power (1997), and Undoing Gender (2004d), Butler has explored the performative and psychic production of gendered subjects. In her work on precarity and precariousness in texts like Precarious Life (2004c), Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), Frames of War (2009), and Dispossession (2013), she theorized how the subject is inextricably caught up in, and becomes a subject through, the very relations with others that can – at times – undo it. Indeed, the title of the collection of her essays published in 2015b, Senses of the Subject, points to how Butler's thinking has returned again and again to the question of how subjects are formed and in what senses. One of those senses of subjection that appears regularly in Butler's thought is one wherein subjects are constituted by, and work to maintain their coherence through, practices of abjection. Abjection is the splitting off and repelling of some part of the self that cannot then be acknowledged, accepted, or touched without bringing that self's constitution as subject into question. Subjection here relies on the production of an always threatening realm of a potentially destabilizing abject.

This paper explores Saidiya Hartman's undertheorized account of 'redress' in conversation with the extensive uptake of her work on Black fungibility, subjection, and critiques of emancipation. Although Hartman uses the term in nearly all of her writing, little work has been done to clarify how Hartman conceptualizes redress as a response to the constitution of Black lives as abstract, exchangeable, and disposable. This paper offers an account of how Hartman theorizes redress, showing how it both resists, and acts as a mechanism for, the constitution of Blackness as fungible. Consequently, I argue that Hartman's readers fundamentally skew her thinking in divorcing redress from her other key concepts.

This paper describes the stakes of ongoing conversations in areas of queer theory and black studies on the epistemological, ethical, and political role of unintelligibility. In line with longstanding philosophical questions about the value of aporia as gap or absence in our understanding, thinkers like Lee Edelman and Frank Wilderson III have articulated how black and queer people have regularly fallen into spaces of unintelligibility as they have run against given formations of the social world. These thinkers have theorized what this unintelligibility – what they will call this queerness or blackness – is other than an impetus for integration. The paper describes the dichotomy between two key positions in this conversation, resistance and refusal, suggesting these positions offer challenges better addressed through a conception of estrangement.

While race and racism have never stopped being urgent issues for many communities of color, talk about race, racism, and racial justice have once again become a central part of mainstream social and political discourse in America. But while critical phenomenologists have offered many accounts of what it is like to live in a world shaped by racism—particularly in terms of embodiment—they have not drawn attention to questions about what it is like to live in a world increasingly shaped by anti-racist sentiment and action, the kind of world in which the question of critical phenomenology’s contribution to projects of racial justice can itself arise. In this paper, I argue that one avenue to approach the silence in critical phenomenology around the experiences and habits of anti-racism as they circulate in our discourse is to draw attention to how critical phenomenology, as it turns to questions of race, tends to turn away from explorations of language. Interrogating how critical phenomenologists approaching racial issues have managed to escape explicitly thematizing language, I argue that this occlusion of language by critical phenomenology consequently leaves behind resources through which to ask ourselves what is happening as we articulate increasingly taken-for-granted ways of speaking and living out an opposition to racism.

This article approaches Judith Butler as herself a theorist of race and racism by exploring her unacknowledged and often problematic reading of Frantz Fanon and his concept of the historico-racial schema. It first traces Butler's uses of Fanon's thinking across her work, outlining the different ways that she draws on Fanon in theorizing race and racism. The article then shows how that theorizing stems from Butler's reading of the historico-racial schema, focusing on her insertion of words that do not appear in either the translation she cites or in the original French text into a key quotation. This article argues that this systematic misreading of the historico-racial schema in Black Skin, White Masks problematically restricts Butler's understanding of the lasting effects and ethical consequences of racism and colonialism as they appear in her readings of that text and of The Wretched of the Earth.