Ezekiel Vergara

Sovereigns sometimes borrow money from creditors. To demonstrate their creditworthiness, private credit rating agencies assess sovereigns and provide them with sovereign credit ratings. While the ethical issues associated with the credit scoring of individuals have received considerable attention, the ethical dimensions of sovereign credit ratings are underexplored. I argue that the current way in which sovereign credit ratings are calculated, which does not use opaque algorithms, is objectionable. This is because of concerns associated with opacity. The credit-rating process is opaque to actors on the outside, while in-principle transparent to credit rating agencies. Furthermore, some economists have proposed that opaque machine learning techniques should be used to calculate sovereign credit ratings. I argue that such a proposal gives rise to independent concerns about opacity. If such algorithms are used, the credit-rating process is opaque to actors on the outside and to the credit rating agencies employing them.

In this paper, I consider Marxist arguments for, and against, race-based reparations. I contend that Marxists have moral and epistemic reasons to support race-based reparations. Nevertheless, I suggest that they also have reasons to be cautious of race-based reparations. I offer a framework with which to consider these arguments. This framework makes sense of two important features that are relevant for Marxist reparations: interpretive disagreements within Marxist scholarship and different empirical circumstances. I explain why these reasons for, and against, race-based reparations matter for Marxists, and I consider how they might be weighed against each other.

Is it morally permissible for states to impose economic sanctions on states that continue to emit greenhouse gases, contributing to climate change? In this paper, I argue that we have reason to believe that imposing such economic sanctions is pro tanto morally permissible. Such economic sanctions can satisfy two moral constraints that are necessary for economic sanctions to be morally permissible: They can satisfy the just cause constraint and the proportionality constraint. Given that economic sanctions can satisfy these two constraints, I argue that they can be pro tanto morally permissible. However, I contend that these economic sanctions must be sensitive to three other considerations. These considerations – our views about causation, our views about what emissions are morally permissible, and our views about climate justice more generally – affect whether economic sanctions are morally permissible in the face of climate change.

How does one’s racialized experience affect whether a person persists over time? Several philosophers have explored this question with respect to numerical personal identity. However, Derek Parfit famously objected to the focus on personal identity, instead arguing that Relation-R mattered for continued existence. If Parfit was correct, then how does one’s racialized experience affect Relation-R? In this paper, I contend that one’s racialized experience can affect the extent to which one persists over time. I consider three cases—those involving changes to one’s racial identity, those involving changes to how one is racialized, and those involving a mismatch between one’s racial identity and how one is racialized—in which one’s racialized experience affects the extent to which one persists. I then consider various objections to my view.

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls sets out his normative conception of global justice. The book remains a foundational text for scholars in the field. In recent years, however, new issues have arisen in the global justice literature, which Rawls did not consider. Moreover, his view has been rejected by many. So, as we move forward, does Rawls’ The Law of Peoples deserve to retain this foundational status? I argue that we have two weighty reasons to afford it this status. As we consider the future directions of global justice, we should do so by returning to The Law of Peoples.