Ezekiel Vergara

Is it morally permissible for states to impose economic sanctions on states that continue to emit greenhouse gases, contributing to climate change? In this paper, I argue that we have reason to believe that imposing such economic sanctions is pro tanto morally permissible. Such economic sanctions can satisfy two moral constraints that are necessary for economic sanctions to be morally permissible: They can satisfy the just cause constraint and the proportionality constraint. Given that economic sanctions can satisfy these two constraints, I argue that they can be pro tanto morally permissible. However, I contend that these economic sanctions must be sensitive to three other considerations. These considerations – our views about causation, our views about what emissions are morally permissible, and our views about climate justice more generally – affect whether economic sanctions are morally permissible in the face of climate change.

How does one’s racialized experience affect whether a person persists over time? Several philosophers have explored this question with respect to numerical personal identity. However, Derek Parfit famously objected to the focus on personal identity, instead arguing that Relation-R mattered for continued existence. If Parfit was correct, then how does one’s racialized experience affect Relation-R? In this paper, I contend that one’s racialized experience can affect the extent to which one persists over time. I consider three cases—those involving changes to one’s racial identity, those involving changes to how one is racialized, and those involving a mismatch between one’s racial identity and how one is racialized—in which one’s racialized experience affects the extent to which one persists. I then consider various objections to my view.

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls sets out his normative conception of global justice. The book remains a foundational text for scholars in the field. In recent years, however, new issues have arisen in the global justice literature, which Rawls did not consider. Moreover, his view has been rejected by many. So, as we move forward, does Rawls’ The Law of Peoples deserve to retain this foundational status? I argue that we have two weighty reasons to afford it this status. As we consider the future directions of global justice, we should do so by returning to The Law of Peoples.